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GDR-Soviet Troop Exercise Ends 29 July

27 July Activities

AU2907141088 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 28 Jul 88 p 2

[Text] Potsdam—The exercises of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army were continued in the Brandenburg, Luckenwalde, Eisenhuettenstadt, Peitz, Jessen, and Moeckern area on Wednesday [27 July]. This fourth day of the exercises was marked by typical defense activities. The participating troops and staffs improved the state of field training and their common action.

Major General Stanislav Rumyantsev, deputy director of the exercises, explained the situation to observers from 20 CSCE states: In the early morning hours the dogged resistance of the "orange" side forced the attacker to start fortifying the section reached. Continuing its attack, the "blue" side brought up a motorized infantry division which at this point ended the phase of concentration in the starting area. The defenders were set the task of not permitting the "blues" to advance any further, and to restore the original situation by launching a counteroffensive.

The foreign observers, who had an opportunity to follow the activities for the first time during these exercises, visited positions and supply points of Soviet regiments at the Altengrabow and Heidehof troop exercise areas. In the Great Patriotic War, the units helped to smash fascism, took part in the battle of Kursk 45 years ago, and were among the liberators of Berlin.

At the command post and at the military gear depot of Major Sergey Kuznetsov's battalion, numerous talks were held with the 40 representatives from the CSCE signatory states. The major said that his men and the soldiers of the National People's Army who are operating in the neighborhood have jointly prepared for the culminating point of the training. Together, they have achieved good training results so far—wholly in the sense of the regiment's Komsomol meeting which called upon soldiers to demonstrate their abilities in the reliable protection of peace and socialism.

The unit of the rear services, which is led by Captain Ilyin, demonstrated its skills by simultaneously refuelling the infantry tanks, tanks, and armored personnel carriers of three field companies in a short time. In the guards regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Makadseyev, the observers acquainted themselves with preparations for warding off an expected attack by the "blues."

Last Day of Exercise

LD2907213688 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1759 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Potsdam, 29 Jul (ADN)—The joint exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and the GDR NVA came to an end today with dynamic fighting. In the Brandenburg, Luckenwalde, Eisenhuetenstadt, Peitz, Jessen, and Mockern area the defenders repulsed forces of the "blue" side which had broken through and restored the initial position after a counterattack.

By means of precisely coordinated deployment, motorized infantry, tank troops, artillerymen, pioneers, communications specialists, fighter pilots, and helicopter forces once again demonstrated their military expertise on the final day of combat.

At the Heidehof troop exercise grounds representatives of 20 signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act closely followed events, as on previous days. They used binoculars and documents for the observers. They made good use of the possibilities provided by the stipulations of the Stockholm document to utilize cameras and dictation machines in their activity.

In accordance with a request from observers, Colonel Nikolay Gusev, commander of a tank unit, answered questions about the exercise under his command. Before the eyes of the foreign guests, artillerymen from the Sherlizin unit demonstrated a change of location by their battery. In a short time they moved forward with their self-propelled guns and reported a renewed readiness to fire.

At the end of the training climax for Soviet soldiers and members of the NVA, Major General Stanislav Rumyantsev, deputy leader of the exercise, told journalists about his respect for the performance of the participants. The objective of the exercise had been to train elements of the defense force in accordance with the military doctrine of the participant states of the Warsaw Pact. The troops and staffs of the fraternal armies had shown a high level of training under field conditions, resolution, and steadfastness in defense, and positive action in counterattacks. At the same time, friendship between the fraternal armies had deepened. In the future also, such exercises would be necessary to ensure that the united forces could cope jointly with the responsibility of defending peace and socialism.

In the afternoon, representatives of the CSCE states at the Werder railway station observed the entrainment of the first units for transporting back to their bases. Thus, the number of participants in the exercise remained under the agreed threshold in the Stockholm document document for the presence of exercise observers.

In the name of the GDR Government and on behalf of National Defense Minister Army Gen Heinz Kessler, the observers were bidden farewell in the evening in Potsdam by Lieutenant General Guenter Leistner, deputy chief of the NVA Main Staff. He stressed that in the GDR the commitments of the Stockholm document were strictly adhered to. The observers had been able to convince themselves of this during the previous days. The possibility to observe was assessed by him as proof that encouraging steps had been taken in the process of building trust and that further joint efforts were required.

Greece's Papoulias Meets Malile in Sarande

AU3107132888 Tirana ATA in English 0745 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Text] Tirana, July 31 (ATA)—On July 30, the minister of foreign affairs of the PSR of Albania, Reis Malile, met with the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Greece, Karolos Papoulias, who arrived in Sarande for a short informal visit.

On this occasion it was discussed on the development of the existing friendly relations between the two countries as well as on their further development. Likewise there were exchanged opinions on the situation in our region and matters that have to do with the Balkan cooperation.

The meeting passed in a friendly atmosphere.

On July 30, too, Karolos Papoulias left Albania.

Alia Receives Swiss Parliamentary Delegation

AU2807172588 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1600 GMT 28 Jul 88

[Text] This morning Comrade Ramiz Alia, AWP Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, received at the Palace of Brigades the Swiss parliamentary delegation led by Rodolph Raischling, chairman of the National Council of the Swiss Confederation, and Franco Massoni, chairman of the States' Council. The reception was also attended by Rita Marko, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; and Petro Dode, chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly. Jean-Marc Sauvant, general secretary of the Federal Assembly, and Pierre-Yves Simonin, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Swiss Confederation to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, were also present.

Comrade Ramiz Alia bid the guests welcome. Rodolph Reichling thanked Comrade Alia for the meeting and for the invitation to the Swiss parliamentary delegation to visit Albania for the first time. He stated that the delegation had the opportunity to witness the progress made by Albania. Its achievements, he stated, are considerable, particularly as regards ensuring the food supply of the population and the country's development relying on its own resources, these being major factors in preserving and strengthening national independence. He went on to express the belief that Albania will surely progress even further in future and that the well-being of the people will be further raised.

Comrade Ramiz Alia stated that very good relations exist between Albania and Switzerland, regardless of the different social systems of the two countries. There are numerous things in common between our two countries, he stated. Like the Albanian people, the Swiss people are industrious and love the freedom and independence of their country. Comrade Ramiz Alia pointed out that possibilities exist to further develop the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the fields of trade, technology, science, and culture. Your delegation's visit to our country, as well as the visit that a delegation of the Presidency of the People's Assembly will make in Switzerland, he stated, will contribute to the strengthening of these relations.

Rodolph Raischling and Franco Massoni expressed their great appreciation for the special solicitude of the Albanian people and government in preserving the country's best traditions and the treasures of their national culture, which strengthen the sentiments of patriotism. They also stressed their wishes for the further development of the friendly relations between the two countries.

After talking to the Swiss guests about the struggle and efforts of our people for a free and happy life, and about the achievements in various fields like industry, agriculture, education, and culture, Comrade Ramiz Alia also stressed that our foreign policy corresponds with the interests of the people and of the country. Albania is pursuing a policy of good-neighborliness with all countries in the region, in the interest of its freedom and independence, and in the interest of peace and security in the Balkans, in Europe, and beyond.

The reception took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Delegation Departs 28 July

AU2807184588 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1800 GMT 28 Jul 88

[Text] The Swiss parliamentary delegation led by Rodolph Raischling, chairman of the National Council of the Swiss Confederation, and Franco Massoni, chairman of the States' Council, left Albania today. The Swiss guests were seen off at Rinas Airport by Petro Dode, chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; Sihat Tozaj, secretary of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; Rahman Hanku, member of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; deputies, and other comrades. Pierre-Yves Simon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Swiss Federation to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, was also present.

This morning, the Swiss parliamentary delegation visited the museum house where the Albanian Communist Party, now the AWP, was formed, and the Tirana Archaeological Museum.

'Mass Action' To Boost Exports Called For

AU2707094088 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 22 Jul 88 p 1

[Editorial: "Increasing Exports—An Important National Mass Action"]

[Excerpt] Our party, led by the teachings of Comrade Enver Hoxha, has always considered the expansion and constant increase of exports as one of the most important factors for the development and progress of the country, relying on our own resources, for increasing the people's prosperity, and strengthening the defense of the homeland. "If we export," Comrade Ramiz Alia has stressed, "we will create opportunities to develop productive forces and to make technical progress in the production rates we are planning. However, if we narrow down our opportunities to export, we also restrict the opportunities for this development, and create the danger of distortions in the economy and stagnation in technology."

The deep political meaning and practical implementation of this important lesson is now assuming particular importance. The great program of national socioeconomic development according to the Ninth AWP Congress directives includes important goals in increasing and intensifying production in all sectors, and for the progress of culture and science. Alongside this, work is being carried out to build many new projects and plants. Further increasing the prosperity of the working masses in the towns and the countryside relies upon these brisk and complex developments.

The economy's needs and opportunities have always required that achieving these above-mentioned goals requires machinery and various kinds of equipment and primary raw materials to be imported from abroad. This of course requires foreign currency funds that are obtained from exports. "No imports without exports." Guided by this principle, we have achieved a positive balance of foreign currency payments that must be strengthened. As the party teaches us, let us not forget that our achievements have been attained under difficult circumstances, under the constant pressure of the imperialist-revisionist siege and blockade, and when our state is meeting a range of financial obligations for basic articles for consumption by the people and for measures of a social and cultural nature in the towns and the countryside that arise from the increased prices of imports as a result of the crisis in the capitalist world.

For all the above reasons, the party demands that increasing exports must be conceived and carried out as a great national mass action. The problem must be properly understood, first of all, by party organizations, and, under their leadership, by all their instruments, state and economic bodies, and mass organizations. [passage omitted]

Districts Report Wheat Harvest, Other Results

AU3007151088 [Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian of 23 July publishes on page one the 1,000-word text of a letter addressed to Ramiz Alia, AWP Central Committee first secretary, by the Tropoje District AWP Committee plenum, informing him that the wheat production plan had been overfulfilled by 13 percent or 4,000 quintals over and above the target. Compared with the previous year, the harvest yielded 14,500 more quintals of wheat. The average yield for the district as a whole was 27 quintals per hectare, compared with a planned 23.8 quintals per hectare. In addition, the general industrial production plan for the 6-month period was fulfilled at 102.8 percent; the export plan was fulfilled at 109 percent; financial accumulation was fulfilled at 107 percent, and the budget income was exceeded by 570,000 leks.

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT of 24 July also publishes on pages one and two a 900-word letter addressed to Ramiz Alia by the Kukes District AWP Committee, informing him that the wheat production plan was fulfilled at 115 percent, exceeding the planned target by 14,000 quintals. An average yield of 26 quintals per hectare was achieved, compared with a planned average yield of 23.6 quintals; the delivery plan was fulfilled at 101 percent. In addition, the 6-month plan was fulfilled at 103 percent, with an excess production of 4.8 million leks, while the export plan was fulfilled at 105.6 percent. The state budget income plan was fulfilled at 102.3 percent.

The same paper also publishes on pages one and two a 600-word letter to Alia from the AWP aktiv of the "Enver Hoxha" State Agricultural Enterprise of Plase, in Korce District, informing him that the enterprise had achieved the highest wheat yield ever, at 66.2 quintals per hectare over a total acreage of 820 hectares, producing 1,400 quintals of wheat over and above the plan.

National Assembly Session Adopts Draft Laws
AU2907105188 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] The eighth session of the Ninth National Assembly ended about an hour ago. Here is reporter Tsveti Gerov's account of the work of the session:

[Begin Gerov recording] In the official box at today's session were Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the State Council; Petur Tanchev, secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and first deputy chairman of the State Council; Georgi Atanasov, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and party and state leaders.

The draft law on international trade arbitration was put to a second vote. The viewpoint of the Legislative Commission was given on the views and proposals expressed during the debate. The draft law was then adopted unanimously, thus acquiring the force of law. The document regulates the procedure and methods for trade and economic cooperation between Bulgarian and foreign economic organizations and firms.

As the last item on the agenda, the draft law on the responsibility of the state for damage caused to citizens, that was adopted in principle at the first vote taken at yesterday session, was submitted for a second reading. National Assembly deputy Yaroslav Radev stated that the Legislative Commission and the leaderships of the Commission for Defense of Social Interests and Citizen's Rights and the Commission for People's Councils and Local Self-Management, after discussing the views and proposals expressed by the National Assembly deputies, (?consider) that the draft law should be adopted and should come into force on 1 January 1989. On the basis of this, an overall reorganization of the legal system in Bulgaria lies ahead. The proposers of the draft law expressed agreement with this viewpoint, and on the second vote the Law on the Responsibility of the State for Damage Caused to Citizens was adopted unanimously.

I will remind you that the law prescribes the conditions and procedures under which citizens may be compensated for damage caused by illegal acts of state organs or officials in the state apparatus. As was pointed out during the in-depth debate on the draft law at yesterday's session, the bill is a further expression of our state's policy of defending the rights and lawful interests of citizens in the conditions of the profound and comprehensive democratization of society.

The adoption of the two laws completed the business on the agenda of the eighth session of the Ninth National Assembly. [end recording]

Release of Some Party Members Called For
AU0108100588 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 30 Jul 88 p 1

[Editorial: "Communists as Leaders of Renewal"]

[Text] The BCP Central Committee plenum outlined the basic trends and tasks in restructuring intellectual life. Its decisions incorporate the main elements that are now to be implemented by the party organs and organizations. This is a consequence of the fact that the party is the generator of the ideas of this revolutionary process and the Communists are the moving force and political guarantee of renewing the scientific front and arts, and further conducting the reform in the field of education.

The broad referendum, frank consultation even on the most delicate issues of our intellectual development, and the discussion which took place at the plenum, prompted serious conclusions related to the party work in this sphere. The discussion showed where and in what cases the party organizations are losing their political image and place themselves under direct subordination to administrative leaderships and even individuals. Those are deformations which cannot be tolerated any longer. Such deformations took place in collectives in which the organizational, political, and ideological activities have been weakened, relations with the non-party members have been neglected, and the personal example of the Communists has been undermined. The result was a wild growth in shortcomings in the work with the cadres and in the style and methods of leadership, which in its turn led to the development of mediocrity and leveling, monopoly and favoritism, career ambitions, and many other phenomena which are alien to the communist principles and ideals.

The main thing now is to strengthen the party work among all units of the intelligentsia. The approach must be no other than the political one—connected with the place and role of the creators in the fields of science, culture, and education in renewing our socialist society. It is necessary first of all that the party organizations master and develop in a principled manner the new features of this approach, which spring from the profound essence of the July Concept: real people's democracy and self-management. This means that the main issues must be solved by the intellectual creators themselves, while the Communists must "assert" their authority not by coercive methods which are now unsuitable, but through most creative and bold ideas. The place of the party organizations is the front ranks of the renewal processes—they must set the tone for the new thinking, support the principles of independence, assert discussion, and encourage initiative, skills, and imagination.

However, this place in the front ranks requires that the vanguard role of the primary party organizations be strengthened daily, that the collective approach and glasnost be developed in internal party life, and that the moral prestige of the Communists be maintained at a high level. It is time itself that demands that party members who have lost the qualities of Communists be released. It is the duty of the party organs to create a businesslike atmosphere and assert themselves and the party organizations not only as partners, but whenever necessary as opponents of the organs of self-management, and of the state and public organizations. This is so because restructuring the intellectual sphere is an all-party cause, which is developing together with all other spheres of life.

The renewal assigns a highly responsible role to the party organizations and Communists in the spheres of science, culture, and education, but it also poses a supreme test. Only those who know how to activate the intellectual potential of the nation, attract the creators and direct their energy toward supporting the revolutionary changes, and indeed work for real and profound restructuring, will withstand the test of time.

Harvest Campaign Proceeding at 'Faster Pace'

AU2807113188 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 27 Jul 88 p 2

[RABOTNICHESKO DELO report: "The End of the Harvest Is in Sight"]

[Text] A comparison of the harvests of 1988 and 1987 may not be the most appropriate thing to do from a statistical point of view, but we can definitely say that the 1988 harvest is proceeding at a faster pace and within shorter deadlines. Approximately 12,000 decares of land sown with wheat is still expected to be harvested, which actually means that the end of the week coincides with the end of the harvest campaign.

Actually, the harvest ends only when the grain has been stored. This is precisely the point where despite the efficient organizational work accomplished by the "Grain Food and Fodder Production" Economic Trust, the real pace of work does not conform to the rate desired. Stoyan Ovcharov, minister of the economy and planning, who participated in today's meeting, expressed concern over the problem of not only harvesting the wheat at faster rates, but also over the problem of timely repayments of the brigades' debts to the state and paying off their natural [naturalni] loans.

So far 69 percent of the bread grain has been purchased. Notwithstanding this positive result, however, the delivery of grain in the Yambol and Shumen areas is considerably lagging. The Mlekarovo agro-industrial complex alone is still expected to deliver as much as . . . 19,000 tons of grain. The high rates of purchase countrywide—namely 150,000 tons of grain every 24 hours—have already been reduced by half.

The water reservoirs are full this year. Water supplies are adequate, thus making it possible to irrigate all irrigated areas more than three times. The new schedule is tight; nevertheless, it is being fulfilled. However, there are also opposite examples. In the Tolbukhin area, for example, only 7 percent of the corn crops for grain have been irrigated, and only 71 percent of the irrigation equipment is operating countrywide, while in the Pernik area this figure barely amounts to 15 percent. However, it is an old and confirmed truth, that only those farmers who, in their attitude toward irrigation do not distinguish between night and day, can achieve positive results.

Leaders' Public Appearances 14-22 Jul

AU2307151688 [Editorial Report] Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian in its newcasts, the Sofia press, and Sofia BTA in English during the 16-22 July monitoring period report the following public appearances of Bulgarian leaders (sourceline of each report given in parentheses):

Grisha Filipov, Yordan Yotov, Milko Balev, Ognyan Doynov, Pencho Kubadinski, Stanko Todorov, Chudomir Aleksandrov, and Grigor Stoichkov were at Sofia airport on 14 July to see off the delegation led by Todor Zhivkov that left for Warsaw to attend the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, (Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 15 Jul 88 p 1) and also welcomed the returning delegation at Sofia airport on 16 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 16 Jul 88)

The following leaders attended a reception given by Todor Zhivkov in the Boyana Residence in Sofia on 20 July for the participants in the Fourth "Banner of Peace" Children's Assembly: Georgi Atanasov, Milko Balev, Pencho Kubadinski, Petur Mladenov, Petur Tanchev, Georgi Yordanov, Petur Dyulgerov, and Dimitur Stanishev. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Jul 88) Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the State Council, made a brief speech to open a plenum of the BCP Central Committee on intellectual restructuring in Sofia on 19 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jul 88) He also spoke at the plenum on 20 July, the last day. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 20 Jul 88) In Sofia on 21 July he received Michel Robert, president of the Liberal Party of Canada. (Sofia BTA in English 1605 GMT 21 Jul 88)

Georgi Atanasov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers, received in Sofia on 21 July Juergen Warnke, FRG minister of transport. (Sofia BTA in English 1210 GMT 21 Jul 88) In Sofia on 22 July he received Pavel Fedirko, chairman of the Soviet cooperative organization Tsentrosoyuz. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 22 Jul 88)

Milko Balev, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, attended a National Day reception at the Polish Embassy in Sofia on 22 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 22 Jul 88)

Ognyan Doynov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo, attended a National Day reception at the Iraqi Embassy in Sofia on 18 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1930 GMT 18 Jul 88)

Grisha Filipov, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, opened and chaired a session of the National Assembly's Socioeconomic Development Commission, held in Sofia on 21 July to discuss production quality. (Sofia BTA in English 1141 GMT 21 Jul 88)

Petur Mladenov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and minister of foreign affairs, received in Sofia Yi In-kyu, foreign minister of the DPRK, who completed his talks on 22 July. (Sofia BTA in English 1726 GMT 22 Jul 88) Mladenov also received in Sofia on 22 July Tansug Bleda, deputy foreign minister for economic affairs of Turkey. (Sofia BTA in English 1805 GMT 22 Jul 88)

Yordan Yotov, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, delivered the introductory speech at the BCP Central Committee plenum that opened in Sofia on 19 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jul 88)

Andrey Lukanov, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and minister of foreign economic relations, also attended the National Day reception at the Iraqi Embassy in Sofia on 18 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1930 GMT 18 Jul 88) In Sofia on 22 July he signed a ferrous resources agreement with Konstantin Katushev, minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR, (Sofia BTA in English 0731 GMT 22 Jul 88) and also received Tansug Bleda, Turkish deputy foreign minister for economic affairs. (Sofia BTA in English 1805 GMT 22 Jul 88)

Petur Dyulgerov, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, attended a reception at the Hungarian Embassy in Sofia on 14 July to mark the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Bulgarian-Hungarian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid. (Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 15 Jul 88 p 2)

Georgi Yordanov, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and minister of culture, science, and education, attended the session of the Fourth International Children's "Banner of Peace" Assembly in Sofia on the morning of 19 July (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jul 88), and also attended the rally held to mark the end of the assembly at the Banner of Peace Monument in Sofia on 20 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 20 Jul 88) In Sofia on 20 July Yordanov also made a speech on the last day of the BCP Central Committee plenum. (Sofia BTA in English 1738 GMT 20 Jul 88)

Dimitur Stanishev, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, also attended the National Day reception at the Polish Embassy in Sofia on 22 July. (Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 22 Jul 88)

Dissident Jailed for Urging Reforms

AU3007202488 Paris AFP in English
1959 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Text] Prague, July 30 (AFP)—A Czech dissident has been in jail for several months for urging perestroyka-style reforms similar to those initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, a human rights group said here Saturday.

Jaroslav Popelka, 29, had distributed pamphlets accusing Czech leaders of incompetence and urging them to introduce reforms, the Committee for the Defence of Unjustly Persecuted People (VONS) said.

Mr. Popelka was first arrested in mid-April, released a month later but re-arrested in mid-June for "illegal activities" and "subversive attacks." He is being held in Brno, central Czechoslovakia.

Another Czechoslovak dissident, Miroslav Polak, 36, was expected to stand trial soon after a dispute with a policeman at Liberec, 100 kilometers (60 miles) north of here, in April, VONS added.

Mr. Polak had publicly protested against the death in prison of dissident Pavel Wonka on April 26. The human rights group said he faced up to three years in prison.

Party Bars Mother for Not Abjuring Son's Views

AU2907154688 Paris AFP in English
1541 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Prague, July 29 (AFP)—A woman has been excluded from the Czechoslovakian Communist Party for having "refused to condemn publicly her son's opinions," the underground monthly opposition journal LIDOVE NOVINY alleged.

The latest edition, published here clandestinely, said Bozena Devata was thrown out of the party because she refused to disclaim the opinions of her son Stanislav Devaty, a spokesman for the human rights group Charter 77.

Mrs. Devata, who has been a member of the Communist Party for 40 years, was expelled on June 13.

On June 7 she was also excluded from the Czechoslovakian Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, to which she had belonged since being a partisan fighter.

"Those who have contributed to my expulsion from the party and the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, and who make my old years bitter, must come to terms with their own consciences. Mine is intact," Mrs. Devata wrote in the journal.

Use of 'Pluralism' To Question System Castigated

AU2907112588 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
28 Jul 88 p 5

[Jaroslav Kojzar article: "Not Just a 'Discussion Club'"—boldface passages as published]

[Excerpts] **It came into being as though by coincidence. Spontaneously, so it was said. But was this really the case? It was as though at the beginning of 1968 the sons of the owners of Lucerna [Prague concert hall] and of film studios [reference to the playwright Vaclav Havel] and all those linked by various umbilical cords with the forces of yesterday sensed that the time was ripe to settle accounts with February 1948, with its political, social, and economic repercussions.**

It all started with playwright Vaclav Havel's article in LITERARNI LISTY. In the "Discussion Tribune" column he delivered his opinion on the subject of "opposition." In this article, the past became for him a "communist error," a period of terror and tragedy. That is why the existing system had to be changed, he claimed.

At that time his friends still spoke about "revival and the socialist social structure" and would only incidentally add that this structure should conform with a "model of two parties."

After several meetings of the followers of Havel's idea, the first 200 invited guests met in the main auditorium of the Chemical Technology College in Prague on 5 April to approve the founding of such a "second" party. For tactical reasons, to divert attention from the actual aims, they called it the Club of Committed Non-Party Members (KAN).

It is beyond any doubt that the very name of the organization, which referred to "committed non-party members," was a political fraud. The KAN's organizers were not intent on "committing non-party members" to the development of the socialist society and on enlisting them for the policy of the National Front but, quite to the contrary, on misusing citizens not affiliated to parties associated in the National Front **against the socialist political system.** It was at the same time an attempt—and this, too, must be frankly said—to take advantage of one of the weak aspects of the CPCZ's policy prior to January 1968: the not always adequate cooperation with non-party members and neglect of this cooperation, which ranks among the key principles of the policy of alliance between the party and the people. Disregard for the interests of citizens without political affiliation was bound to backfire and the organizers of the so-called KAN demagogically exploited this weakness of the political life at that time.

One question is relevant also from today's viewpoint. Let us ask it: Is there no discrepancy, no contradiction between our critical attitude toward KAN on the one hand and our proclamation of socialist pluralism on the other?

At issue is a big, crucial, and principal question of our society. We regard as subjects of socialist pluralism all forces endorsing a constructive dialogue and sincerely striving to improve the socialist society. To put it in the words of Comrade Milos Jakes, **all citizens are called upon to cooperate, because the shape of our common socialist home and how we feel in it is truly a cause of all of its honest and upright inhabitants.** On the other hand we reject the so-called KAN, an ill-famed antisocialist organization, because it sought the exact opposite—not to improve the socialist society but to weaken and "dismantle" it, to discredit and liquidate it.

It was still April 1968 when members of KAN's main preparatory committee established contact with K 231 [organization of former political prisoners], that is, with an organization which was closest to it politically. KAN's Manifesto, its Programmatic Statement, and its Statutes were being drafted at the same time. The course pursued by leading KAN officials was still outwardly loyal. In the officially adopted documents there was talk of commitment, cooperation, of KAN **not being** a political party. But....

As early as 16 April KAN's main preparatory committee slowly started to chuck aside its mask—the speeches of its members at that meeting were full of hatred for communists and the socialist system. They speak about the creation of some sort of a new National Front; about the need to support also other anticommunist forces, with a view to the formation of a possible coalition against the CPCZ; about a coordinating anticommunist center; about further steps to be taken; about the need to infiltrate the information media; and so forth. [passage omitted]

Engineer Rudolf Battek, employee of the Sociology Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and one of KAN's leading ideologists, wrote: "We are and call ourselves a political club. Let it be accepted that we are, and want to be, a club!"

However, in his article **"KAN and the Possibilities of its Further Development,"** Battek himself does not oppose the formation of a new political party. The opposite is the case. He sets himself the goal of working out an analysis of "our attitude" to **"winning and seizing power"** because, as he writes, **"by virtue of our efforts and orientation we belong to the same category of social groupings as a political party."**

This was an important statement. It was the until then most overt expression of the true aim of the political adventurers masquerading as "committed non-party members" —to seize political power, to reverse the results of the victory of February 1948, to turn the clock back to the situation as it was before 1938. [passage omitted]

In the meantime, the first KAN branches were being established. Members of the Ricany branch called for the removal of communists from the Army and the security forces. The Usti nad Labem branch of KAN began to compile information files that could be used to scandalize individual leading officials and existing political organizations. [passage omitted]

The further course of action was openly discussed at KAN meetings. One of the minutes of a session of the KAN main preparatory committee contains, under item No 8, the transcript of a speech by philosopher Svitak, the purpose of which was to press for "democratic elections." What was their idea of them? Even this issue was addressed by Svitak on several occasions.

In a speech in Ostrava, for instance, he stressed that everyone who served the incumbent regime would be excluded from the lists of candidates. [passage omitted]

In the Usti nad Labem branch and elsewhere, an instruction was even making the rounds how to gradually push communists out of their functions, including functions in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and other social organizations. [passage omitted]

Hence, the next step would have been the pushing of communists from public posts and the liquidation of socialism as a social system. [passage omitted] However, first there would have to be elections, into which, as Svitak used to stress, followers of KAN would go with a certain advantage, since they supposedly "are free of the heritage of the past 20 years, for which the Communist Party is accountable." (R. Battek)

This past therefore had to be sullied and defiled cost what it may. It was clear what would follow. The "experiment" with socialism would come to an end, because—as one of the leading KAN representatives, Slanicka, stressed at an aktiv in Pardubice—"a whole number of countries" supposedly "achieved considerable advancement without socialism."

Subsequently KAN strove to disrupt any consolidation of political and social life. At a time when the days of their organization were numbered, KAN representatives were calling on their members: "Refuse to engage in any creative activity in sectors that do not directly ensure basic vital functions! Leave your workplaces for factories, cooperatives, and state farms and become workers!" Later on they disappeared. Some of them joined their foreign patrons, others stayed in Czechoslovakia and either vanished from the horizon forever or are trying, through the so-called charter, to pocket some of the money so generously provided from abroad. However, their army dispersed a long ago and there is no one to whom to issue commands.

One final question remains: Had the real objectives of KAN been known? The entire party leadership, including Alexander Dubcek, was informed about them in several reports. On 12 August the CPCZ Central Committee's division for hierarchically structured [svodny] information, plan, and management, led by Jan Kaspar, worked out a report, which it submitted to the party Presidium. It dealt not only with KAN's objectives but also with the methods of attaining them, with Ivan Svitak's contacts with foreign organizations, with the misgivings of some district party committees, and so forth. And yet no decision was made. The resolute "Enough. Not a single step further!" could be said only after August 21.

One of the organizations that "overtly declared that their immediate aim is to take revenge for February 1948 and did not conceal their intention to establish a bourgeois democratic system and to fiercely settle accounts with communists and all upright builders of socialism" (quoted from the document "Lessons") has irreversibly vanished through the trapdoor of history, although from time to time its posthumous children make an attempt to revive their activity. The shared interest of members of the CPCZ, members of the other political parties associated in the National Front, as well as the interest of people without party affiliation in fulfilling the tasks of restructuring, their commitment to public matters, a correct political line, and the policy of openness are guarantees of a successful socialist development of our society. This is one of the important lessons, also for the present, to be drawn from the short-lived KAN.

Czech SR Should Have Own Party Organization

AU2907124088 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Jul 88 p 3

[Letter from Jan Bachan, retired miner from Ostrava, in the "Exchanging Views, Conducting Polemics" column: "Federation Principles Also in the Party?"]

[Text] It is laudable that RUDE PRAVO has been publishing articles and facts in the effort to point out various mistakes and shortcomings and to have them rectified. The restructuring and democratization of our whole society, which you also quite frequently mention, must begin in the CPCZ Central Committee. What I have in mind, is that since the establishment of the Federation we have had in the CSSR two national republics with equal rights—but only one of them has its own territorial-level, republican Communist Party. In November 1968 they at least set up a CPCZ Central Committee Bureau for the Czech lands. The small brochure about the lessons from the critical development in the party states that this was a positive contribution. However, with time the bureau silently withered away. This I cannot understand. Or do the Czech lands have no political problems of their own? Perhaps this issue continues to be taboo, because it is never mentioned in public, never written about in the press—although the time is ripe for this situation to be rectified. Perhaps other readers will state their views on this matter.

New Farm Management Principles To Begin Jan 1989

LD3007085588 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] In connection with the restructuring of the economic mechanism, a number of significant changes are taking place in the management of the agricultural and food complex. They are the subject of the following talk by Ondrej Vanek, Czech minister of agriculture and food.

[Begin Vanek recording] As is known, the whole agricultural and food complex is adopting new management principles in accordance with the recently approved laws on state enterprise and on agricultural cooperatives. This will begin as early as 1 January 1989. At present the first stage has been approved involving total of 105 state enterprises. This stage began 1 July. We are currently preparing the second stage involving another 97 state enterprises. They will begin their operation 1 January.

At the same time one must realize that we have another 1,025 unified agricultural cooperatives and another 200 joint agricultural enterprises. If we add to this figure research institutes and certain budget financed organizations, roughly 1,500 enterprises will be controlled in the department within the framework of the Czech SR alone. All these organizations will act in implementing the tasks set by the state plan for next year, 1989, as totally independent legal subjects in mutual contractual relations as respective suppliers and customers as well as with the full responsibility for the fulfillment of state orders as expressed in the state plan. Here the extraordinary social and political responsibility of every state or cooperative enterprise and of each employee of the agricultural and food complex comes to the fore, especially from the viewpoint of the regular supply of foodstuffs on the market. The Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, the Federal Government as well as both national governments of both republics have therefore been concerning themselves in great detail with preparing the restructuring of the economic mechanism and the management structure of the agricultural and food complex.

The two-tier system of management in the sense of the law in operation will also be fully applied in the agricultural and food complex. In this connection both the general directorates of the existing production-economic units and the regional and district agricultural boards will be abolished effective 1 January 1989 in the existing structure and the existing powers to secure the implementation of the plan by agricultural organizations. One must realize that even under this two-tier system of management, in view of the large numbers of controlled organizations—I said that there were roughly 1,500 of them, which are distributed throughout the entire territory of our republic—the ministry will assert its function as the founder of state enterprises, through its departments and sections, which will be operating separately in individual regions and selected districts. These work places will then be in direct contact with state and cooperative enterprises, especially where difficulties occur with self-financing and the fulfillment of the tasks set by the state plan. This is also the purpose of the change that has been approved in the conditions of the management of the agricultural and food complex. [end recording]

Construction To Be Cut, Services Stressed in '89

AU2707095088 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
26 Jul 88 p 1

[CTK report: "The Plan Under New Conditions of Management; From a Press Conference at the Office of the CSSR Government Presidium"]

[Text] Prague—Speaking at the regular press conference at the Office of the CSSR Government Presidium yesterday, Vaclav Vertelar, first deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission, and his colleagues provided information on the draft state plan for the development of the national economy in 1989, which the CSSR Government approved on 19 July.

It was stated, among other things, that the approval of the state plan in midyear makes it possible to convert it, in the fourth quarter of the year, to the wholesale and procurement prices that will go into effect on 1 January next year, as part of the restructuring of the economic mechanism. The amended law on levies, which represents a marked increase in labor costs, will also take effect the same day, as will the reinforcement of the remuneration fund, which will be boosted so that it represents between 5 and 7 percent of the total wage bill. The possibility of introducing foreign currency normative rules [normativy] in relation to nonsocialist countries will also be tested. Domestic trade and the agricultural-food complex will in their entirety switch to the new conditions of operations; the methods of management will also be significantly affected by the establishment of additional state enterprises. All these factors, plus additional practical measures connected with the restructuring of the economic mechanism, had to be considered in drafting the plan. The plan consistently builds on the results achieved thus far in implementing the Eighth 5-Year Plan. It guides the development of basic national economic relations and proportions so as to maintain a regular development of the national economy and reinforce structural balance, despite the aforesaid accumulation of considerable changes. To achieve this aim, use is made not only of previously used directive tasks of the plan but, on a broader scale, also of indirect instruments of management.

Vaclav Vertelar made known some of the main figures of the plan for 1989. Gross national income should rise 2.2 percent compared with the adjusted state plan for the current year. The chief aim is to achieve an improvement in the development of qualitative indicators, compared with the years 1986 and 1987. The proportion of material costs in the value of output is planned to decline by 1.2 percent, the proportion of total costs by 0.82 percent, and a 9.2 percent rise in profits is planned. Vaclav Vertelar said that, in spite of this, one has not succeeded in establishing in the plan conditions for a turnaround of principle in intensifying production. This finds its expression in the aforesaid growth rate of national income, which is below the target of the Eighth 5-Year Plan, as well as in the strain on the budget.

Much of the discussion concerned engineering, which requires a consistent implementation of structural changes. The CSSR Government has, for example, assigned the task of drawing up by the end of the year proposals for changes in a number of engineering production programs, changes that would open additional possibilities for sales of our products and permit a future rise in the dynamism of the development of engineering. Another piece of information concerned capital construction: The number of newly started projects will be greatly curtailed.

Attention was also paid to provisions for a rise in the standard of living. A 2.3 percent rise in personal consumption is planned next year. Specific tasks have been assigned concerning increased deliveries to the domestic market and improved structure of the merchandise on offer. Sales of industrial products should increase 3 percent, while sales of food products should increase 2 percent. In harmony with the intentions of the plan, there will be an increase (of more than 5 percent) in the expenditures of budget-funded and subsidized organizations on services and jobs for the public. The plan foresees, furthermore, a further rise in the material expenditures on the development of branches that ensure the development of paid services—expenditures on the housing economy will increase 3.2 percent, on communal services 5.6 percent, and on passenger transportation 3.4 percent.

Simultaneously with the plan for next year, tasks concerning the 1990 plan have also been laid down. Gross national income, for example, is to increase 3 percent compared with the plan for next year.

Cargoes Aid Managua's 'Carlos Marx' Hospital

AU2907173388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 28 Jul 88 p 6

[Elke Ehlers report: "Regular 'Solidarity' Service to Nicaragua; Three GDR Seagoing Freighters in Regular Service"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the week the motor vessel "Glauchau" has set course for Nicaragua from Rostock. Its cargo contains solidarity goods for the Latin American country, including additional construction materials for the "Carlos Marx" Hospital in Managua and an orphan's home. The goods are urgently needed because the contras' aggression which has lasted for 7 years has claimed many victims and caused great damage. More than 11,000 Nicaraguan children have become orphans or have lost one parent. Thousands have suffered physical harm.

On the ninth anniversary of the Sandinist revolution, the "Pasewalk" entered the port of Corinto with 150 containers of solidarity cargo, including textiles, shoes, and toys. The MS "Crimmitschau"—the third modern GDR seagoing freighter which is permanently used on the line from Rostock via Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Santo Domingo to Corinto—is prepared at the Neptune Shipyard for the next voyage.

The regular service to Central America has been instituted by the VEB German Maritime Shipping Company in Rostock, in 1986. In only the first 6 months of 1988 the three ships brought approximately 7,600 tonnes of goods to the Sandinist country on behalf of the GDR. These included goods agreed upon in the GDR-Nicaraguan Trade Agreement, such as agricultural machinery, in addition to the solidarity cargo which had been mostly financed by citizens' donations. On the way back the freighter carried coffee, cigarettes, or fruit preserves.

The GDR shipping company also offers transport services on the Nicaragua route to international relief organizations, for example, the World Hunger Relief Association.

NATO Skepticism of Pact Disarm Schemes Chided

AU2807095588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 27 Jul 88 p 2

["He." commentary: "Only Confusion?"]

[Text] Following the new Warsaw Pact disarmament proposals a certain confusion is beginning to appear in NATO. NATO Secretary General Woerner, who has not even been in office for 14 days, set the tone without consulting the allies and before the texts had been translated and analyzed: "I am skeptical."

The states of the alliance reacted more realistically. Their governments called the results of Warsaw a positive contribution to the disarmament discussion. Chancellor Kohl spoke of the positions of East and West coming closer together.

In contrast to this, NATO military circles in Brussels have not stopped concocting the old hostile images. No matter what is said about disarmament—the East's superiority remains "overwhelming," the danger of "aggression" with a "large-scale offensive" remains unchanged. NATO is helpless in the face of this threat, so to speak.

On the other hand, when asked how NATO is prepared for such a "threat," Bundeswehr General von Sandrart, supreme commander of the Allied Forces in central Europe, said: "We believe that things are not really so bad." The general even spoke of Western forces which, for their part, are "capable of an offensive."

But the Warsaw summit proposals are aimed precisely at reducing NATO and the Warsaw Pact conventional armed forces and arms between the Atlantic and the Urals to such an extent that on each side only the ability to defend itself remains and nobody can carry out a "large-scale offensive." The diabolical nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, too.

Is the confusion in NATO a result of the fact that the entire new direction does not suit some people there? Those who cling to the dream of military superiority and tend toward hazardous risks? Those who do not want to forego the super profits that gush out of high armament? EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE, a mouthpiece of those circles, wrote that the point is rather "arms shaping" than arms limitation. And: "The vision of a world without nuclear weapons becomes a nightmare, if we think realistically."

How will the responsible politicians of the West, who are now examining the Warsaw proposals, react to such major disruptive actions? If it is stated that, with regard to disarmament, deeds now have to follow words, we have to agree to it. However, goodwill and efforts are required on both sides.

Further Reportage on Grosz Visit to U.S.

Grosz on Talks With Reagan

LD3007115888 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Text] Karoly Grosz and his entourage are on their way home from Canada. The party general secretary and prime minister held talks in Toronto with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and with leading personalities of business and financial circles. Shortly before his departure he visited the headquarters of the North American Telecommunications Company where he was shown new digital telephone exchanges. Karoly Grosz is scheduled to arrive in Budapest early in the afternoon. The general secretary and prime minister, has given a statement about his visit to Elemer Csak:

[Begin recording] [Grosz] I felt our concepts, only the main contours of which have been sketched out as a visit of this kind is not suitable for going into detail, were received well but with a little scepticism that perhaps these are only words. I also detected a wait-and-see attitude. But this does not surprise me because we ourselves have pondered a great deal back home and have argued about how far it was allowed to go—how, in what way, how much the public would tolerate, how much would traditions allow, what was the international medium in which this had to be carried out?

It is true that we conducted this debate last year before the conceptualization of the September government program, but it must repeatedly be considered. So I consider it natural that as we go forward along the path to realize the program, debates will renew and doubts will also strengthen. I consider it completely normal and justified that in the United States one could detect doubts here and there and perhaps even the feeling that maybe we have not thought this over completely.

[Csak] President Reagan gave the impression that he was watching the changes in Hungary with some sympathy, and I think he is also quite aware of our problems. Nevertheless his statements do not lead to the conclusion that they might show readiness to give some sort of concrete support. I am referring for instance to the possibility of reducing the various restrictions.

[Grosz] Well, I must say that President Reagan was impressively informed about the situation of Hungary and Hungarian issues. And let us not be immodest; this is no small matter. After all, the President of one of the world's greatest powers has many different kinds of problems and burdens, and despite this it was apparent that he had prepared very thoroughly for the meeting.

I did not expect any concrete promise or decision during this visit. I do not consider it little, however, that they have promised to re-examine the current practice regarding both the Cocom list and favorable treatment. If they do that, then I think that is a great deal, perhaps everything that can be achieved on a visit like this. I do not wish to list everything. Several matters were raised. But I detected a very unequivocal readiness to help, and the intention on their part to look for and seek ways in which the general principles and individual treatment can be matched. We shall not breach a single agreement in the interest of development, but we shall seek new ways, mobilize new means.

This will no doubt be the subject of debate among our friends as well, and I also consider this natural. Once we have accepted the thesis that socialism will have many colors, will advance in many different ways, then similarities as well as differences will also be present. Everyone has the right to state an opinion on the difference, so one should get neither insulted nor hurt. Neither should far-reaching conclusions be drawn from it.

In my judgement, history has made redundant the era when heightened sensitivity was the characteristic feature of mutual relations, when unity was demonstrated by the fact that every sentence was identically phrased, when all our actions were identical without taking national peculiarities and endowments into consideration. [end recording]

Interviewed on Trip

LD3007162988 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 30 Jul 88

[From the "168 Hours" program]

[Text] Our domestic affairs in the past 2 weeks seem to have taken place in the United States. And not only did they take place there, but we learned about them from a new angle, through the eyes of journalists in the United States. Sometimes we were astonished to hear that Imre Nagy could now be buried, although nothing had changed in the assessment of his role. We also heard reports from overseas that Western capitalists could buy Hungarian enterprises lock, stock, and barrel if they wanted to. And then it was casually mentioned that Hungary could leave the Warsaw Treaty if this is how we decided in a referendum. It is true, however, that it was said that the general secretary would vote against the suggestion. And it was reported that Karoly Grosz and Ronald Reagan thought alike on human rights.

I think some of you have lost the thread while following the news of the visit. But do not despair, for the moment it is impossible to decide what will bring bigger changes in our lives: The fact that from now on we can think about certain things in a completely different way—and we can even ask questions in a completely different way than 2 weeks ago, and this is not just the reporter in me that says that [sentence as heard]. But the truth is that I am equally hopeful that there will also be substantial changes in the objective aspects of life as well. The evaluation of the 2-week visit could take months. Karoly Grosz was met at the airport in Budapest by Katalin Kondor of "168 Hours."

[Begin recording] [Kondor] Did you sleep on the plane?

[Grosz] Yes, for 3 hours, after two (?Eunoptins).

[Kondor] Of course, I would not have been surprised if you had held talks even on the plane.

[Grosz] No, not now. I got tired, I have to admit. I am ashamed to say I got tired.

[Kondor] Were you so hyped-up that you needed the (?Eunoptin)?

[Grosz] Yes. I need it anyway, so this situation is nothing special. But if I look at the program, there were about 50 to 55 organized events, one following the other. It was difficult to adapt because it was a different environment. Parts of it are not familiar enough to me: the banking world or the traders. This demanded much more intellectual concentration than, say, 50 activities at home in 10 days.

[Kondor] Why did you think you had to have such a tight schedule?

[Grosz] Well, believe it or not, I did not think this schedule would be so tight. I have been working in this profession quite long, but a script, a timetable of this kind, seems much simpler written down than when I am doing it. The basic idea crystallized in time. But in the meantime, things pile up. To meet the business world, this is natural; to meet bankers, yes; to meet manufacturers, yes; to meet the emigres, yes. And then when it all comes together, this great quantity produces a new quality.

[Kondor] Is the final result of the visits to the United States and Canada what you expected?

[Grosz] I got much more out of it. I gained a great deal of experience, personally. But this is not important; this is my private affair. I got a lot out of it from the point of view of work: The fact that I was received with so much circumspection, attention—which did not show itself in outward appearances, because there is not much ceremony here, thank God—but in the content of the discussions, in their constructive nature, in the openness, sincerety; that questions arose so directly; in the way they expected an answer and gave answers.

In a sense, I have to admit honestly that I did not expect that the threads of the economy could be woven in this way. It is not the government's job to make deals; I hope it will be even less so in the future. This is part of our concept. But that it should create the political conditions for good business deals—that is its job. Now I think a great deal has been achieved here. If we could make use—as I just told Peter Medgyessy—of no more than 10 percent of the offers we have now, then a substantial portion of our problems would already be solved.

[Kondor] Are there any concrete examples, and are we allowed to know about them?

[Grosz] You already know what we have signed. This agreement to the tune of $115 million with the Guardian [U.S. glass manufacturer] was signed there. There is a $100 million investment venture. And there is a series of concrete matters under preparation, which one ought not to talk about, not because we want to keep them secret from Hungarians, but because our business partners are very sensitive that before the signing of the contract the details should be confidential.

[Kondor] You have always stressed that you were going to the United States to inform and to gain experience, and not to sign deals. So anyone going there to reach concrete deals will have to take your word for this. How will you pass on this message?

[Grosz] Well, this is extremely simple. First, the businessmen are coming within days. The day after tomorrow, for instance, Mr Lauder will arrive. It is common knowledge that the Lauder firm is one of the biggest cosmetics firms in the world. It produces as well as sells. It wants to have certain semifinished goods in Hungary. The reason I say semifinished is that this industrial branch is very sensitive that the finished product must be made either in France or in the United States. And it is keen to accept semifinished products. It is already purchasing products; it does not manufacture the whole range itself. And at the same time, it wants to market goods. And he will be here on Monday. Next week 3 people—I think—are arriving. Within 2 weeks, at least 5 or 6 people will arrive from Canada.

[Kondor] Are they also from light industry?

[Grosz] Yes and no. Well, you have embarrassed me, because I do not know where telephone technology should be classified—in light industry or heavy industry. It is somewhere in between. This is one of the biggest items and it is of very great magnitude. So many agreements are under preparation which will be signed within weeks and months.

And then there are prospects for two or three big contacts which were arranged by Ferenc Bartha. In these cases, either we shall be travelling—not me personally, but my colleagues—or people will be arriving from there to strike up agreements. These primarily concern joint investment projects. this covers a very wide range.

Everyone has been thrown into a fever by our company law which is to be submitted [to parliament] in September, namely by the prospect of being able to buy shares and to become involved in successful enterprises. And I have also said that it is our intention—I did not say we had decided, because we have yet to decide—so it is our intention to allow foreign shares to exceed 50 percent in enterprises where the partner accepts this. There are other interests also—in the precision engineering industry, for instance, high technology.

This is why we had to discuss with President Reagan the fact that we were interested in shortening the Cocom list; and we asked them to think it over.

[Kondor] You received the loudest applause, as far as we could tell from the television coverage of your press conference, when you said you would like all soldiers in the world to be disarmed, or that you would prefer to disarm all soldiers. But we could not hear every question back home. What was your toughest question there?

[Grosz] Here at home, I wrote down 8 little questions for myself, I sealed them in an envelope, concerning what they would ask. I was not disappointed regarding one single question. The fact that I received more is another thing. But they asked exactly what I had written down that they would ask. The problem of the Hungarians in Transylvania came back, typically, everywhere, at every meeting—1956, Imre Nagy, the handling of the demonstration held on the Imre Nagy anniversary, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, my talks with Mr Gorbachev—I phrase it this way because this is how they asked it everywhere. [laughs] I could not say Comrade Gorbachev, but that I had exchanges of views with Mr Gorbachev.

Sometimes my replies, or reply, were well received, and sometimes the air was frosty. Well, my God, this is what politics entails. I did not go there so that everyone would agree with me. I went there in order to state my position.

[Kondor] At which one was the air frostiest?

[Grosz] Well, for example, about whether we will reexamine 1956 or not. And we shall not re-examine it. I also said that naturally we do not oppose, but encourage research into the development, the components of the events of '56.

[Kondor] In the nearly 2 weeks that you were abroad, we learned many more important matters concerning economic intentions than we do here at home—what should I say as comparison—let us say, in half a year or a year. I have heard that many people took offense and felt that it would have been good to learn here at home that—let us say—the government is planning things like selling a factory. People are very, very curious whether this has been concretely worked out in regard to how this is conceived.

[Grosz] The question is naive, because it shows that they have not thought through the government program which was adopted in September of last year. We wrote it down last year in the program. Please get it out. The only thing is that it is worded in jargon. If this is intended as criticism, I really accept it. We carried out this debate last year. We clarified these issues last year. We clarified—I do not remember exactly—that the proportion of private investments, or the proportion of private property in production, must be increased.

[Kondor] Up to 25 percent...

[Grosz] Well, this 25 was the subject of debate last year—whether we should give a percentage or not. I gave the percentage when someone there asked me how far we wanted to go. I said, let us say, 25 to 30 percent; and later we shall see. It is quite clear in the program that we intend to do this. Anyone who knows Hungarian events, even a little, knows that this amount of private capital, accumulated by the population, does not exist. So, how can this be ensured? By our opening the gates to foreign capital. We wrote this down last year in the document.

[Kondor] Are these plans worked out in detail, or is this work still ahead of you?

[Grosz] Look, the company law in September will be a big step. Very serious work is already underway on this. If there is a God, then it will already be on my desk this afternoon, because when I left...

[Kondor interupts] Probably there is a God, because the press very often mentioned this week that work is really underway.

[Grosz] Yes. When we left, we agreed that by 1 August the colleagues would prepare it for submission. It now will go to the party bodies, to the government, and then to parliament. This must be in detail, because if it is not laid down by the laws, then the whole thing will be a wish, an illusion. No matter how much those in the United States or Canada believe the government, they need legal guarantees. They are entirely right. They do not accept seriously the law of 1875, because, to put it mildly, they believe—and perhaps there is some truth in it—that perhaps Hungary has changed since 1875.

[Kondor] Somewhat, it appears.

[Grosz] Yes, yes. That is why I say this. They expect legal guarantees. Of course the colleagues have been working on it, for long months. I did not say anything in the world which might not have been laid down in principle in Hungary. What I said now is an expounding of a program.

[Kondor] But, [words indistinct] were very well formulated...

[Grosz interrupts] Look, I will tell you something: I can not tell businessmen "if you please, our intention is to change the proportion of state property and private property."

[Kondor] You are liked by very many people here at home because you do not say that here either.

[Grosz] Look, it is a strange thing. I am entirely unsuited to be a politician. I have proclaimed this loudly for a long time, because I say what I think. At most, I do not say everything that I think, but I always say what I think. And now we are now living in the atmosphere of these debates. We now are starting to realize this program which has been planned for 3 years, and to unfold it in detail. It is more than probable that we will step backwards in some issues, but we want to go forward on these. I cannot evade it—if I am asked, should I stand there tongue-tied?

[Kondor] If you are asked if there is a factory which the Americans want to buy, and it has an outstanding manager, will you tell him "dear sir, as from today we do not need you?"

[Grosz] Look, I have clarified this now, with them: The government is not selling factories. It is not selling shares. That is not the government's business. That is also in the program—the government wants to reduce its role in (?organizing) the economy. They themselves should reach agreement with the enterprise. If there is a Hungarian managing-director who is clever, cultured, good for the enterprise, he will sell, at the minute, some of his shares; and if he is so good, he certainly will be happy to seize the opportunity to sell even more, because he will be kept. Because the Americans have stated that it is not good business for them to bring a manager here from over there, who would need 10 years to learn the Hungarian economy. For them, it is good business that the most talented Hungarian leaders should be there: and they will pay for it.

Now, of course, this will not happen without state control. It will not be as if someone were to decide to sell his enterprise, and the enterprise council were to vote for this. The government must always give permission for this, it must approve it, because it will not let the country be sold off. So there will be an established system and mechanism for this. They are not interested in how we develop this mechanism here at home; they are interested in whether or not they will have access to it, whether or not they will receive guarantees to take the profits out, what kind of preferential treatment they will get if they bring their money here, and so on.

They negotiate very rationally. It is not ideological gymnastics which takes place at these business negotiations.

[Kondor] Now, a very important question: You also visited Disneyland. Why did you not go to Las Vegas?

[Grosz] There are several reasons. It would have been physically impossible to include even one more thing on the schedule.

[Kondor] But, let us say, if you had been able, would you have not visited this strange city, which is unique in the world?

[Grosz] I do not want to organize a Las Vegas in Hungary, but I would like a Disneyland.

[Kondor] Where?

[Grosz] Now, this, too, will be new.

[Kondor] To be sure, after the decrepit Vidampart [in Budapest], this would be very new.

[Grosz] Yes. The vice president of Disneyland will come to Hungary in September. During preparations, there already was talk of our meeting abroad. They arranged things very correctly and willingly so that the important leaders were there and they said "Look around, sir. Look at what this is, and then let us talk about it."

We raised the idea that if we do the Vienna-Budapest World Exhibition in'95, on which there will be a decision in February, then we would build the sites of the world exhibition in a manner so that part of Disneyland would already start operating before it, and later, also during the world exhibition, we would further develop Disneyland in the places occupied by the world exhibition.

And the real business at Disneyland—excuse me for the expression—is not that tourists should go there. A background industry of such a size must be developed for it, so that the crocodile opens up its mouth and winks when the boat goes there, and the elephant starts to squeal like a pig. Electronics operates it all. There is an enormous background industry to this. Properly speaking, this is what excited me. I did not want the Hungarian People's Republic to put down a penny, even in Las Vegas, all the less so since I am unlucky and would not have won anyway. Neither was my daily remuneration enough to allow me to gamble with it. [end recording]

Speaks on Trip Objectives

LD3007213488 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Interview with Karoly Grosz by Istvan Sandor in Zurich on 30 July from the "Newsreel" program—recorded]

[Text] [Sandor] The journey from Toronto, via Montreal, to Zurich, lasted 8 hours. There was not enough time for a real rest, but there was a little time to sort out and sum up on's thoughts. That is why I asked Karoly Grosz for a conversation to sum up the visit, in the Zurich waiting room.

Prior to your departure, you formulated two objectives: You wanted to get acquainted with the United States and to familiarize the competent political, economic, and business circles, with whom you held talks, with Hungary. To what extent have you achieved these objectives?

[Grosz] It happens rarely in the Hungarian economy, but we have now overfulfilled the plan. I feel that we have successfully outlined our endeavors, our ideas, our plans.

They were received cordially, with sympathy. At the same time, we managed to gather very much information, no matter how tiring the organizational form was, since at first we travelled through several cities of the states; we met people, businessmen, bankers, and manufacturers there. This provided very many experiences, thus opportunities and possibilities to glimpse into the American way of thinking, their conception. This, properly speaking, culminated with the meeting with President Reagan, with Vice President Bush, with the other candidate in the elections, Governor Dukakis, as well as with three secretaries. Therefore, I feel that we have built well on this journey.

[Sandor] You just gave the names of the President, the vice president, and one of the presidential candidates. Properly speaking, you held talks with the current, and presumably future, leaders of U.S. foreign policy. According to your impression, what foreign policy will the United States pursue in the future, and what will they expect from us, Hungary, in this sphere?

[Grosz] My earlier conviction was strengthened, that after the elections, as well, the United States wants to continue further on the path which it began at the time of President Reagan. Many people expressed and affirmed this, I felt, without any kind of posturing or election intention.

One of my great experiences was the feeling that the politicians genuinely want to cooperate with the Soviet Union, with other countries, and in this my conviction is that Hungary, the Hungarian People's Republic, has a place. I feel that the President's perception, outlook, as well as the standpoint or mentality felt at the meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at the beginning of the month, are in harmony. Neither of them want the right to form policy and to cooperate to be solely for the superpowers. However, they also count on the cooperation of the medium-sized and small countries.

[Sandor] For years, Hungary officially received praise from the United States when and insofar as it differed from its East European neighbors. The current government, and you personally, received a lot of praise on this visit. Do you think it is for the same reason?

[Grosz] It is possible that that had a role in it. It is very difficult to say after the impact of the experiences of such a brief and full visit. The very recent experiences we gathered yesterday, the day before yesterday, and the previous days, are still fresh to us.

[Sandor] Even today, as well.

[Grosz] To be sure, this has a role, but I do not consider it to be a fault. I have an experience precisely to the contrary. There is still a very strong conception in the United States that the socialist community is a closed, rigid, monochromatic, and single-surfaced bloc. They do not understand the differences, the national characteristics, although every country has its own conception, its own tools and methods. In my view, these will strengthen in the future, for they want to ensure prosperity for their own people. In my judgement, with regard to the future, socialism will be multifaceted, with uniformity present in some fundamental issues. I feel they they do not yet entirely sense this.

At the same time, our ventures, which in part are still plans, on the other hand also are manifested in concrete decisions, elicited sympathy. I feel that they have an interest in the Hungarian economy entering a more dynamic period of development, after stagnating for a long time. In these plans, out hosts see some kind of guarantee—I word it like this because full guarantees cannot be offered—that this Hungarian economy will develop rapidly. So I see an interest in this.

Well, of course, it is very difficult to say whether or not there are separate, secondary intentions. There are none on the part of official policy——that is entirely certain. Possibly there is on the part of the supporters or the opponents.

By the way, there are also very many new elements in this program we are planning and shaping—really it has not yet ripened, it has not yet taken shape in its final form—that will crystallize in final shape sometime around 1990 for the congress. It has some kind of new formulation of the practice (?overtaking) the previous 4 decades. I believe that they are uncertain in this. They respect the intention. The doubt is quite strong that we will be able to carry this out. They made us aware of this in a very civilized, refined manner, with the style formed in the political arsenal, saying good, good, what you are saying is fine, but let us get down to business. That was the essence of the matter. Properly speaking, it was understandable. I cannot expect that on such a visit, on such a missionaries' tour, there would be immediate success in bringing everyone over to our religion. Here it is the deeds and actions that will bring about movement and provide proof.

[Sandor] It is possible that no small amount happened so that this missionaries' tour could be successful. I am thinking that a good number of statements were heard from you at various meetings, press conferences, of which, I imagine, not only the hosts took note, but here at home, as well. For example, possibly 100 percent Western ownership of some Hungarian enterprises, or concerning domestic politics, the series of questions connected with Imre Nagy, to which you said that if the family requests, the ashes of Imre Nagy will be put in their final resting place. Obviously, when you return home, more questions will await you than when you departed. Did you count on this? Was this your objective?

[Grosz] No. It was not my objective. Otherwise, I do not like to cause surprise. Second, I do not consider it my place to voice an opinion on such fundamentally important issues of principle and policy. Before we set off on this trip, we conducted a widespread exchange of views in these issues. We held consultations in the Politburo, with the leading members of the government—I word it this way because naturally the Council of Ministers has not yet discussed it.

However, these elements of thinking, primarily the elements of mixed enterprises, of drawing in foreign capital, are clearly worded in last year's government program. I said nothing in the world other than what parliament approved last September.

Of course I understand that to write down itemized sentences worded in specialized jargon in a program is different from the effect elicited when we start to realize and do this. Therefore, in the economy, I did not go a single millimeter further than what we worked out last year, and it was not because I did not want to, but simply because I consider this program to be adequate to more or less guarantee, the phase of consolidation, stabilization, if we realize it. In the meantime, we gave ourselves time to work out a longer-term program.

This working committee, which Imre Pozsgay is heading on behalf of the Central Committee, and which is summing up the lessons of the 4 decades, particularly the past 3 decades, has, as one of its main tasks, when taking stock, to reply to theoretical questions which, in our view, life has already passed by.

We have said loudly that we feel that the previous framework of socialist practice properly speaking has exhausted the possibility of development. This is not a Hungarian opinion. If one thinks of what is happening in the Soviet Union, it is exactly the same. Or take Poland: my conversation with Comrade Jaruzelski, I believe 2 weeks ago—I do not remember when, any more—on the final day of the meeting in Warsaw, moved in the same sphere of thought. So we have not announced anything sensational, here, nor have we said anything new, but we are continuing forward in our own track.

Naturally, (?abroad), in this medium, the emphasis falls on different elements, in the course of exchanges of views, than if we were to discuss them at a workers' rally at home. Naturally, they speak differently.

With regard to Imre Nagy, that is the consequences of the sentences passed after the events of 1956, we conducted a consultation at a Politburo session. I did not voice an individual opinion, but the intention of the body. We do not have to pass a resolution on this. That is the task of the authorized government body, so it is not even up to the Council of Ministers. We feel that after 3 decades, it is justified to close this for humanitarian reasons. Otherwise, it would be good to get beyond the phase of always looking back, of always mulling over our problems, weaknesses of yesterday. These must be known, they must by all means be known because the lessons are important, but in Toronto at the enormously large gala dinner—or I do not know how they call it over there—I said that our intention is to close this period and to look ahead. We cannot proclaim what has happened to have not happened. By undertaking them, there are a lot of things we are not denying. I think that I was quite unequivocal in this, and for example, I did not elicit a great deal of sympathy with this.

If a person deals with politics, he develops reflexes so that he senses what is applauded and what is not, to what meets an icy silence and to what does not, and in this, for example, I did not see any great enthusiasm when I said this. However, for all that, it was my duty to represent this, in part because it is my personal conviction, and in part because we formed, thus, this evaluation, politically. Therefore, I willingly undertake further debates in this sphere of issues and in the others, as well, and allow me to say that there will be even more in the future.

Now, too, it is true that there is a program with which everyone agrees in principle. When it must be done...

[Sandor, interrupting] Practice [words indistinct]

[Grosz] Furthermore, if it is not advantageous for one, at the moment. They accept that it is advantageous in the long term, but when it means a burden for an individual, the question mark immediately makes an appearance.

I read the newspapers, in large doses, of course, all at once. The trade union headline is: the trade union invariably represents the interests of the workers. So far it also had to represent them. It does not agree with the devaluation of the forint. Why should the trade union have to agree with the devaluation of the forint? That is not the trade union's business. I feel that a lot has not been settled here. I am not surprised at this. At present there is a change, a new style is taking root. This was decided by the party conference. This fits into this. We shall debate it. Public opinion will be divided, and then it again will be united on the issues that have been clarified.

[Sandor] In conclusion, allow me a personal question. I have learned from your close colleagues that with great speed you absorb what is new, and with this, you change with great speed, and transform, a little, your way of thinking. To what extent are you different, today, fromk the Karoly Grosz who 11 days ago stepped onto the American coast?

[Grosz] I hope that I am different. Why did I travel so much? That was one of the objectives, which is how we began the conversation. A person tries to shape his surroundings—it would be an exaggeration to say the world. However, the surroundings shape the individual, as well. I believe it is normal for there to be a reciprocal effect. I saw many things in this country, indeed in both countries. Many things appeared with the impact of being new, in my way of thinking, in my feelings. Naturally, a little time is necessary for this to settle, for the esseential elements to crystallize. I think that I have become richer, that is my conviction. It was an experience to meet the politicians, it was an experience to meet the people; there was a thought, something in every one of them. What is very important: I was convinced that what we decided last year at the Central Committee session last June and later in parliament, and now at the party conference, can be represented, and we must proceed further on this path. Therefore, the trip gave me self-confidence and encouragement.

Naturally it is a personal experience, and does not interest the public very much, but I do not dispute that I had a certain degree of prejudice or reservation prior to the departure, not as to whether I would be received cordially, but with regard to what the atmosphere would be like. I had a strong prejudice that this would be characteristic of the visit, and it was a very pleasurable experience that it was not so. First, we experienced sympathy everywhere; they handled us as people, as partners in discussions. They shared their ideas, problems, and they were extremely interested. It was apparent that they knew little about us, so they inquired what we want to do, how we conceive this. Properly speaking, this is liberating.

Returns From U.S., Canada Visit

LD3007154888 Budapest MTI in English 1428 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—On Saturday Karoly Grosz, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and chairman of the Council of Ministers, returned from his 11-day official visit to the United States and from Canada. He was accompanied by Ilona Tatai, member of the HSWP Political Committee, vice-president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and general director of Taurus, Laszlo Kapolyi, government commissioner of the Council of Ministers, Under-secretary of State Ferenc Bartha, president of the National Bank of Hungary, Laszlo Kovacs, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Vencel Hazi, Hungarian ambassador to the United States, who remained at his post.

The prime minister and party were welcomed at Ferihegy Airport by Lenard Pal, secretary of the HSWP Central Committee, Peter Medgyessy, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Geza Kotai, head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the HSWP Central Committee, Peter Varkonyi, minister of foreign affairs, and Elemer Kiss, vice-president of the office of the Council of Ministers. Present were ambassadors Mark Palmer of the United States and Robert L. Elliott of Canada to Hungary.

Deputy Foreign Minister on U.S. Visit

LD3107214088 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Interview with Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, "A member of the delegation accompanying Hungarian Prime Minister Karoly Grosz to the United States" by unidentified correspondent in the studio on "The Week" program; date not given —live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Unidentified correspondent] There were several meetings with representatives of Hungarian emigres. What was the mood of these meetings, if for no other reason than because a lot of things sounded very novel here at home as well?

[Kovacs] It must be said that those of us who were responsible for preparing the meetings, or to be more precise the visit, were afraid of these meetings, partly because there has never been a precedent for this, that the country's number one should meet Hungarians living abroad in such a wide range. On the other hand, we also had information to the effect that hostile circles among the emigres were also organizing certain actions. Well, no such things took place. To be more precise, the day after our departure from San Francisco we learned from the newspaper in Los Angeles that the previous day, while we were there, there was a demonstration of altogether 12 people against Hungary, against Hungary's policy. [passage omitted]

President Reagan Speaks on Budapest TV

LD3007215988 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Recorded message by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the Hungarian people; date and place not given]

[Text] Thank you for this opportunity to address the Hungarian people during this visit of General Secretary Karoly Grosz to the United States. I am pleased not only by Mr Grosz's visit, but with his decision to meet with many different Americans and explore a number of regions of the United States. You know that American-Hungarian relations go far back and predate the current improvement in relations. Americans benefitted richly from the contributions of Hungarian emigrants to American life. Hungarians have demonstrated their enormous talent and genius in America. From George Soti to Eugene Ormandi in music, Nobel prize-winners in scientific fields Albert Szent-Gyorgyi and Eugene Wigner. More recently I was moved while watching the return of the remains of Bela Bartok to Budapest, and I am proud and honoured that America was able to provide a sanctuary for the great Bartok during the Second World War. But today it is appropriate to turn our thoughts to the future.

In the economic area we in the United States are following with interest the bold reforms calling for the exercise of greater responsibility of individual managers, and broader scope for private enterprise and growing competitiveness among companies. We welcome the recently announced opportunities for direct foreign investment in Hungarian firms. Clearly there is recognition on both sides of the mutual benefits of economic cooperation. We are confident that the determined movement towards a market-orientated economy will result in greater opportunities for Hungarians. Hungarian leaders have noted that economic reform cannot move forward without a political reform. We strongly share this view.

We welcome the increasingly open discussions in Hungary on democratization, pluralism, and a greater role for parliament and the press. We look forward to the full implementation of these important reforms in Hungary, because we know that respect for human rights and democratic processes is the key to peace and prosperity. In recent years our bilateral relations have been steadily improving in many areas.

In the first half of this year alone there was a 30 percent increase in visas issued to Hungarians to visit the United States. This clearly demonstrates the expansion of professional and tourist traffic between our two countries. We hope many more will come to see the United States first hand. We welcome the easing of Hungarian travel restrictions which will almost certainly result in many more Americans visiting Hungary in the coming years. We think even more can be done in all of these areas.

General Secretary Grosz is visiting during a time of promise. I am convinced that there are excellent prospects for improving East-West relations in a wide range of important areas. Hungary has played and can continue to play a valued role in this larger East-West relationship. We look forward to continuing better and richer contacts with the Hungarian people and send our best wishes for your successes. Thank you and God bless you.

Szabo 'Dissatisfied' With Israeli Trade

LD2507120488 Budapest MTI in English 1030 GMT 25 Jul 88

[Text] Budapest July 25, 1988 (MTI-ECONEWS)—"Hungary is dissatisfied with the level of Hungarian-Israeli trade", said Mr Istvan Szabo, a member of the HSWP Political Committee, president of the National Council of Agricultural Cooperatives and of the Red Star cooperative of Nadudvar during his recent visit to Israel.

Mr Szabo paid a visit to Israel between July 17 and 24 and was received by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, and foreign minister Shim'on Peres.

Mr Istvan Szabo stressed during the talks that Hungary was dissatisfied with the present low annual goods turnover of the two countries as it valued only about 20 million USD [as received].

Mutual deliveries consist primarily of raw materials and agricultural produce.

Mr Szabo said that since the Israeli Government has set high customs tariffs for Hungarian goods and there is a need for import licenses, the expansion of relations is not easy. He stressed that Hungary was interested in the purchase of technologies, in cooperation on third markets and in the development of tourism.

Both Hungarian and Israeli companies have shown interest in setting up joint ventures, though no such venture has been established as yet. Mr Szabo proposed that the regulations hindering economic cooperation should be reviewed as soon as possible.

During his visit, Mr Szabo met with Mr Arye Nehamkin, minister for agriculture, Mr Dan Gillerman, president of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr Yisra'el Qeysar, secretary of the Israeli Trade Union Centre [title as received] and Mr Me'ir Vilner, general secretary of the Israeli Communist Party.

Olechowski Concludes Official Visit to U.S.

Holds Talks With Shultz

LD2907205188 Warsaw PAP in English 1955 GMT 29 Jul 88

[By PAP Correspondent Jerzy Gorski]

[Text] Washington, July 29—Poland's Foreign Minister, Tadeusz Olechowski, conducted the first round of talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and also held talks with members of the U.S. Congress here on Thursday.

George Shultz pointed to the fact that Minister Olechowski's visit was the first visit to the U.S. by Poland's foreign minister for many years and said it reflected a permanent process of improvement in Polish-American relations.

Pointing to the very active development of Polish-American dialogue in the past 18 months, George Shultz recalled the talks in Warsaw and Washington conducted by representatives of both governments, including the visit to Poland by U.S. Vice-President George Bush and to the United States by Poland's Deputy Premier Zdzislaw Sadowski.

Over that time we have covered a long road, but greater possibilities still lie before us, Shultz said. He added that the process of reforms currently being realized in Poland was a difficult process. At the same time he stressed that the development of mutual relations should be based on realism, persistency and permanency.

Minister Olechowski stressed that his visit was not only a visible confirmation of the development of Polish-American dialogue and relations between both countries but also was of great importance for both countries and international peace.

He also expressed the conviction that Polish-American relations could develop fruitfully on the basis of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the partners' internal affairs despite political differences and still existing difficulties.

Olechowski expressed a view that Polish-American relations should become an element supporting economic reforms in Poland.

Stressing the importance which Poland attached to the positive development of the Soviet-American dialogue Olechowski expressed respect for the United States' contribution to this dialogue. He said that Poland wished to contribute to the process of international detente and improvement of East-West relations. The President of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski's plan of reducing armaments and increasing confidence in central Europe is an expression of the wish and contribution to the process of the improvement of East-West relations, he said.

In the name of the Polish delegation he thanked his host for the welcome and good atmosphere in which the visit was taking place. "We treat this as an expression of the will of achieving further progress in the process of normalization and development of our bilateral relations," Olechowski said.

On Friday the Polish delegation, headed by Minister Olechowski, conducted talks with the Senate Foreign Affairs committee and the House of Representatives' Sub-Committee for European Affairs. The participants discussed many aspects of Polish-American relations and matters directly concerning the situation in Poland.

The majority of questions from members of both chambers of Congress pertained to such problems as joint Polish-American industrial undertakings, the conditions of the functioning of foreign capital in Poland, the creation of solely foreign capital companies and the legislative activities of the Polish authorities in these fields.

On Friday the Polish delegation continued talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead.

Interviewed on U.S. Visit

LD3007190488 Warsaw PAP in English 1706 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—On the last day of his Washington visit, that is on Friday July 29, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Olechowski granted an interview to the PUWP daily TRYBUNA LUDU U.S. correspondent Zygmunt Broniarek. Excerpts:

"The present official visit of the Polish foreign minister to the United States joins a sequel of important steps taken along the road toward restoration of normal relations between Poland and the United States.

"The contacts (since 1986—ed.) indicate that the dialogue held with the U.S. Government encompasses a broad spectrum of political and economic problems. At the same time, it is a proof that the process of normalization of relations with the United States is well under way.

"A considerable change is occuring in the way of thinking about Poland. The fact that Poland is, as it is described in Washington, one of the most 'liberal' socialist countries is beginning to be more and more recognized. In certain circles something remains to be done to achieve such a change.

"But the trend is good, positive. Surely no one questions the sincerity of our intentions. Also, such processes are appreciated as dialogue with the church, or freedom of discussion, discussion in mass media included, or opportunities for Poles to travel to the West, and the like.

"A conviction is gaining more and more popularity that Europe and the world need stable Poland that would be internally reconciled, though pluralist in thinking and that would be developing successfully in terms of economy.

"If this way of thinking penetrates all American decision-making centres, and there is much to imply that it will, then new horizons will open in front of us. Every effort must be made to attain this and I think that this visit of mine and of my assistants has contributed to consolidation of such way of thinking."

Cites 'Step Forward' in Talks

LD3107183188 Warsaw PAP in English 1725 GMT 31 Jul 88

[By PAP Correspondent Jerzy Gorski]

[Text] Washington, July 31—Poland's Foreign Affairs Minister, Tadeusz Olechowski, ended his visit in the United States, paid at the invitation of Secretary of State George Shultz, here today. Minister Olechowski was received by Vice-President George Bush and held talks with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, William Verity, the director of the U.S. Information Agency, Charles Wick, members of the U.S. Congress and representatives of American economic circles and Polonia.

In a statement for PAP's Washington correspondent Olechowski said that the visit was an important event in Polish-American relations. It was evidence that the dialogue between both countries was developing, that normalization was progressing and new possibilities of cooperation were opening up.

"The goal of the visit was an improvement of relations, continuation of the comprehensive dialogue, the shift from a policy of small steps to the policy of bigger steps. We wanted to interest American economic circles in becoming involved in Poland, we also wanted to influence the image of Poland in the United States—make it more objective. We realized these assumptions [last word as received] to a great extent. The dialogue with the representatives of the government, especially with Secretary of State George Shultz and his deputy, John Whitehead, was open, sincere, conducted in a good atmosphere.

"We were agreed that we have achieved quite a lot during the last two years and that we must move on to more intensive relations. Our intentions are aided by the improvement of the atmosphere of East-West relations. The development of Soviet-American dialogue, the new course of Soviet policy and the deep transformations in Poland.

"We did not come here to ask for credits. We showed our American partners that we, first and foremost, want normal treatment, including the awarding of trade credits. We also had in mind support for our efforts in the IMF, the World Bank and the Paris Club," Olechowski continued.

"We met with greater understanding of our postulates and we perceived a greater readiness of involvement as the implementation of reforms progresses.

"We also discussed concrete possibilities of the development of scientific-technical, cultural, tourist cooperation and exchange of information.

"We do not accept any subordination of the development of relations with Poland, especially any economic cooperation, to the evaluation of our internal situation. However, we did not avoid giving information about our reforms and process of democratization. We noted good-willed interest in our actions in these fields.

"I also held talks with representatives of Polish Americans of various orientations. They are becoming more and more convinced about the need of cooperating with Poland, especially in the economic and cultural fields. I can say the same thing about American Jewish circles.

"Summing up, we have made a step forward though a breakthrough has not yet occurred. Both sides must continue to make considerable efforts to achieve this. Changes and possibilities for this do exist.

"We will strive to base our relations and stable, realistic principles, not subordinating them to opportunist political shifts and attempts of interfering in internal affairs.

'We will develop the system of consultations in order to increase mutual understanding and confidence. We will strive towards strengthening economic cooperation," Tadeusz Olechowski told PAP.

Comments on Exports to U.S.

LD3107215888 Warsaw PAP in English 2009 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Text] Warsaw, July 31—Asked about the changes of Polish exports to the United States, Poland's Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski, who has just ended his American trip, said in the prime time TV news bulletin today:

"It is our great cause at present to create through our political activity the best possible conditions for the effects of both the economic reform and economic cooperation with abroad.

"On the American market we shall try to upkeep traditional exports and on the other hand, to introduce a wider range of modern commodities. During the next two or three years we plan to reach the pre-crisis level."

Wasilewski Views Polish-Soviet Relations

AU2907155888 Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish Apr 88 pp 4-10

[Article by PZPR Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski: "The Work of Millions of People"]

[Text] One year ago, on 21 April 1987, on the 42nd anniversary of the first treaty of friendship and cooperation between Poland and the USSR, PZPR First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed a "Declaration of Cooperation in Ideology, Science, and Culture." This document is of unprecedented importance for contacts between our parties and states in the entire superstructure.

Poland and the Soviet Union are experiencing a period of great change and the shaping of new forms of political and economic life. Last year's declaration, as Mikhail Gorbachev said at the signing ceremony, is chiefly meant to tighten up the cooperation between the two parties and bring it closer in line with the socialist renewal in our countries. Wojciech Jaruzelski pointed out that this declaration is at the same time a confirmation of the friendly Polish-Soviet relations based on mutual trust, a respect for national dignity, and the right to an independent choice of solutions.

The date chosen for the signing of this document was no coincidence, for the date in question refers back to the April 1945 treaty which established new, allied, and good-neighborly relations between Poland and the USSR. The April 1945 treaty confirmed the breakthrough that was occurring and illustrated the shaping of convergent interests between the reborn Poland and the Soviet Union. While bringing advantages to both sides, this treaty became a pillar of the postwar peaceful order in Europe, on the basis of which political and economic cooperation between our countries developed in subsequent years. The conditions for lively scientific and cultural contacts also emerged. Without any attempt to idealize the joint experiences which, just like the development of socialism itself, were not free of complications, one can say that the achievements of the past 40 years are permanent and indisputable in all fields, and form a basis for our further development, whose driving force is provided by the changes in both countries.

In line with the progress with perestroyka and glasnost in the USSR and the socialist renewal and reforms in Poland, there is a natural increasing need to apply cooperation to ideology, science, culture, and interpersonal relations as well. This stems from the new challenges of today and their urgency. It is essential to take part in the next wave of scientific revolution and guarantee an energetic growth not only of materials production, but also of social relations and democracy. All this involves increasing the role of the "human factor." It has become imperative to restructure the old methods of managing the economy and state in order to achieve further progress, but this depends on the readiness of people and the effectiveness of their work.

Marxism-Leninism is a living theory that is meant not only to offer explanations, but also to change the world. "A Marxist must face up to real life and the facts of reality, not tenaciously cling to the theory of yesterday," wrote Vladimir Lenin. These words have assumed great topicality now. The task of theory and practice is to consistently lead to a a new understanding of socialism in all its aspects. Therefore, one's duty vis-a-vis the past and present is to dispense with schematic doctrinairism, dogmatism that is blind to the dialectics of life, and the oversimplifications that vulgarize the processes of today.

All this requires that Marxists take a fresh look at the basic problems of today. This is not easy. While remaining faithful to the fundamental principles of socialism, they must break with the bad traditions of abstract theorizing which involved a feeling of complacency, the repetition of well-worn schemes, and shallow technocracy. Socialism and stagnation are not compatible, so theoretical thinking must be constantly on the move. An exchange of experiences and an encounter between views and proposals during open, unrestricted discussion should encourage the reemergence of creative revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory. This is a basic platform on which people of culture and science from both our countries may come together, and it facilitates the solution of problems and the overcoming of difficulties. We note with great satisfaction that the approaches of both parties to these problems are to a large degree similar. This increases mutual trust and respect, and establishes a creative climate.

Last year's Polish-Soviet declaration is a clear expression of the "new thinking," and forms the theoretical basis of the changes to the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in recent years. Mikhail Gorbachev captured the essence of this process in his book "Perstroyka and New Thinking For Our Country and the World," in which he writes: "The essence of the new thinking is a recognition of the priority of human values or, to put it even more concisely, the priority of human survival." This gives rise to a desire for a partnerlike shaping of international relations and encourages the solution of the entire tangle of past problems and controversies. It encourages one to overcome differences for the sake of the supreme goal. Such a policy is positively influencing the international situation, especially Soviet-American dialogue and the disarmament talks. Major impulses for Polish-Soviet cooperation also stem from the philosophy of "new thinking."

The ambitious program contained in the declaration has created new possibilities of action for scientists, artists, and journalists in both countries. Openness, a value essential for the unrestricted development of all kinds of creativity, has become the rule. The citizens of Poland and the USSR are already noticing this.

Economic and scientific ties have been considerably enriched with joint undertakings and much broader direct contacts between scholars, educational institutions, and other research establishments. There are further possibilities of expanding this cooperation, to the advantage of both sides.

The scope of mutual information has also clearly expanded recently. Television, radio, the press, films, and books are now providing much more honest information about what is happening in Poland and the USSR, what we are doing and what we want to do, and what problems we are encountering. We can read about problems that were kept secret before—we can read about the discrepancies, dilemmas, and barriers in development; the price that had to be paid for having doubts about success; the complexity of history; the variety of scientific and cultural life; and society's richness of thought. With great satisfaction and a warm feeling, the Poles are observing the birth and development of new forms of socialist democracy; the changes in the economic life of the Soviet Union; the multiple effects of "perestroyka" and "glasnost" on the mass media, education, culture, and social climate; and the results of the struggle between the old and the new. All this is bringing the Soviet Union closer to the Poles, for a more credible picture of the Soviet Union encourages a consolidation of friendship. One should expect more information for Polish society about new Soviet solutions and experiences.

We also realize and note with satisfaction that our affairs are also being written and spoken about more fully and with greater honesty and understanding in the Soviet Union. An unrestricted exchange of information, so necessary during a period of comprehensive sociopolitical and economic renewal, is eliminating the patterns and stereotypes of propaganda.

The parts of the declaration that speak about the need to jointly create a full picture of the histories of our peoples and their mutual relations and the removal of so-called "blank sports," or areas about which information is lacking, matters about which nothing is said, half-truths, and even fabrications were received with great interest and hope. Part of the document reads: "The age-old relations between the peoples of Poland and Russia call for a far-reaching assessment. All the periods of this history, including the difficult ones, should be interpreted in an objective and precise way from a Marxist-Leninist position and in line with the current state of knowledge. Above all, justice should be accorded to what has strengthened friendship between our parties and peoples, and judgment should be passed on what has harmed it... In setting out matters in this way, we are guided by a feeling of joint responsibility for the future and the further development of fraternal Polish-Soviet relations."

With a view to implementing this decision, a joint Polish and Soviet commission of historians commenced working. Its task is to conduct an in-depth examination of the difficult and painful issues in our common history that have been shrouded in silence until now. This is logically linked to uncovering the beautiful episodes in our common past—the roots of contemporary friendship—episodes that have been insufficiently examined and are not well known. The reports on the work of the commission that have appeared so far and the articles and statements resulting from it indicate the importance of these tasks, as well as their broad scope and complex character. We are becoming convinced that undertaking these tasks was not only useful but essential for our friendship. Arriving at the truth about important events for our peoples and the presentation of the truth makes it possible to dispel doubts and mistrust, and undermines and gets rid of resentment. Thus, it reduces the scope of and removes the material for anti-Soviet propaganda. The long years of the strategy of exploiting "blank spots," the selective and tendentious interpretation of facts, the promotion of half-truths, and other forms of manipulation aimed at painting a very black picture of Polish-Soviet relations are coming to an end.

Today, there are new facts. In both countries there has been a very positive response to press, radio, and television reports on dates, names, and episodes about which nothing was said. A great deal of interest was generated by the article by Prof Georgiy Smirnov in NEW TIMES that fundamentally rectified the one-sided assessments that appear in the Soviet historiography on the subject of September 1939, Poland at that time, the defensive war that it waged against Hitlerism, including the statement made by Molotov that insulted the Poles and ran counter to Leninist ideas.

Work is continuing on both the Polish and the Soviet sides on problems relating to the years 1917-1921, and to the 1919-1920 war in particular. We expect this to culminate in a joint monograph. There is still a need for an extensive explanation and elucidation of the tragic fate of Polish communists in the USSR during the 1930's and the circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the KPP and the Comintern's position on Polish affairs. The events of August and September 1939 and their many consequences, including the tragic fate of the Polish officers interned in the USSR after 17 September 1939, await a particularly penetrating reconstruction and reinterpretation. Research work has started on the several million Poles who found themselves in the Soviet Union after the hell of Poland in 1939. This relates to the resettlement, deportation, and arrest of hundreds of thousands of people.

However, the reappraisals are not just proceeding in one direction. It is also necessary for the Polish side to stop being silent, to reject misleading theses, and revise oversimplified assessments. Decisions that accord with the truth will result in the dispelling of the myths and stereotypes that distort some of the pages of our past. Another important element of last year's PZPR-CPSU Declaration concerns the cultural sphere, which is an area that is particular to me.

For the workers' movement, the arts always represented a particularly important vehicle for conveying humanist ideas, and that is how the PZPR and the CPSU also view these areas. We realize that the ideas, concepts, and attitudes that have been recorded by the artist, which stem from national tradition or have a universal character, have a strong impact and can often give visual form to ideas that are more profound than those that can be expressed in the language of politics or economics. Nothing can bring our peoples closer together than culture.

Cultural cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union has a long and rich tradition. We know a lot about each other, and we are familiar with most outstanding works of art and artists. However, there are always unfamiliar areas, books that are waiting to be translated, plays to be staged, and films to be distributed on a broad scale. In the past it was not always quality that determined their accessibility; dogmatic prejudices and bureaucratic checks were often obstacles. It has meant, for example, that the Soviet public is not particularly familiar with Polish twentieth-century avant-garde literature, with much that was written during World War II and the occupation, and the biting social comment of many present-day works. There are also many gaps in our knowledge of the literature of the peoples of the USSR and the arts during the first years after the revolution. It is time to eliminate them, in keeping with the declaration thesis: "In providing mutual access to our spiritual riches and drawing attention to the cultural achievements of our peoples, the PZPR and the CPSU will also strengthen the internationalist awareness of working people, particularly that of young people, and subdue manifestation of national egocentricity and megalomania.

"The written word has a special role to play. The most enlightened minds among our peoples—the geniuses of Polish and Russian literature—showed how our friendship should be appraised and preserved, and they stressed the importance of respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual. The traditions and spiritual values of our national cultures are similar. This should serve as a basis for expanding opportunities for becoming familiar with the greatest achievements in literature, art, theater, and film, as well as other areas of the creative artistic spirit."

The declaration and the decisions stemming from it contained in the "Program for the Development of Ideological Cooperation between the PZPR and the CPSU Until the Year 1990" have defined the new character of cooperation and exchanges in the arts. The qualitatively higher goals and tasks call for a resolute break with monotony, window dressing, and glossing over difficult problems. We are implementing a process of transition from contacts of an official kind to direct cooperation, the lively exchange of ideas, and numerous artistic initiatives, and mutual sources of intellectual inspiration. There is a growing list of meetings, seminars, open-air painting sessions, and exchanges of directors, conductors, and groups. The development of various forms of coproduction concerning film, television, theater, and books. Tangible results are being produced through efforts to increase mutual familiarity with various traditions and contemporary creative activity and the popularization of theater, film, music, and art through the mass auditorium of radio and television. Cooperation between artistic unions is assuming more concrete form. Personal contacts between creative people and cultural activists have been revived and expanded. Polish society views the resassessment of the Soviet Union's cultural policy with affinity and interest. This is attested to by an increase in the popularity—this is true of a mass audience as well—of Soviet books, films, and songs. The literary press and publishing houses are printing new stories by Aitmatov, Bykov, Rasputin, and Rybakov, as well texts by Akhmatova, Bulgakov, Mandelshtam, and Platonov, and Pasternak, which have not been known until now. Direct contact with Soviet culture has been made possible through receiving Soviet television's first channel in our country. There are more Soviet films and shows on Polish television.

The Polish culture that the Soviet public can experience is becoming richer and more diverse. The "Warsaw Days" held in Moscow were an important cultural event. The performance staged by "Studio" of plays by Jozef Szajna and the Warsaw Contemporary Theater's production of "The Master and Margarita" were cultural events that met with extraordinary interest on the part of the public and were highly appraised by Moscow critics. Thanks to television, they were seen by millions of people. Enormous interest and passionate debate were also generated by the performances by Jozef Szajan and Jerzy Duda-Gracz, and the exhibition of contemporary art and sculpture.

Plans to increase the number of Polish books (more than 70, including 45 works of fiction) have been announced. Agreements between publishers and literary figures and meetings with translators of Polish literature have increased interest in authors that have not been published in the Soviet Union so far, including Witkacy, Gombrowicz, Schulz, and Mrozek. Works that have been previously unknown are becoming mutually accessible.

Plans for this year envisage a further expansion of contacts. The Polish Culture Center in Moscow began work in April of this year, and this will undoubtedly increase the number of friends of our culture in the Soviet Union. The first all-union festival of Polish song in Vitebsk will undoubtedly be interesting. Lovers of Soviet culture in Poland are going to experience a lot of excitement during the "Moscow Days" in Warsaw that will take place in September.

Thus, it can be said that practice has become the most important criteria for assessing the importance of the Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mikhail Gorbachev declaration. The process that was initiated a year ago is gaining momentum. Its prospects for the future are not only being defined by institutions, but also by the increasing number of citizens in both states that are engaged in various forms of cooperation.

However, it is still too soon to be satisfied. This is just the beginning. The obstacles represented by old habits still have to be overcome, but the changes are becoming irreversible, and time is in their favor. This is because the idea of friendship is not an abstract concept. Its form is derived from people's attitudes, thoughts, and activities, from direct ties between various social groups. Thus, it is all the more important that there is a clear democratization of cooperation and a significant expansion of it, with those taking part in it directly without the involvement of intermediaries. This is the case in the economic sphere—conferences and working contacts between representatives of enterprises are an example of this. Cooperation between academic and cultural communities is developing in a similar direction. Increasingly broader direct contacts are, at the same time, the product of driving force behind beneficial changes in mutual relations. They make it possible to give substance to political decisions and set out prospects for the future. The April declaration says that "Polish-Soviet cooperation ought to be a cause for millions of people," and that is precisely the direction in which it is evolving.

1,000 Solidarity Militants March at Gdansk

AU3107145188 Paris AFP in English
1450 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Text] Warsaw, July 31 (AFP)—Nearly a thousand militant members of the banned trade union Solidarity demonstrated peacefully Sunday in support of union rights in the northern port city of Gdansk, reliable sources said.

The militants marched through the city centre chanting support for Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and calling on the authorities to stand by agreements, made with Solidarity in 1980, on free speech and union pluralism.

Watching police did not intervene during the march, sources said.

Activists came from all over Poland to take part in the demonstration, which began after mass at Saint Bridget's, the dockyard parish church whose priest, Father Henryk Jankowski, is Mr. Walesa's confessor.

During the march, militants shouted "no freedom without Solidarity" and "we want Lech and not Wojciech" (Jaruzelski), the general who heads the Polish Government.

The crowd dispersed quietly after singing Solidarity songs and giving "V" victory signs.

Police Break Up Demonstration in Warsaw

AU0108064988 Paris AFP in English
0640 GMT 1 Aug 88

[Text] Warsaw, Aug 1 (AFP)—Club-wielding Polish police broke up a demonstration here Sunday by several hundred people trying to get to the tomb of the unknown soldier on the eve of the 44th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising on August 1, 1944, correspondents said.

Several people were bundled into police vans, and dissident Leszk Moczulski, chairman of the banned Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), was arrested at his home before the demonstration started.

The protest began as churchgoers streamed out of a patriotic mass at Saint John's cathedral in the old city, celebrated by the suffragan bishop of Warsaw Monsignor Wladyslaw Miziolek.

In his sermon he praised the heroism of those who took part in the uprising and criticised the Soviet Army for standing by while Poles were massacred by the Nazis.

The demonstrators, led by KPN member Krzystof Krol, bore banners saying: "We will never bow to Moscow."

They ran up against a police blockade some 500 metres (yards) from the tomb, and scuffles broke out. Police clubbed and arrested several of the demonstrators.

Patriotic masses were celebrated throughout the country Sunday, notably at the Warsaw church of Saint Stanislaw, which houses the remains of the murdered pro-Solidarity priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko.

Dissatisfaction With Government Reform Work

AU2907151588 Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 24 Jul 88 pp 1, 2

[Ernest Skalski article: "Words and Deeds"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Although the PZPR, which has been in power for almost 50 years, cannot consider itself as relieved of responsibility for Minc's investments and Gierek's voluntarism, we can ignore the issue for the time being and even forgive the present governing team for its 1982-97 stage of the reform. We are exclusively concerned with the second stage of the reform begun last November amid assurances that it was the real thing. Various measures were taken, ostensibly to improve the flow of basic goods in the first months of 1988, but our people know of no improvements. On the contrary, price hikes and the rapid increases in inflation are continuing, without being matched by wage increases. The galloping inflation is making it impossible to reasonably plan economic measures for periods measured by months. Price hikes were supposed to improve price relations and market balance and to maintain and even better our living conditions. Last May the premier said that the market situation and living standards of most people had become worse, but no one told us that the achievement of appointed goals was not becoming reality. Could this have been surprising after 40 or so years of price hikes, which have always caused our economic and social situation to deteriorate and have even caused unrest, while never resulting in a balance at all? [passage omitted]

It was a good thing that the premier admitted in the Sejm that the price hikes had failed, but this admission was unsatisfactory. What guarantees are there that the government, which regards public support for its policy as the condition for its realization, will cease to disregard public, general experience, the views of economists, and the stand of the influential circles within the governing party itself? Pluralism is no doubt a valuable commodity, but the governing team could do with a little more cohesion.

The law on the enterprising spirit is to be the main point of the reform program, and equal rights of sectors and the freedom to take economic initiative, excluding (why?) special areas, are to be the main point of this law. As for that equality, the question is: Has anyone told us how Government Decree 112/81 has been implemented? Has this decree, which introduced the equality of sectors a long time ago and which was never implemented, been canceled? Or has it withered away? [passage omitted]

A tested practice of making changes to improve the situation in the PPR has existed for a long time. At first, much is said about the range, boldness, and momentous significance of these changes, and this talk is meant to amass political capital for the authorities. After that, nothing much happens for a long time. This is followed by drawing up a bill, the final form of which loses many of its original provisions. When the bill has been passed into law, again nothing happens for a long time, because implementation decrees are not available. This may seem strange, but it is a fact that the Sejm is unable to pass an important law for immediate action, if such action is not to the liking of the apparatus or of some part of it. At long last some of the implementation decrees are issued, but they generally prune the law in question or are even in conflict with its principles. This is followed (or not) by practical implementation, which deviates from original plans or contradicts them. Soon afterward the law is modified and deviates even further from preliminary promises. Although all this is not always fully repeated, the practice is frequent enough, especially insofar as important issues are concerned, for us to stop worrying about what happens to various projects and even to new laws.

We may assume that the law on the enterprising spirit will not harm this spirit, which, despite everything, has continued to develop in Poland in the past few years, overcoming the main bureaucratic barriers. Perhaps it will be easier to overcome them next year, but they will not disappear. The situation will call for even more radical solutions than today and we will not know whether this process will not be marked by a sudden leap occasioned if only by another inflation curve or social disturbances.

Imperfect laws are the nightmare of our reality, but principles of momentous changes in society can do without excessive precision. They should be simple, readable, and obvious. The principles that all are equal in law and that one is allowed to do what is not prohibited have been the foundation of our civilization for many generations and have not been invented on account of the second stage of the reform. The law on the second stage could have been put into operation as of 1 November 1987 or as of 1 January 1988 at the latest. This bold procedure, justified by the seriousness of the moment and by the nature of our changes, would have certainly been much more effective than the present routinized approach toward the reform. It would be enough for the government to use only a part of the speed, consistency, and determination it used on 13 December 1981..., except that it would have to be used against someone else. [passage omitted]

As for the government's special powers, I was initially inclined not to worry about them, because I saw them as rhetoric and as a wish to raise some wind. After all, even without such powers the government could dismiss any manager; open, close down, divide, and merge just any enterprise; mete out punishment for strikes; fix prices; and so forth; and so on. However, the crucial issue is how these powers are used. One use provides for listing the goods that should always be available. Instead of radically adopting the market system, in which all goods are always on sale everywhere, a list is produced of the goods that the authorities consider the most important for customers. They will then supervise the entire course of production and supplies. If, in addition, they consult all this with the trade unions, the Federation of Consumers, or some other bodies, they will only increase their work. In this way the authorities, which were supposed to disengage themselves from production and trade under the economic reform, to allow people to work, and, say, to liquidate themselves, which would be the best thing, seem to prove their indispensability, because they are concerned for our interests! Cunning, is it not? [passage omitted]

The authorities, church dignitaries, leaders of the opposition, Western statesmen, and economic experts continue to appeal to us to support the policy of reforms. Very well, but what is it we should support? The never ending declarations? The legislative capers and the laws that are never realized? The mockery directed at us and at common sense?

And what should this support be? Establishing an economic society? But the authorities will not register it. Establishing an enterprise? The law on the enterprising spirit has still not been passed. Besides, one has to wait at least 8 months for a notary's decision. (It will be interesting to know how long this waiting time is when the law is passed.) The only thing we can do is to declare our support.... In this way the reformers, whom hardly anyone is able to trust, will make themselves credible for perhaps a short time, but the time they gain is the time we all lose.

Jaruzelski Meets PRON National Council Chairman

LD2907214788 Warsaw PAP in English
1645 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—President of Poland's Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski met with Chairman of PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) National Council Jan Dobraczynski here today.

Jaruzelski and Dobraczynski discussed problems pertaining to the broadening of national agreement and the development of socialist democracy against the backdrop of Poland's socio-economic situation.

PRON Member Views Dialogue With Opposition

PM2907162388 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish
15 Jul 88 p3

[Interview with Prof Anna Przeclawska, deputy dean of Warsaw University Faculty of Pedagogics, Consultative Council member, and PRON National Council Presidium member, by INTERPRESS correspondent Krzysztof Strzelecki; date and place not given]

[Text] [Strzelecki] Last Tuesday PAP announced that PZPR Politburo member Jozef Czyrek received a group of people connected with the monthly KONFRONTACJE, a periodical published on the instructions of the PRON National Council, to discuss questions which had been the subject of their recent meeting with—to quote PAP—"representatives of the so-called independent circles," at which particular attention was given to questions of social pluralism and the anticrisis pact. Professor, you attended both those meetings. Could you give us some more information on the circumstances in which the meeting took place and the course it took?

[Przeclawska] It is true that it was the first time that we had met in that particular composition, or at least the first for many years; and perhaps it was not the last. The origin of the meeting can be described in simple terms. Our monthly publication KONFRONTACJE, whose editor-in-chief is Marek Goliszewski (I sit on his editorial board, as do Prof Mariusz Gulczynski and Dr Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, who also took part both meetings), has as its objective the creation of a broad forum for an extensive and unrestrained debate on all that is good and all that is bad for Poland, how we can successfully overcome the crisis, and how to direct future development. That is why the second issue of KONFRONTACJE already carried an interview given to our monthly by Bronislaw Geremek, in which he proposed—perhaps unexpectedly for many observers—the idea of an "anticrisis pact" which would provide an opportunity for cooperation among people who may represent diametrically different political orientations, but are unanimous in their concern for Poland's present day and for her future. That voice did not die down unanswered. The idea was taken up by editor and Sejm deputy Ryszard Wojna and then by Prof Mariusz Gulczynski. In an interview printed in the May issue of KONFRONTACJE Prof Gulczynski declared outright that opposition in socialism is "an objective fact. It is necessary to think of ways in which we can make it constructive instead of destructive. Experience has proved that legalization is the best solution—that is, of course, legalization of the opposition which accepts the framework of the constitution. I think that applies to a predominant proportion of opposition today." Please forgive the longish quote, but I fully endorse that standpoint.

[Strzelecki] You probably also agree with another opinion, which was—not by coincidence—given a prominent place in the same, May issue of KONFRONTACJE. I am thinking of the passage from deputy Ryszard Wojna's 11 May Sejm address. He said: "Let us not overlook the fact that not all persons whose names have for many years been associated with the opposition automatically joined the campaign designed to encourage the wave of strikes. A significant stratification of attitudes occurred in their ranks. Not all of them allowed themselves to be prompted into insanity."

[Przeclawska] I think these questions are still very topical although they remain extremely complex. But let us go back to that meeting of 28 June this year. After much mutual—or, rather, multilateral—reconnoitering, we accepted the hospitality proffered by the rector of Warsaw University and met on the "neutral" ground he provided for our group of more than 20 persons. Apologies were received from several more who had declared their readiness to take part in our exchange of views. The meeting lasted over 4 hours. You will, of course, ask me for the names of those present and for an account of what was said—for nearly everybody present took the floor, sometimes even several times. I will not be able to grant your request, or satisfy your readers' curiosity. In accordance with the wish of several participants in the meeting we decided that we would not issue any press statement. I am not released from the obligation to respect that agreement even by certain "leaks" which have occurred since that Tuesday in June and which, unfortunately, have also been repeated by Polish-language broadcasting stations in the West. I can tell you that there were very many themes in our conversation, as usually happens between people who meet for the first time after a long period in which they maintained no contacts at all. The predominant theme was definitely that of Poland's present day and its future. We debated many possibilities of devising a blueprint of a coalition of all people of goodwill: a coalition which we all need so much. In connection with that, questions of social and political pluralism were discussed in a matter-of-fact, open manner. These involved its possible models, the opportunities it would offer, and its consequences.

[Strzelecki] While I understand and respect the restrictions by which you are bound, I should be grateful if you could at least tell us what was said by Prof Anna Przeclawska, academic with no party affiliation, member of the Consultative Council attached to the Chairman of the Council of State, and member of PRON National Council Presidium, at that Warsaw University meeting of 28 June this year?

[Przeclawska] Roughly speaking, exactly what I have been saying in my capacity as a member of the bodies you have just mentioned, and at many other meetings where, just as at that one of 28 June, I first and foremost try to represent myself. I say first and foremost because, after all, we all live in definite existing milieus and each of us is entitled to relate our own personal beliefs to those shared with other people and groups. I firmly support, and have done so for a long time, the idea of talks, of dialogue. I believe that even if the only result of dialogue is awareness of the degree to which the sides differ in their positions, that, too, is a gain. And, after all, our meeting yielded more than just a register of differences... I am also a confirmed advocate of institutional formulas for presenting opinions which diverge from official ones (although even the latter are sometimes difficult to contain under a single denominator). It cannot be simply a dialogue of a private nature, between individuals. A structure, or even more than one structure, must be provided to accommodate what Prof Gulczynski spoke of: legal opposition. I believe that opposition is necessary in every aspect of public life as a verifier of programs realized by the authorities. This is a condition required both by political prudence and ordinary principles of fair play. Perhaps I should add one more thing here. With all these "heresies" which I profess, I have long believed that it is high time today, half-way through the year 1988, to pass from words to actions. It is true that we should continue to try to "shape" the formula to be adopted for the legalization of those diverging opinions (associations? political clubs? parties?) and we must allow for the fact that the process is bound to progress in stages, but if the ideas we have been talking about are not to turn into reality soon, we might as well stop talking altogether—and perhaps not just talking...

[Strzelecki] So, Professor, you take a firm stand in favor of confrontation, although—let us admit—that term has an ambiguous significance for us here in Poland, to say the least...

[Przeclawska] Depending on the circumstances, everything can become distorted and even become, as it were, its own opposite. Given the absence of an institutional system based on a legalization of the existing facts and unavailability of public information on the realities of our life, any confrontation of contrasting views can become potentially explosive. And the reverse is also true: Given the sort of conditions which I have been describing and which I recommend, confrontation—which, in my opinion, we must accept as soon as we realize the inevitable need for a series of mutual or sometimes many-sided compromises—can only be to our advantage. Without wishing to prejudge the future course of further meetings to follow that first one of 28 June, or to predict their dates, I should like to emphasize that that was the strongest impression which remained with me as I was leaving the senate room of my university on that Tuesday.

More on Poll on Influence of Church

LD2907160988 Warsaw PAP in English
1412 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Warsaw, July 29—"What are, in you opinion, the signs of the church's influence in Poland." The Public Opinion Poll Centre (CBOS) asked. The following are the most frequent answers: These signs concern actions promoting national agreement, easing the situation in Poland (7.8 per cent of such assessments), participating in decisions made by the government (4.1 per cent), dialogue with the government based on partnership (2.9 per cent) and expressing a stand on political questions by the church (2.3 per cent) of such answers.

At the same time, some respondents mentioned the church's interference in the state policy (4.1 per cent), using confidence of the faithful and manipulating their behaviour for its own ends (2 per cent), active support for the opposition and inciting society (1.8 per cent).

Respondents rarely sized up the church's influence on the basis of its social work: Struggle against signs of social ills (2.2 per cent), interest in human questions and giving assistance to those in need (2 per cent), participation in bringing up youth (1.8 per cent) or the church's work of charity 1.2 per cent).

What contributed to exactly such an influence of the church on Poland's situation. The CBOS asked.

Respondents mentioned the following causes for the church's influence: The majority of society are believers, the church exerts considerable influence upon them (19.3 per cent), the church is a force and enjoys prestige (8.4 per cent). Respondents pointed also to the fact that the church's influence was traditionally considerable in Poland (5.4 per cent), that it is moral support for people (4 per cent) and it is the church's moral duty to commit itself to questions of the faithful (2.8 per cent).

Andrei, Ungur Meet Hungarian Trade Official

AU2907160288 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1541 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 29/7/1988—On July 29, Stefan Andrei, Romanian deputy prime minister, and Ioan Ungur, Romanian minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, met with Imre Dunai, deputy minister of trade of the Hungarian People's Republic, who is paying a visit to Romania.

Measures were examined of boosting Romanian-Hungarian commercial relations, of expanding economic cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Discuss '89 Trade Accord

LD2907172888 Budapest MTI in English
1625 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Bucharest, July 29 (MTI)—Imre Dunai, Hungarian deputy minister of trade, and Alexandru Necula, Romanian state secretary of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, held talks in Bucharest on July 28-29 on the implementation of deliveries specified in the 1988 Hungarian-Romanian goods exchange protocol and on the preparation of next year's goods exchange agreement.

The sides agreed that bilateral commercial relations were developing in a satisfactory way and both countries met their inter-state obligations.

Imre Dunai held talks with Ioan Ungur, minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, and Radu Paunescu, minister of machine building industry.

Imre Dunai met Stefan Andrei, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and alternate member of the Executive Political Committee of the RCP CC.

Ceausescu Receives Syrian Industry Minister

AU2807191588 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1822 GMT 28 Jul 88

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 28/7/1988—On 28 July, President Nicolae Ceausescu of the Socialist Republic of Romania, received Antoine Jubran, minister of industry of the Syrian Arab Republic, now visiting Romania, at Neptun resort.

The Syrian minister thanked for being received and conveyed to President Nicolae Ceausescu, on behalf of President Hafiz al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, a cordial salute and wishes of success in all his activities as well as wishes of progress and welfare to the Romanian people.

President Nicolae Ceausescu addressed the Syrian president his warm salute and best wishes of good health and success in all his activity and peace and prosperity to the friendly Syrian people.

During the interview the sides pointed out the good relations of collaboration between Romania and Syria, pointing out the important part played for their development by the understandings reached during the summit dialogues. At the same time the sides considered that the current potential of the two countries' economies offered conditions for expanding the Romanian-Syrian cooperation in various domains, special attention being paid to the mutually-advantageous collaboration in metallurgy, machine building and other industrial sectors as well as in the technical and scientific planes. They pointed out that further developing the economic, technological, scientific and other collaboration between Romania and Syria was to benefit both countries and peoples, the cause of peace, international understanding and cooperation.

Participating in the call was Radu Paunescu, minister of the machine building industry.

Attending was Bahjat Dughman, Syrian charge d'affaires ad-interim in Bucharest.

CSCE Emphasis on Human Rights Deplored

AU2807172388 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1530 GMT 28 Jul 88

["European Security and Cooperation: Options and Prospects"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 28/7/1988 - A commentary under the above heading run by the foreign policy weekly "LUMEA" in its 28 July issue reviews the questions approached at the all-European follow-up meetings as well as Romania's contribution to the dialogue conducted by the 35 CSCE participating states, begun at the Helsinki conference, which concluded with the signing of the Final Act, and continued by the Madrid and Stockholm meetings and the current Vienna reunion.

The all-European meetings organized after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the contacts held on the occasion deepened mutual knowledge, thus favouring collaboration in many areas. Referring to the Vienna meeting which is now working out the final document, the weekly underscores that it is called upon to help maintain the dynamics and continuity of the CSCE process by adopting a balanced resolution apt to stimulate the building-up of confidence and stability on the continent, a passage to tangible disarmament measures, the growth of economic, technical and scientific collaboration and cooperation in all spheres of interstate relations. The commentary also calls attention to the fact that some trends [that] occurred during the all-European process run counter to the Helsinki spirit and understandings.

Referring to the period that has elapsed since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act when the tendency emerged to disconsider the balance that should characterize the CSCE process "LUMEA" shows:

Balance is a specific element of the Final Act which contains provisions referring to a wide range of domains virtually including all political, security, economic, cultural, humanitarian and other relations extant among the CSCE participating states. The attempts to single out some aspects for ideological, circumstantial or political reasons from this coherent and balanced whole do nothing but harm the equilibrium of the process started in Helsinki, raise artificial obstacles to cooperation, security and understanding among nations. Significant in this respect are the insistent and continuous attempts of some Western countries to take only one principle into account: the observance of human rights, with emphasis on their peripheral, secondary aspects. The respective countries absolutize such aspects as contacts among persons, emigration, full freedom of religious sects, ignoring or refusing to examine and take pledges on major, highly topical questions which affect millions of people like the right to life, work, education, culture, shelter and social assistance. Even if at a given time, some aspects of the CSCE process could be of a greater concern to some participating states, one should not disconsider the fact that this process had not aimed at serving the interests of some states without mutually observing the others' vested rights.

The thirteen-year experience in the CSCE process shows that, when emphasis is placed only on a section of the Final Act which serves the circumstantial interests of one state or of a group of states, nothing can be achieved but confrontation and tension that prejudice both the spirit and the letter of the Final Act.

Equally detrimental to the balance of the CSCE process is the negligence or disconsideration of aspects or even important domains, as it was the case of the development of economic, technical and scientific cooperation.

It is well-known and unanimously acknowledged that economic, technical, scientific and commercial exchanges among states must be effected without any obstacle and any kind of political discriminations to achieve an ever broader and beneficial participation in the international division of labour and a better integration into the world economy. The full observance of the basic principles of international trade, of non-discrimination and the most-favoured-nation clause status have a decisive importance in interstate relations. The free exchange of scientific achievements and top technologies must also be a priority goal in the CSCE process. The attempt to make abstraction from like important aspects of the Final Act and the refusal to observe the pledges assumed in such a domain inevitably dissipate the hopes and possibilities of fulfilling the obligations assumed by the other participating states and would ultimately paralyze what has to be a dynamic process and steady progress. [sentence as received]

Referring to another trend, manifested especially during the Vienna meeting, namely to impose points of view and "patterns" of approaching questions advanced by a group of states under the pretext that they were also acquired by the neutral and non-aligned countries which, according to a tradition created during the CSCE process, give compromising solutions to disputed issues, the weekly notes: The neutral and non-aligned countries found in the CSCE an appropriate framework for the safeguarding of their interests. Being promoted, they constituted themselves a set of initiatives and proposals conducive to generally acceptable solutions. This contribution was appreciated by the other participating countries as long as such solutions aimed at striking a balance of interests of all the thirty-five states. Notwithstanding, when the balance tended to obviously incline in the favour of some of them to the others' detriment, the solutions found by those countries could no longer help reach compromising agreements, and the contribution which was thought to be positive had no effect. Falling within such a context is also the draft final document of the Vienna meeting tabled by the neutral and non-aligned countries on 13 May 1988 which favours the Western states' stances and proposals regarding several problems. The Vienna meeting, now in a final stage, could end with positive, substantial and balanced results only to the extent to which it succeeded in giving a new impetus to the Helsinki spirit, to the observance and application of the Final Act provisions.

The CSCE process provided and can provide, in future as well, an adequate framework and propitious opportunity for dialogue and cooperation if all countries understand to observe the spirit in which this process was conceived, the goals and principles that underlie it just as the interests of each participating state, "LUMEA shows in conclusion.

Transylvanian German Protests Rights Abuses

AU0108092888 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 1 Aug 88 p 4

["Letter to the German-Speaking Public"]

[Text] On 1 November 1986 33-year-old puppeteer Ivan Peter Chelu from Cluj-Napoca wrote the following letter, which has now reached the West:

I, Ivan Peter Chelu, a German in Transylvania, protest against the aggressive state power, which is about to destroy our community, to repress our culture, to close down our schools, and to destroy our historic and intellectual heritage. It is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve our national identity!

I protest against the cutting off of our connections with our mother nation.

I protest against the suspension of German-language radio and television broadcasts.

I protest against the restricted college entry and general discrimination.

I protest against the measures designed to make us leave our homes. Recently the number of us surpassed three-quarters of a million!

I, Ivan Peter Chelu, an independent artist, protest against the despotic censorship and bureaucracy which makes any independent, artistic work in this country impossible. The alternative is either intellectual and moral prostitution or keeping silent: Both lead to the death of the artist and the arts.

I, Ivan Peter Chelu, a Romanian citizen, protest against the violation of such basic human rights as freedom of opinion and movement.

I protest against our people being made to live in misery and unworthy conditions, against the way public life is directed and controlled by the secret police, and I express my solidarity with those people that have been imprisoned and persecuted for political or religious reasons.

I declare that this letter is authentic and that all potential attempt to change it afterwards or withdraw it are invalid.

Ceausescu Views 'Agrarian Revolution' in County

AU2807181688 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1738 GMT 28 Jul 88

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 28/7/1988—28 July, RCP general secretary, president of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu paid a working visit to farm units in Constanta County (south-eastern Romania).

During the visit, an analysis was made with responsible factors in the mechanization of agriculture, of practical aspects regarding the implementation of the programme of harvesting and modernization of farm machines and equipment in keeping with the objectives set in this domain, with the requirements of the new agrarian revolution. On a terrain near Valul lui Traian Commune the experts presented the new type of self-propelled harvester equipped with a high-power motor and a great cutting capacity which shortens the harvesting period by 30 percent as compared to the harvester now in operation in the Romanian agriculture. The new harvester is to be put into serial production as soon as possible to ensure the equipment of the farm units with like high-capacity combines.

Next, the Tekirghiol cooperative producer farm was visited where questions were analysed concerning the implementation of the flax cultivating and processing programme and emphasis was placed on the advantages of capitalizing the natural land conditions in this zone.

Participating in the visit were Emil Bobu, Gheorghe Oprea, Silviu Curticeanu and Gheorghe David, minister of agriculture, executives of this basic sector of the Romanian economy, experts.

State Council Decrees Pay Increase

AU2807110788 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 26 Jul 88 pp 1, 2

["Decree of the State Council of the SR of Romania on Implementing the Working Personnel's Pay Increase"]

[Text] In order to implement the 1988-89 pay increase measures established by the 13th Congress and the December 1987 National Conference of the RCP as well as the provisions of Law No 4/1988 on increasing the working personnel's remuneration,

The State Council of the SR of Romania decrees:

Article 1. (1) As of 1 August 1988, the basic pay of all categories of working personnel will be increased in stages.

(2) In the 1 August-1 October 1988 period, during the first stage, the remuneration of personnel with a monthly basic pay of 2,000 lei will be increased gradually according to branch and activity.

(3) In the 1 November 1988-1 January 1989 period, during the second stage, the remuneration of personnel with a monthly basic pay of 2,001-2,250 lei will be increased gradually according to branch and activity.

(4) In the 1 March-1 August 1989 period, during the third stage, the remuneration of personnel with a monthly basic pay of more than 2,250 lei will be increased gradually per according to branch and activity.

Article 2. (1) The pay increase in the first and second stage will be applied as follows.

Number-Branch-Activity	Date of Increase	
	First stage—for personnel with monthly basic pay of up to 2000 lei	Second stage—for personnel with monthly basic pay of 2000-2250 lei
1. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Mines	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
2. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Petroleum	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
3. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Electric Power	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
4. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
5. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Machine Building Industry (including technical assistance and service units)	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
6. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Electrical Engineering Industry (including technical assistance and service units)	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
7. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
8. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Wood Industry and Construction Materials	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
9. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Light Industry	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
10. Industry—units subordinated to the Geology Central Department	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
11. Drilling and geological operations	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
12. Scientific research, technological development, design, and data processing	1 Aug 1988	1 Nov 1988
13. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Food Industry	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
14. Agriculture (including agricultural general directorates)	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
15. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
16. Forestry	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
17. Construction-Assembly	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
18. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Industrial Construction	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
19. Water management	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
20. Transportation and Telecommunications	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
21. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
22. Industry—units subordinated to the Council of Socialist Culture and Education and to other ministries and central bodies	1 Sep 1988	1 Dec 1988
23. Industry—units subordinated to the people's councils, the Central Union of Artisan Cooperatives, the Central Union of Production, Purchasing, and Commodity Sales Cooperatives, and other cooperative organizations	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
24. Communal and housing administration	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
25. Goods circulation	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
26. Education	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
27. Medicare, social assistance, physical culture and sports	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
28. Culture and arts	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
29. Financial and insurance institutions	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
30. State administration	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989

31. Unions, associations	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989
32. Other economic branches	1 Oct 1988	1 Jan 1989

(2) In the third stage, the pay will be increased as follows:

Number-Branch-Activity	Date of Increase
1. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Mines	1 Mar 1989
2. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Petroleum	1 Apr 1989
3. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Electric Power	1 Apr 1989
4. Industry—units subordinated to the Geology Central Department	1 Apr 1989
5. Drilling and geological operations	1 Apr 1989
6. Agriculture (including agricultural general directorates)	1 May 1989
7. Forestry	1 May 1989
8. Water management	1 May 1989
9. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry	1 Jun 1989
10. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture	1 Jun 1989
11. Scientific research, technological development, research. Data processing	1 Jun 1989
12. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Machine Building Industry (including technical assistance and service units)	1 Jul 1989
13. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Electrical Engineering Industry (including technical assistance and service units)	1 Jul 1989
14. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry	1 Jul 1989
15. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Light Industry	1 Jul 1989
16. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Wood Industry and Construction Materials	1 Aug 1989
17. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Light Industry	1 Aug 1989
18. Assembly-Construction	1 Aug 1989
19. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Industrial Construction	1 Aug 1989
20. Transportation and Telecommunications	1 Aug 1989
21. Industry—units subordinated to the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications	1 Aug 1989
22. Industry—units subordinated to the Council for Socialist Culture and Education and other ministries and central bodies	1 Aug 1989
23. Industry—units subordinated to the people's councils, the Central Union of Artisan Cooperatives, the Central Union of Production, Purchasing, and Commodity Sales Cooperatives, and other cooperative organizations	1 Aug 1989
24. Communal and housing administration	1 Aug 1989
25. Goods circulation	1 Aug 1989
26. Education	1 Aug 1989
27. Medicare, social assistance, physical culture and sports	1 Aug 1989
28. Culture and arts	1 Aug 1989
29. Financial and insurance institutions	1 Aug 1989
30. State administration	1 Aug 1989
31. Unions, associations	1 Aug 1989
32. Other economic branches	1 Aug 1989

Article 3. (1) As of the various times stipulated in Article 2, one will apply for each stage the increased basic pay and other remuneration rights included in Annex No 1 of the current decree, which modifies accordingly the remuneration envisaged in Annexes No 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 of Law No 57/1974 and the State Council Decree No 100/1979.

(2) The increased basic remunerations also include compensations for agricultural and food products, thermal energy, natural gas, and other fuels granted on the basis of provisions of State Council Decrees No 46/1982 and 240/1982.

Article 4. (1) As of the time stipulated for each stage in Article 2, all remuneration rights for the personnel whose basic pay has been increased at a given stage will be established on the basis of the newly increased basic pay, in accordance with their sphere of activity.

(2) All remuneration rights for the personnel whose pay is scheduled to be increased at a later stage will be established on the basis of the nonincreased basic pay, until such time as stipulated in Article 2.

Article 5. (1) The remuneration increase will be applied, at the date stipulated in Article 2, for the entire working personnel of a unit that falls within a given stage—enterprise, central department, institution, factory, plant, mining unit, construction brigade, agricultural farm, and research, design, computer, and other similar centers, including their subunits—in accordance with the specific sector in which the respective unit is carrying out its basic activity and with the provisions of the uniform national plan for socioeconomic development, regardless of the central or local body to which that unit is subordinated.

(2) For certain special situations, the pay increase will be applied as follows:

a) for the personnel of sections, laboratories, or other independently operating subunits, which are directly subordinated to various ministries and to other central bodies and executive committees of county people's councils or the Bucharest Municipality—at the date envisaged for each stage, in accordance with the sphere of activity of these subunits;

b) in the steel, metallurgical, and chemical combines (enterprises)—at the same time, within each stage, for all their member units;

c) for the entire personnel in units with a mixed production flow—at the date envisaged for each stage, in accordance with the sector in which they operate, with the provisions of the uniform national plan, and with the main line of activity in which the personnel is involved;

d) for the personnel of the road and bridge directorates in the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, of county road directorates, of construction and repair enterprises, and of housing administration—at the date stipulated for each stage in the assembly-construction branch;

e) in foreign trade enterprises specialized in operations abroad—at the date established for each stage in the sectors that correspond to the operations performed;

f) for the personnel of industrial units from the special sector—at the date established per each stage for similar enterprises subordinated to branch coordinating ministries; for the personnel of other economic units, at the date envisaged for the sector to which they belong;

g) for the personnel employed in day nurseries, kindergartens, medical and health services, vocational and foremen's schools, training courses, and other educational or medicare units financed by units belonging to other sectors—at the envisaged date, within each separate stage, for the respective educational or medicare branch, as the case may be.

Article 6. The working personnel who, up to the date of the pay increase, received compensation for thermal energy, natural gases, and other type of fuel, in accordance with the number of children they care for, will receive the state allocation for children increased by 10 lei per month for each child, according to Annex No 2

Article 7. Starting with school year 1988-1989, scholarships for pupils and students will be granted in accordance with the joint income of parents or legal guardians, stipulated in Annex No 3.

Article 8. The monthly contribution for children in day nurseries and kindergartens, during the period 1 August 1988-31 August 1989, will be established in accordance with the remuneration of parents and legal guardians before the pay increase.

Article 9. (1) The Council of Ministers, together with the ministries, central departments, enterprises, central survey bodies, and executive committees of county people's councils and of Bucharest Municipality Council, will take appropriate measures to fulfill the plan for 1988, in order to mobilize all the working people's collectives in enterprises and central departments, with a view to achieving the complete item-specified production, the commodity and net production, and the exports production and putting into operation all the investment objectives on schedule and in the most favorable conditions.

(2) Likewise, the government, ministries, and the other central and local bodies will take appropriate action to fulfill all the provisions included in the special programs on ensuring a more marked increase of labor productivity, raising the technical and qualitative level of products, and reducing production costs, mainly by reducing raw and other material consumption, energy, and fuel, ensuring a higher degree of utilization of all the resources, and by firmly applying the remuneration in accordance with the the overall contract system, which will lead to the complete fulfillment of plan provisions on increasing national income and on fully securing the fund required for the action of increasing the remuneration of the working personnel.

Article 10. (1) The State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Labor, within 10 days of the date of issue of the current decree, in accordance with the proposals of plan executors, will lay out the sums allocated for pay increase for the ministries, central departments, county people's councils, and Bucharest Municipality Council, which in turn, will ensure the distribution of the sums to the units, in accordance with the time table for pay increase in stages, stipulated by the current decree.

(2) The ministries, the other central bodies, central departments, and the executive committees of the county people's councils and of the Bucharest Municipality Council, within 10 days of the date of this decree, will submit proposals for modifying economic and financial indicators for the second half and for the entire 1988.

(3) The State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance will submit proposals for modifying indicators in the national uniform plan for socioeconomic development and in the volume and structure of the state budget, for the second half and for the entire 1988, as a result of the application of the current decree.

(4) The consequences arising from the application of the current decree will be taken into consideration when finalizing the national uniform plan for socioeconomic development and the state budget for 1989.

Article 11. The Annexes No 1-3 are an integral part of the current decree. (The Annexes are published in the Official Bulletin)

Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Leaders Address LCY CC Session on Kosovo 29 Jul

Setinc Speech

AU2907113288 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0810 GMT 29 Jul 88 [Speech by France Setinc, member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, speech at the 16th plenum of the LCY Central Committee in Belgrade on 29 July—live]

[Text] Because of my listeners and the very important topic, I will speak in Serbo-Croatian and in Slovene at the end, certainly sufficiently loudly and clearly that you will be able to hear and understand me. I have a duty to myself and in principle that no one thinks that we only have one state language. Apart from that, what I will say I cannot express differently than in the language which was given to me at birth.

Comrades, we open our report with information that we have achieved certain initial results in the implementation of the conclusions of the ninth session of the LCY Central Committee. We agree with the appraisal contained in the stances of the 12th session of the Serbian LC Central Committee which said that these results were significant as they confirm that the problems can be solved and the situation can change. They are encouraging because they were formulated in conditions of a complex and intensified political and economic situation, not only in Kosovo but also in the whole country. However, we cannot be satisfied, as the state of intranational relations is worsening, especially in certain communities; and the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins is continuing intensively which is the synthetic indication of the entire state of the province.

It is this that best shows the mutual interconnection of all tasks and conclusions of the ninth LCY Central Committee and the Yugoslav program which can give results only if they are solved as a whole and if through a constant process of differentiation of daily specific responsibility for incomplete and badly implemented tasks (?is established). Therefore, we have to use this session in order to realistically appraise the implementation of the conclusions of the ninth session of the LCY Central Committee and to agree over further action to essentially get rid of obstacles and to in essence influence a change in the situation.

When we prepared the report on the implementation of the conclusions of the ninth LCY Central Committee session, we primarily proceeded from the report of the Serbian LC Central Committee and the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee, but also from reports of all the other central committees, the Vojvodina LC Provincial Committee, and the committee of the LCY organization in the Yugoslav People's Army.

We have strived for realistic and clear appraisals, without embellishing and belittling the achieved results. We will pass over in silence no specific success and will not close our eyes to any failure. We must proceed from the truth in our basic decisions. We will not help anyone by beautifying things. However [word indistinct] feelings of helplessness [word indistinct] doubt in the conscience, but this does exist. When good news about Kosovo is only bad news that cannot be a stimulus to anyone for future work, and especially to the Kosovo leadership and the SR of Serbia.

The conclusions adopted at the LCY Central Committee ninth session a year ago represent the essential crossroads, as they significantly contributed to the strengthening of awareness that the stabilization in Kosovo is a general Yugoslav problem. The recognition that all tense contradictions in our country come to a head in the Kosovo situation has been strengthened and that our way of socialist self-management, the policy of brotherhood and unity, the federal structure, and finally the integrity and independence of the country are being tested. The whole of our policy on intranational relations, which once served the world as an example, but was dealt a particularly hard blow with the 1981 counterrevolution in Kosovo, is also being tested.

In fact, in the example of Kosovo, we must show that there is no alternative to the policy of national equality for us and our country. Only on this basis, can we restore tranquility and political and economic stability to Kosovo and no one, regardless of which nation and nationality they belong to and which language they speak, should not be anxious about their own safety and the security of their property.

All peoples and nationalities in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Moslems, Romanies, Croats, and others must be equal and secure in the construction and implementation of joint policy and life in the the Kosovo Socialist Autonomous Province, the SR of Serbia, and the whole country.

In the search for joint answers to the questions that are important for Kosovo, Serbia, and Yugoslav; their equal voice must be heard. This is the only possible democratic and humane way to joint life in our community of several nationalities. The creation of ethnically pure communities in Kosovo or anywhere else is not only an anachronism but also has deep reactionary and antihumanist meaning.

When we appraise the achieved results and also the unimplemented tasks and The specific blame for that, we must state that after the ninth LCY Central Committee session there were smaller differences in the assessment of the situation but the question arises, why have these recently resurfaced and even increased? At the session of one organ, it was assessed that the situation is improving, at that of another, that it is deteriorating. Some claim that room for maneuver of the Albanian nationalists is being reduced, and others that it is growing. Some say that the protest meetings are primarily the consequence of dissatisfaction with the slowness in solving the problems and others stress more the nationalist exploitation of and gambling with human troubles.

Differences are also appearing in assessments of the causes of the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Although everyone cites counterrevolutionary activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists, assessments diverge at the point where some stress more the question of the security of the person and property of people; and others the objective causes of emigration like the generally bad sociopolitical atmosphere, the destruction of intranational relations, the difficult socioeconomic and social problems—especially unemployment, backwardness, and the low standard of living and so on.

Recently the LCY Central Committee Presidium asked the leaderships of the Serbian and Kosovo LCs to overcome these differences with joint efforts and to reduce them to the lowest possible level. However, it is important not to quarrel any longer about assessments but act jointly not only in Kosovo and Serbia but also in the whole of Yugoslavia , which means that the burden of daily specific questions rests and must rest on the Kosovo Communists. This is regardless of whether they are Albanians, Serbs, or members of any other nationality; and on all organized socialist forces in Kosovo, also without any difference in nationality because as people say you cannot drive a split pole into the ground. It is important to emphasize that the Twelfth Session of the LC of Serbia Central Committee unanimously adopted the stances that are aimed at changing the situation and fulfilling the assumed obligations and tasks and not at differences.

And even despite the fact that the situation in all Kosovo communities is not the same, we certainly cannot be satisfied with the situation as a whole because in the end there is the painful conclusion that the process of emigration continues and that intranational relations continue to deteriorate. We will not pick on words and seek differences in formulations, be it a matter of the appraisal that the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo continues with unabated intensity or a matter of the appraisal that the intensity of emigration is a cause for concern.

In any event, the problem is so big and tragic that we must devote all our forces and our entire responsibility to it—primarily in Kosovo and Serbia but also in all other parts of Yugoslavia. Even if there were fewer pressures, overt or covert than there are, this should not be any consolation to us because the fact is difficult enough that, because of pressures, people are forced to leave their homes, the homes of their ancestors, and that in this situation any play with figures and percentages makes no sense. We must not overlook the fact that we are faced with the danger of collective emigration unless we quickly stop the present negative trends and turn them into a positive direction. We must not allow the current trends of national divisions to turn into mutual conflicts and pressures between peoples and nationalities because such a turn of events would also entail catastrophic consequences on a wider scale for this part of Europe which now lives in relative peace and coexistence. Therefore our responsibility for the inviolability of Yugoslavia's integrity and sovereignty turns into a responsibility for peace in this part of the world.

Halting the emigration of Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Muslims, and others; and bringing about their return to their homes and developing the Socialist Alliance as a joint front of socialist forces from among the ranks of Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Romanies, and all others living in the province, a joint front in the role of establishing healthy relations—these are two inseparable aspects of the same problem. This is in fact the true measure of our efforts and of stabilization of the situation in Kosovo, our measure of brotherhood and unity and of Yugoslav internationalism. If we fail to cross this Rubicon, there will be no progress, no happiness or peaceful life in Kosovo, and no good and stable situation in the entire country.

Following the Ninth LCY Central Committee Session the competent organs increased their activities to protect the personal security of citizens of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities and their property, and to suppress the Albanian nationalism and separatism. But despite this, the security situation is very difficult and the political security situation is burdened by hotbeds that potentially can result in a further and very grave deterioration of the situation. Last year the internal affairs organs uncovered five illegal groups of Albanian nationalists and separatists. Altogether 70 criminal reports and 404 reports on violations were submitted as a result of illegal and other activities.

Although measures were taken to suppress all forms of nationalist activity, the number of army members of Albanian nationality acting from hostile positions has increased to a pronounced extent. In the second half of 1987, criminal submissions were made against 51 members of the Yugoslav People's Army of Albanian nationality and until now 34 of them have been sentenced. In the first 6 months of this year, criminal submissions were made against 22 individuals and 15 of them have been sentenced up to now.

At the same time last year, the number of the army members of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality acting from nationalist positions and adopting a revanchist attitude toward members of Albanian nationality also increased.

The situation in Kosovo can be improved only by persistently and consistently implementing every-day tasks in the light of long-term tasks. If we fail to respect that, our current and long-term actions will resemble the construction of a dam with big cracks through which water goes and undermines the dam. The key question in the present specific conditions and relations in Kosovo is why we fail to be more successful in ensuring the personal, legal security of all people in Kosovo and the security of their property, particularly of Serbs and Montenegrins, who are most endangered. What do I care about objective causes when I am leaving, one of the Serbs who emigrated has said. He needs help now and not just in the future. The law must be obeyed and implemented immediately, and not only after some time has passed. There is finally the question of the functioning and survival of a legal state, law and order, without which there is not peace, prosperity, and a future for people and society as a whole. This is not contrary to the democratic character of our society—it is in fact a condition for democracy. It is there that the greatest responsibility of over 100,000 LC members, Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and others is shown. They must be more united in implementing tasks from the platform instead of succumbing to the danger of division. It is a question of all socialist forces in the province who must strive all the time for the creation of a favorable climate for joint life instead of permitting the danger of national division to increase. Finally, it is a question of the spiritual and moral level of society, [words indistinct] question of our time.

As long as there is national division and the feeling of fear and endangerment, it will not only be a real political problem of one community, but will also endanger our entire country. Yugoslavia cannot allow that because what is at stake is its integrity and sovereignty. This is why we are all interested that lawfulness should reign in Kosovo. As the first decisive step toward the political stability it is also in the interest of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo, because progress is possible only on the basis of the positive program of its development, its healthy national life and affirmation and not on the program of Albanian nationalism and separatism.

It is becoming more and more clear to the majority of the Albanian population in Kosovo that a nationalist platform would make everybody living in Kosovo suffer, Albanians included. It suits all nationalists that the situation is becoming worse and worse, because they think that the greater the disorder, the greater their chances, although they are contrary to the interests of the majority of Albanian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and other populations in Kosovo and the whole of Yugoslavia.

It is true that Serbs and Montenegrins have started returning to Kosovo and that the number would have been even larger had there been, among other things, more work for everybody. Those people are right who say that data on people who have emigrated are published in large print, and the numbers of people who have returned are published in parentheses as if that is spoiling somebody's plans. Over 4,000 returnees since 1981 is still an encouraging fact which should not be underestimated. Serbs and Montenegrins are returning in an organized way, with the engagement of social factors and conditions being created for their return. In factories, Albanian comrades vote in favor of self-managing decisions according to which Serb and Montenegrin returnees have priority in employment and those who were employed there before get their jobs again without any further procedure although long queues of unemployed people are waiting at the door.

However, the flood of those who emigrate is much greater, since 30,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have emigrated since 1981. Until we turn the tide, so that many more Serbs and Montengrins will return that depart, or rather until we create conditions so that nobody should emigrate under duress but only for normal reasons like elsewhere, we cannot relax and we cannot rest, for nothing would justify our removing one evil to replace it with a worse one.

We would have been even happier had the Albanians earlier said to their Serbian neighbors: Do not leave; we will protect you from pressure; we give you our word of honor for your peace and security, although this cannot be a substitute for a legal state. No country in the modern world can be proud if people leave it under duress. It is a matter of dignity and humanism of the majority of the population. It was the same during the war, for instance in Prizren and in other large towns, when Albanians were hiding their Serbian neighbors in the community, saving them from the ravages of the Albanian separatists, in fact miscreants who exploited the confusion arising with the arrival of the occupiers for plunder, rapes, killings, and persecution.

The Albanian Communist and the Albanian patriots must oppose the Albanian nationalist who exerts pressure on a Serb or Montenegrin to leave his home.

It is a fact that the Albanian nationalists and separatists work in an underhand and hostile way. Unfortunately, young people often join them. Many have been sentenced with long prison terms because they have violated the law. Unfortunately a high percentage of those who have served their sentences find it difficult to return to society.

However, the problems do not begin only with the application of penal policy or with difficulties in the process of resocialization. Preventive social actions have a much greater significance, so that young people would be drawn away from the influence of the nationalist and separatist ideology.

It is necessary to work patiently with those who have been deluded and blinded, and perhaps even intimidated by the nationalists and separatists. Let us stop their fear. Let us bring back their trust in our system and our humanism. Let us struggle resolutely against the enemies of all kinds, and let us struggle even more to gain friends with whom we may expand the joint front in the struggle for the respect and implementation of our socialist ideals.

Having a fatalist attitude, feeling impotent, underestimating and even ignoring what has been achieved, and doubting everything and entertaining a paternalistic attitude toward the cadres in Kosovo is not a good road toward the stabilization of the situation in the province.

At the Kosovo LC Conference, it was said that we must not allow nationalist quarrels to be passed on to the young generation or even to the children. The Albanian intelligentsia must have a positive role in this. Anybody who is somebody must not keep silent at a moment when his voice of reason is most necessary. Teachers, parents, and others must also not fail. They all must be the champions of a different, more civilized relationship among the people and the peoples and nationalities.

The escalation of nationalism in all the parts of Yugoslavia makes the settling of the situation in Kosovo difficult. It would be good if there were less of this poison. We are often preoccupied with misunderstandings about these and similar occurrences, instead of discussing in a well-argued way as equals our joint actions for a solution to the present great difficulties.

Some individuals have even begun to cite the 1974 Constitution as having caused all our problems. Some people turn history into myths. They want to shackle our way of thinking to the past instead of freeing it and making it work for a more successful future. The Constitution did not create the counterrevolution in Kosovo, although we agree that the constitutional problems are important to the situation in Yugoslavia and its further development; to a way out of the social, economic, and political crisis; and for essential economic and other reforms. This, of course, also applies to the constitutional problems in the SR of Serbia where one should proceed from the LCY Conference's position and jointly make additional efforts to harmonize views and overcome differences that still exist regarding constitutional questions; regulating unity and togetherness in the SR of Serbia contained in the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the SR of Serbia, including those that refer to the definition of functions performed by Serbia as a state and a self-managing community over all of its territory, so that conditions may be created for a successful completion of work in amending the Constitution of the SR of Serbia and the Constitutions of the socialist autonomous provinces.

It is of exceptional importance that the discussion of these questions should begin at once, and should be carried out jointly and with full responsibility, and that agreeable solutions should be found to these questions within the current discussions of the constitutional amendments. One should strive for a democratic and constructive atmosphere for the discussion without any pressure and tension as was indicated, among other things, in the recently adopted stances of the LCY Central Committee Presidium. One should particularly point out that the draft amendments to the Constitution of the SR of Serbia were unanimously adopted in the Assembly of the SR of Serbia.

Gatherings on a nationality basis, public protests, mass marches in other communities, and various forms of undemocratic pressure are not the right way to solve the amassed problems. This will not lead to an improvement or to successful discussions of our difficult situation. It only makes the situation worse, and the situation is frought with danger of tragic proportions. The basic thing is to overcome the problems that encourage dissatisfaction. All our forces and all our responsibility must be directed toward this task and, at the same time, we must take all of the political measures so that protest meetings may not occur; if they do occur, talks must be directed toward perceiving the problems, overcoming the divisions, and creating the conditions for people of various ethnic affiliation to live together and not for deepening the chasm between them.

In this sense we must stress more the responsibility of the organizers of various gatherings for their democratic and socialist nature and content. He who oversteps this line of responsibility does not wish well to our community. If such people include LC members, they have no place in our organization anymore.

We in the Presidium and the Central Committee of the LCY must also ask ourselves what we have done to prevent nationalist divisions. We must not allow people to apply various standards to nationalism, to classify or evaluate types of nationalism according to whether they are more or less dangerous, primary or secondary, or are a cause or a consequence, nor must we allow people to treat types of nationalism according to some sort of symmetry. Why should any, even Serbian, nationalism and revanchism—particularly when one knows that the nationalists are appearing in a more and more organized way—be less dangerous than the Albanian? What would be the criterion for this; what principle we could invoke?

There must be more democracy in the discussions, but efforts must be made to overcome the existing differences in a positive sense of implementing the jointly adopted precepts in the LCY. However, it must be clear to all of us that the differences cannot be overcome only through discussions, but primarily through joint action for a rapid change in the situation, or as Vuk Karadzic would have said, the vineyard does not require prayer, but a hoe.

We are aware that what the report says about the LC, its ideological work and political breadth is insufficient. There is no doubt that we still keep to the old track in our activities. There is still much opportunism, a forum-like manner in work, and a settling of the situation according to formulas. This certainly is not characteristic of the LC of Kosovo alone. What do the activities of the LC mean at all if they are not spread out in the institutions of the socialist system, above all the SAWP, its social grass roots? They would be mills running without grist. We still fill tons of paper sheets describing how it should be, but we do not say why things are not like that.

One could say that we are slow in abandoning the forum-like manner of work, that our activities are too slow in spreading and coming down to people, especially the young people with whom alone the proper bridges of brotherhood and unity and life together can be built, where the virtues of neighborly aid, local (?self-management), the SAWP, and all the wealth of their political life should be developed. Vital problems and questions should be solved, regardless of national affiliation, so that we may be able to apply to human relations the folk saying, they are as necessary as bread and salt.

Therefore, we must work more in the field and less with paper in the future, too. This applies to our activists, members of the LCY Central Committee and of its Presidency, who must often be in Kosovo. Without jeopardizing the independence and legality of the organizations and leaderships in Kosovo, they must help them without issuing orders.

The relatively favorable trends in the class structure of the LC of Kosovo membership would have little purpose if we did not use them to increase efficiency, to strengthen the LC's prestige, and to implement its leading role in these difficult complex times. Certain successes have been achieved in ideological and work differentiation, but there is still an insufficiently manifested need to build unity in the LC and the SAWP as the widest joint front of the Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and members of other peoples and nationalities in Kosovo, to help the cadre renovation.

Of course, differentiation is not a purpose in itself. Its main task is to influence an improvement in the work of these organizations and organs without opportunism. It must make it possible for all the creative forces in Kosovo to rally around a clear joint program, regardless of their national affiliation, and for them to struggle for a Yugoslav concept of the development of Kosovo, for the equality and security of all the people, and above all the Serbs and Montenegrins who at present are most exposed to various kinds of pressure, humiliation, and other trouble.

Socialist self-management and the federal system are the common road for all progressive people. What all the separatists, nationalists, and revanchists have in common is the destruction of such a road, of our Yugoslavia, and of our Serbia, to which the autonomous socialist provinces are no burden, but an encouragement to a richer life together in the republic.

Efforts have been invested to increase the people's trust in the institutions of the political system. We must particularly stress the professional and moral assistance of the state organs and the juridical organs of the SR of Serbia and the federation. Positive changes have not yet had any essential influence on the greater security of the people, especially the Serbs and the Montenegrins, often even children who cannot go to school without being accompanied by adults or militiamen. There is still much poor and negligent work in the judiciary, especially at the level of the communes.

The Communists, especially the Kosovo Communists, bear the major share of responsibility for the functioning of the institutions of the system that protect the security, rights, and freedoms of citizens. There is still much sloppy and irresponsible behavior. In some cases it is a matter of pure boycotting, inspired by Albanian nationalists, and in others a matter of a bureaucratic spirit and of shortcomings in internal organization, equipment, and cadre ability.

The situation certainly differs from commune to commune, and therefore cannot be assessed by some average, so that one would take away something from the good communes and add something to the bad one. It is not always a matter of counterrevolutionary activities; much of it should be ascribed to bureaucratic manners and arbitrariness; there is a great deal of this all over Yugoslavia, but certainly much more in the backward conditions in Kosovo.

The dissatisfaction with the speed of the changes is also reflected in the increased number of complaints by Serbs and Montenegrins in which social problems dominate more and more, in addition to personal problems. The complaints commissions at all levels note that complaints are being solved more slowly. This reflects the impotence of the commissions and the opportunism of the organizations, organs, and communities to which complaints are passed for solution.

Working groups going to the field are a great help. It is said that as long as the working groups are in the field, something is being done, but as soon as they leave, it stops again. It is particularly important to point out the certain positive changes in schools, for nationalist indoctrination has left the deepest traces there. With the cooperation of the institutions and cadres of the SR of Serbia, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and in some cases of the SR of Macedonia and the SR of Montenegro, much has been done to create a unified system of education and training, determine joint teaching plans, plan the publication of joint textbooks, and so forth.

What is important is the effort to eliminate all forms of segregation and introduce bilingualism, for learning only the Albanian language has prevented many Albanians from having access to certain fields of work, has isolated them, and prevented them from getting jobs in other parts of Yugoslavia. Changes in eliminating national divisions in schools and kindergartens are positive, although this has not been fully implemented yet. One should persist in this direction. Any improvement is welcome.

National divisions in this sphere are most pernicious, because it corrodes the human spirit, its identity, and roots from a young age. It is encouraging to note that the situation in the Pristina Student Center has improved, particularly considering that it was precisely there that the well-known events of 1981 started, although that was only a pretext for the beginning of counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo [words indistinct].

The situation at the university is improving, although it is not satisfactory yet. Pristina University must provide cadres primarily for Kosovo and for its comprehensive development, but it must be open to students from all parts of the country. The structure of the students should be adjusted to the future development structure, and above all to the material possibilities of the province, considering that the proportion of young people in secondary schools and at the university, and undergoing instruction in general among the active population is too large in comparison with the social product in the province.

What is worth mentioning are the joint efforts by the SR of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo to set up an Institute to study the cultural achievements of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Muslim people in Kosovo and to protect important cultural monuments in Kosovo.

Some (?people make efforts) to present to the young people some historical truths about our (?liberation) struggle and postwar construction (?in an acceptable way). Popular publishing could make a prime contribution to the national affirmation of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia, and many such things.

The young people must be told the truth about the great successes in the postwar development of the province but also about the fatal errors in the development policy when magnificent palaces were built instead of jobs being created for those that leave school. It is no wonder that some Marxist-Leninists, in quotes, young Marxist-Leninist, began to dream even about a Stalinist society.

Because of great unemployment, dissatisfaction appeared that nationalists and separatists directed against Yugoslavia, asserting that too little had been given but Yugoslavia provided nine tenths of all the funds for Kosovo's development. An atmosphere was thus created in which the separatists launched the slogan Kosovo-Republic, as if this in itself would make possible the solving of all the problems, as if the flag were more important that work and development.

The economic situation in Yugoslavia is difficult, and it is most difficult in Kosovo. It may be improved only as part of the improvement of the overall situation in the country, but also with the policy of relying on one's own forces without which solidarity cannot be effective.

According to FEC data, certain positive results were achieved in the first years of the current planning period. The growth of the social product has been more dynamic, the physical volume of production has increased, especially in industry. New plants have been opened. The rate of employment in the social sector is also above the Yugoslav average. Certain results have also been achieved in changing the economic structure. This, however, is not enough yet to have any considerable influence on the situation in Kosovo. Above all, the quality factors of business operations have not been improved. The accumulation ability of the Kosovo economy continues to weaken. In addition to measures for economic and financial consolidation of the economy and the banks, the debts of the province are from 1.5 to 2.5 times above the Yugoslav average. One should bear in mind that the per-capita income in Kosovo is the lowest in the country.

Although the number of illiterate persons has been essentially reduced in the postwar period, there are still many of them: 200,000. There are 130,000 unemployed, including (?14,000) Serbs and Montenegrins.

The Kosovo economy needs more radical structural changes, and we must also exploit the possibilities for the development of agriculture and small businesses. The aim is to liquidate the hotbeds of inefficiency in the economy which devours large sums but produces no results.

A more efficient model is needed so that we do not repeat mistakes and money is not poured into a bottomless barrel. Good programs, brains, and cadres of all parts of Yugoslavia are more necessary than money, for what does more money mean if the absorption power of high-quality factors is insufficient for investing efficiently.

The report speaks in detail about significant activities in associating labor and pooling resources between associated labor organizations in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and associated labor organizations in the SR of Serbia and other republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. In the 1986-87 period, 84 agreements were concluded. Out of the total, 440 were concluded by associated labor organizations in the SR of Serbia; 22 in Slovenia; 9 in Croatia; 1 in Macedonia; 1 in Bosnia-Hercegovina; 7 in Vojvodina; and there were 4 other self-managing agreements. It is envisaged that these projects will employ over 14,600 workers.

Some people note that all the agreements are based on credit relations, but others advance different opinions. It is a fact, however, that there are not enough joint investments on an income basis. The causes are partly the same as all over the country. They are, above all, causes inherent in the system and unsettled relations, but the (?long), slow procedure in confirming the agreements, and other difficulties constitute a hindrance.

Activities have started, more in some places than in others, to facilitate the arrival of experts in Kosovo. Various aspects of expert assistance to Kosovo institutions and collectives have been organized, young people are leaving for professional training in other parts of the country. There is, for instance, assistance by various social organizations in intensifying social activities in Kosovo.

In Serbia, talks have been conducted with more than 400 highly skilled cadres who had emigrated, to persuade them that their return to Kosovo is necessary.

Demographic experts from all over Yugoslavia assure us that demographic policy and family planning, which is imperative in the development of the province, have not yet been widely accepted in practice, despite the clear precepts and positions of the LC of Kosovo, and the initiatives and work in the relevant institutions. The demographic policy has a real link with the lack of development and with backwardness, but at the same time it is one of the essential factors for a quicker economic and cultural development.

At the present level of population growth—2.4 percent a year—and with the value of the coefficient of capital exceeding 6, one would have to invest over 15 percent of the social product just to retain the present level of per-capita industrial production. On the basis of the present birth rate, there is no chance for Kosovo, to develop more quickly, no matter how much Yugoslavia now gives and whether it can contribute more for the development of the province at all. Yugoslavia is not so rich that it could meet such a population explosion with a policy of accelerated development of less developed regions.

In this respect it must certainly be clear to all of us that a demographic policy can only be advocated by progressive people from the ranks of the Albanians once they have realized that a demographic policy and family planning (?are an achievement) of cultural and civilizational development and a condition for a more humane life and work of people, and not something imposed on them from outside.

The part of the report that speaks about the public information media contains the assessment that public media are one of the essential factors of the struggle for the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo. Information media of the SR of Serbia report most regularly on events in Kosovo, while the coverage by other communities is uneven and certainly is insufficient. Some of the articles display a lot of partisanship [navijastvo]. Some individuals constantly inflame passions. The ways of a rational dialogue must prevail in the public. These problems must be discussed seriously, openly, in a communist way, without getting inflamed, and without pushing arguments aside.

We cannot do anything else, if we really want to help people, for passions and emotions merely befog facts and blunt the feeling for reality. He who insults another people is not worthy of his own people.

What is worrisome is the climate in the press, at various gatherings, the discussion forums, and among people; the climate is electrified and inflammable and can take no even more dangerous proportions fatal to the entire country. Feelings really act as strong stimulation for a general mood, but are a very poor method for judging international relations.

At one time, I said that a poor practice has been introduced into our political life—flippancy in attacking people, attaching labels, and naming names. I do advocate greater responsibility and, what is more, specific responsibility. We must look clearly into each other's eyes and see for ourselves what we have done and have not done; and we must see where our responsibility lies, and determine the responsibility of Central Committee members, particularly those in charge of individual communes in Kosovo, the responsibility of members of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, of members of coordination committees for Kosovo, and so on. That would be a good sign and at the same time prove that we really plan to work differently in the future. By this one certainly brings up the question of the responsibility of all LC members who occupy the highest offices at the federal level and in the Army, that is in party and state organs at republican and provincial levels, the people most responsible for implementing conclusions of the Ninth LCY Central Committee session, the Yugoslav Program on Kosovo, and all other measures and activities on which the improvement of Kosovo situation depends. We must be more humane in such debates and not allow names to be hung on the pillory without reason. This creates insecurity in society. It is normal that during a crisis there is more discontent, nervousness, and tension, even unmeasured reaction, but that does not justify blanket attacks against people, and our society must not allow that. However, this also is not and must not be an excuse to pardon each other's sins in an opportunist way and not to make people responsible for their actions.

Comrades, preparing this session, the LCY Central Committee Presidium discussed self-critically its own share of responsibility for the sluggish overcoming of the national divisions, the phenomenon that has recently penetrated even some LC organizations and leaderships. I would say that this road toward settling differences is the most democratic road, because if differences are made public, then you are more responsible for them and you must cope with them and must do so using acceptable and open facts. Problems are not solved by being postponed; in that way they are only increased. The longer we wait, the fewer chances for success there are.

The coordination at the federal level is not the best one, but it is indispensable. It can contribute considerably to solving the Kosovo situation and to performing the tasks of the Yugoslav program. It would be good if an initiative is started at this session on setting up a special coordination body at the federal level within the LCY Presidium, or at the state level. Or it would be good to establish a body within the SAWPY Federal Conference, which would regularly follow, direct politically, and instigate the activity of all subjective socialist forces and, of course, all state organs within them. What we need are more critical, profound, political, and expert assessments of the situation in the individual spheres of social life in the province—something that we often lack now. We often must reconcile ourselves to incomplete assessments. We must not forget that dilemmas, deeper contradictions, and differences which appear in performing tasks should be carefully analysed and not spoken about on the basis of impressions and without thinking. All data on the performance of tasks from the Yugoslav Program and other actions should be collected in one place and arranged carefully so that they will always be available. There are many contradictory assessments about that now, as well as too much paper, without sufficient specific effort and activity with a view to improving and moving the situation in Kosovo in a positive direction.

Thus one could hear at the session of the joint commission of the SFRY Assembly, Serbian Assembly, and Kosovo Assembly that two-thirds of the 90 measures and actions in the Yugoslav Program are not implemented within the set deadlines. This was also discussed recently at the SFRY Assembly committees and chambers where one had to state clearly what tasks had not been performed and why this was so. Responsibility must be established resolutely and consistently—justice should not follow a roundabout path. There also must be more coordination among activitists who go to Kosovo, so that their coordination with Kosovo legal institutions can be more fruitful.

We have therefore reached that critical point when there is no road back and when new incentives and actions are needed which would ensure consistent implementation of conclusions and positions on Kosovo. What is left to us is to resolutely overcome the extremely unsatisfactory situation in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia on the whole. We must express firm resoluteness to use all decisive political, economic, and all other appropriate measures by the institutions of the system in order to eliminate the causes of the grave situation, disturbed intranational relations, increasing national divisions, and the phenomena of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo being harassed and being denied their rights.

The debate at the session today will contribute to establishing reasons why we fail to realize conclusions, why the situation is worsening, and what is one to do in order to have the LCY positions implemented consistently. These positions are our only options in finding the way out of the crisis; there is no other. We must seek other, additional actions in order to change the situation more quickly, to overcome obstacles, and to establish specific responsibility for a bad situation at all levels.

We must be more realistic too; Vuk Karadzic was right when he said that the mind can grasp more things than can sail a sea. Only in this way can this highest LCY body can have a positive influence on the trends in Kosovo and the entire country. In the future we must act even more energetically, show initiative, and efficiently help prevent the negative polarization of people and events, and above all help to stabilize the Kosovo situation.

There is a large gap between assessing the dimension of problems and finding means to solve them. We must bridge it and time is not on our side.

[Setinc here switches to speaking in Slovene, with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation:]

Comrades, I would now reply to a remark that we Slovenes, including me in particular, fail to feel sufficiently clearly and deeply on the problems of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and that we observe the problem from a distance. That is really not true. What is true is that with our entire life and being, we disapprove of the phenomena of violence and pressures against people. I am especially sensitive when someone has to leave his home and fatherland under duress, as has been happening in Kosovo or anywhere else. You know that in World War II they wanted to destroy my Slovene people and to erase its existence from the world map. I was 12 when the Germans threw me out of my homeland and then my father told me that they would cut out our tongues, no matter whether we were Slovenes or Yugoslavs. Later, when I heard in the camp that the Serbs had openheartedly, accepted Slovene (?refugees), my relatives, I was sorry because I was not expelled into Serbia.

We live in the same country and the question of people's peace and security, their rights and property is indivisible. If pressure is exerted on somebody to leave his native home, I feel as though my own roots are also cut off. Any attempt to realize an ethnically pure region creates fear in me, because that can only be done by throwing all those people who speak a different language from their home area. We must therefore fight for a new road of humaneness, brotherhood, peace, and harmony among peoples and nations, as Slovene Poet Oton Zupancic used to say.

We must oppose national mistreatment of people in Kosovo, because that is not the road of togetherness, but the road of digging deep ditches that we would find difficult to come out of and we would therefore stay there.

I understand the (?pain) of these people and their protest gatherings, because these are gatherings of people who have good thoughts and who carry love and not hatred in their hearts, people of all nationalities who protest against every chauvinism, which speaks the same language all over the world—the language of intolerance and hatred.

We in Yugoslavia fight for that which is humane in people, to remove everything that for centuries presented an obstacle to a humane and just relation and solidarity among people. Violence has never solved any social problem. Our struggle for the return of peace in Kosovo implies equality among everybody, Serbs, Albanians, and others living in that province. Yugoslavia as a community opens up the possibility of social and cultural development for every man, people, or nationality.

Dolanc Speech

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[Speech by Stane Dolanc, member of the SFRY Presidency, at the 16th LCY Central Committee Session in Belgrade on 29 July—live, relay begins with Dolanc speech in progress]

[Text] [Announcer] Now Stane Dolanc is speaking. In conveying the stances of the SFRY Presidency, he assessed among other things that after [word indistinct] the political situation has become somewhat more difficult and for that reason he expressed his support for the arguments aimed at considering the question of implementation of the conclusions on Kosovo in the context of the general Yugoslav situation. And now we pick up Comrade Dolanc's speech with our relay.

[Begin Dolanc, heard in mid-sentence] ...unjustified social stratification, then covering the incomes that are not the result of work. Any further delay in advancing the tax system and taxation policy is impermissible. The competent organs of the republics, autonomous provinces, and communes have the greatest responsibility for the implementation of these positions.

The SFRY Presidency emphasizes that, because of the importance of solving certain problems of economic stabilization in regard to which work has been insufficiently organized or efficient, the republics, autonomous provinces, and communes must urgently adopt without delay considerably more favorable regulations on small-scale economic operations, regulations that include as few conditions and limitations as possible, in order to promote an accelerated development. In the same way it is necessary to work out without delay an effective program of measures to really stimulate the inflow and use of the foreign currency funds of our workers employed abroad, as well as the inflow and use of the foreign currency funds of citizens. The FEC and other competent organs must accelerate work in this respect. The SFRY Presidency has requested the FEC to comprehensively consider all aspects of the struggle to curb and stop inflation. It has been concluded that the SFRY Presidency would consider this question at a special session in mid-August this year.

The SFRY Presidency points out that the deterioration of intranational relations, the escalation of nationalism, the increasingly aggressive attacks on the achievements of the revolution are a cause for special concern. The activity of nationalists is increasing in virtually all parts of the country and they are calling for people to rally on a national basis and are inciting chauvinistic hatred. Nationalism is also infiltrating the ranks of the organized socialist forces and there have also been occurrences of flirting with nationalists. It is on this basis that the concepts of national homogenization grow. All this threatens to provoke wider national divisions and encapsulations. Instead of resolute reaction and organized political struggle against these phenomena, it is the interests of one's own nation, nationality, republic or province which are more and more emphasized, whereas the class factor and the common interests of Yugoslavia as a whole are relegated to a secondary place.

The Presidency believes that in this situation the strategic orientation must be to create all political and other conditions for improving intranational relations. The political situation is burdened by politicized differences on many political, economic, and ideological problems and by the polemics that have burst out between individual leading individuals of republics and autonomous provinces, which at times even develop into public conflicts. Political confrontations, pressures, and undemocratic methods in the search for solutions for open problems are also spreading and they are accompanied by an inflaming of political passions, neglect of interest of our community as a whole, and the leadership's lack of responsibility for the country's general political stability. In this atmosphere one frequently finds an uncritical attitude toward what is bad in one's community and a lightly adopted negative characterization of individual phenomena in other communities. These occurrences further poison relations and have a divisive effect on the political situation in the country and on its unity.

All this primarily threatens the democratic alternative in overcoming the crisis and threatens the country's unity. Political differences are also evident in relation to the inevitable process of further democratic development and toward abuses of democracy and legalization of oppositionist activities, something that widens the scope for the activities from antisocialist and anti-self-managing positions. The work connected with the changes in the SFRY Constitution is burdened by political pressures that weaken the democratic course of social development, cause intranational relations to deteriorate, and block the changes without which economic reform also is impossible. The SFRY Presidency believes that further work on constitutional changes must promote the development of socialist self-management and a further advancement of all relations in society. It is necessary to continue to work patiently in a democratic atmosphere, proceeding from an understanding for the arguments of others and with a view to finding the best solutions in order to ensure that changes in the SFRY Constitution will be carried out according to schedule.

According to the SFRY Presidency, a section of the public information media also exercises a negative influence on the political situation in the country. By their one-sided and tendentious reports and articles these media contribute to a negative politicization and even greater political disagreements. The interests of one's own narrow community are exclusively favored and the leaderships and leaders of the federation, as well as the leaderships of republics and autonomous provinces, are attacked and they are attacked as a rule only from other communities. All this has a negative effect on public opinion and further deepens differences and disagreements.

Some public media disregard the line dividing criticism of the shortcomings and inconsistencies in the development of society which contributes to the elimination of these shortcomings and inconsistencies, from criticizing and the criticism of everything that exists. The influence of organized socialist forces has been substantially weakened in some individual editorial offices and, at the same time, the groups and individuals following the nationalist, bourgeois-right-wing, and other antisocialist and anti-self-managing orientations have strengthened their positions in these offices. The SFRY Presidency points out the responsibility of all political and state organs, primarily in the republics and autonomous provinces, for eliminating shortcomings from the work of public media and strengthening the role and influence of organized socialist forces in these media.

The political situation in the country is further burdened by the attacks on the Yugoslav People's Army and its members and especially by the negative politicization of the trial of the four in Ljubljana on criminal charges of betraying military secrets, a politicization by which pressure was exerted on the military justice organs. This development also leads to disagreements and to a lack of understanding for the Slovene situation in other communities. Although efforts are being made to calm this situation, the problem has not yet been overcome, because united activities in this direction are lacking.

The relations in the SR of Serbia are deteriorating. The negative politicization of differences and public political confrontations have an unfavorable effect on the overall political situation in the country, provoke or increase anxiety, and, in combination with certain negative phenomena in other parts of the country, weaken the internal stability and cause serious harm to the SFRY's world reputation. The SFRY Presidency has called attention to the responsibility of the competent organs in the SR of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina for calming this situation, for overcoming the tensions, and for creating a political atmosphere in which solutions will be found for all open problems in a principled, constructive, and democratic way and by proceeding from the stances of the LCY Central Committee on creating and strengthening the relations of unity and togetherness in the SR of Serbia. The leaderships of the SR of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo must strive much more actively at joint meetings to solve every open issue or problem [word indistinct] and do everything possible to stop public confrontations and unprincipled polemics. The arrival of a group of Serbs and Montenegrins in Novi Sad and the reaction to this event intensified even more the political problems and relations, both in the SR of Serbia and the entire country

The Presidency believes that the slow progress in overcoming the situation in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo represents one of the most difficult problems faced by our society. Despite the multitude of adopted conclusions and measures for the stabilization of the political-security situation and the adopted Yugoslav program to stop emigration, the situation in the province continues to be difficult. The pressure from Albanian nationalists and separatists against the Serbs and Montenegrins has not ceased, the intranational relations are deteriorating, divisions on a national basis are deepening, and the emigration continues to the accompaniment of predictions of mass departures of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Personal security and the security of the property of the Serbian and Montenegrin population, and fear about what may happen to them tomorrow represent the main reasons for emigration. The present state of disrupted intranational relations suits the Albanian nationalists and irredentists, because they believe that this situation makes it possible for them to achieve their goals. The same state of affairs also suits the Serbian nationalists to some extent.

The current political situation is primarily burdened by differences and disagreements about some key issues, that is, the appraisal of the situation, the problem of constitutional changes, the appraisal of petitions, the appraisal of assemblies—as comrade [name indistinct] also said a little earlier—the appraisal of departures for Belgrade or Novi Sad: All these differences have not been overcome. In the Presidency's opinion, insufficient support is extended to the forces and activists among the Serbs and Montenegrins, as well as among the Albanians who work honestly and want to mend the intranational relations situation. All too often, place is ceded to those who would like to break it up and prove their thesis about the impossibility of the coexistence of these peoples and nationalities in Kosovo.

The SFRY Presidency believes that economic development, political activity which now is far below the level at which it should be, the creation of the necessary conditions for the peaceful life of all citizens in Kosovo, strengthening intranational trust, the greater effectiveness of measures aimed at establishing the equality in the personal security and the security of the property of all citizens in Kosovo, and a consistent implementation of the tasks arising from the Yugoslav program of measures and activities in Kosovo are of key importance for stabilizing the situation in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The Presidency will also regularly discuss the program in future.

The SFRY Presidency and the bodies responsible for the questions of protecting the constitutional order are considering the need for and possibilities of additional participation by the federal organs and organs of all republics and the Province of Vojvodina in strengthening security in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. They are also considering the probable more effective engagement of militia detachments of the federal Secretariat in order to secure peaceful life and work for all citizens in Kosovo.

The SFRY Presidency points out that the intensified activities of the bourgeois right and the nationalists also influence the deterioration of the political situation. They constitute the backbone of the political opposition which endeavors to become legalized in the struggle for power. This opposition even acts in some legal institutions of our system and in our organizations, as well as in parts of the public information media and the publishing organizations, from which it exerts influence on public opinion.

All the opposition groups have shown interest in the discussions of the constitutional changes and have joined them. In this way they are pursuing their aim of establishing a partnership with organized socialist forces in their endeavor to influence the changes. They openly advocate an abolition of the federal system, a restoration of the bourgeois democracy, or a bureaucratic centralist system in the country.

Recently some individuals gathered in the Committee for the Protection of the Freedom of Thought and Expression initiated a so-called critical reassessment of the name and work of Josip Broz Tito. Although this constitutes a most crude attack on the Yugoslav revolution and the communist movement, there has not yet been a proper reaction. On the contrary, one gets the impression that such activities are being underestimated.

The Presidency assesses that the intensity and the volume of the activities by the opposition forces in the coming period will primarily depend on the efficiency in solving the economic and political problems, as well as on the political unmasking of the protagonists of the antisocialist and anti-self-managing activities.

There is no need to explain—although this could be a separate subject—that our entire political and economic situation, our internal difficulties, the situation in Kosovo, our contradictions, confrontations, work stoppages, demonstrations, arrivals in the Assembly, rumors about the preparations of a military coup in Slovenia, and the like, weaken the international position and prestige of Yugoslavia and objectively hamper the implementation of the economic reform.

The SFRY Presidency again stresses on this occasion that the political situation in every republic and autonomous province directly reflects in the overall situation in the country. Therefore, all the leaderships are obliged to take into account joint interests or rather the stability of the internal political situation and its international aspect, and to avoid and to prevent everything that harms them. The leaderships of the republics and the autonomous provinces must manifest maximum patience in searching for joint solutions to all the disputed questions. Experience has shown that unity cannot be built on political exclusiveness and untouchable positions, but on the basis of mutual trust and on a joint platform built on a democratic basis, through frank and palpable clearing up of problems that appear in mutual relations.

An important condition for such an atmosphere is, among other things, to stop inciting polemics and inflaming political passions and conflicts that encourage a negative politicization and polarization and an aggravation of the relations in the country.

Proceeding from these assessments, the SFRY Presidency draws the attention of the respective organs in the republics and provinces to the seriousness of the situation and it demands that in conformity with their constitutional power, they should do everything so as to overcome the existing situation both in the republics and autonomous provinces and in the country in general.

Open problems can be solved only in a democratic way, but with an energetic condemnation and suppression of any attempt to achieve any goal whatsoever by applying pressure through and the activities of uncontrolled forces.

The overcoming of the economic crisis and the implementation of the economic reform constitute a general Yugoslav interest and demand that all forces should be mobilized in this direction. Therefore, there is an imperative need to create a political climate that will encourage and mobilize the workers class, all the working people and citizens, and all other creative forces to implement this basic aim.

Zarkovic Speaks

AU3007162788 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1108 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Speech by Vidoje Zarkovic, member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, at the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee in Belgrade on 29 July—live]

[Text] I do not underestimate the efforts that have been invested and results that have been achieved, but the data included in the documents prepared for this session show that we can by no means be satisfied with what has been achieved during the last 12 months in implementing the conclusions of the Ninth LCY Central Committee Session, in stabilizing the situation in Kosovo, and in curbing the counterrevolutionary activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists in this province of ours. We should be particularly concerned about the fact that the situation in three most important spheres has changed very slowly: first, in the sphere of strengthening brotherhood and unity, intranational relations, and the belief in the future of coexistence of all Kosovo citizens, irrespective of their national affiliation; second, in the sphere of strengthening the legal security of all citizens and protecting them from various pressures of Albanian nationalists and separatists who endanger their freedom, integrity, and dignity; third, in the slow removal of the causes of the intensification of emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo.

Concerning the state of intranational relations, the report of the LCY Central Committee Presidium states that they are still bad, that national divisions are being deepened, even spreading to the institutions of the system, the LC, and its organs. These assessments should worry us Communists above all, because we know very well that the resumption of intranational confidence and the belief in the possibility of coexistence is the most important prerequisite for stabilizing the Kosovo situation. These assessments show that so far in this field we mostly remained with principled statements, that we failed to get more deeply into the essence of the problem, and that in the overall LC activity in Kosovo this question was not treated as the most important one, as the highest priority, and as a prerequisite for successfully solving all other questions and problems.

Due to all possible and present speculations, we are obliged to provide an answer to the question of whether this means that our policy of intranational relations has not passed the test or that its basic postulates are seriously undermined. Since it is the latter that happened, in my opinion, these questions should today be at the center of our Central Committee's attention.

Let us not forget that the main causes of the counterrevolution in Kosovo lie in the very fact that Albanian nationalism was growing there almost undisturbed. With the benign attitude and support of the Kosovo bureaucratic, political, top leadership of that time, Albanian nationalism has poisoned many generations of young Albanians and very seriously disturbed intranational relations. The most important slogans of counterrevolutionaries are extremely nationalist and their aim is an ethnically pure Kosovo. Therefore, the LC platform and the resolution of the 13th LCY Congress have put at the center of attention the LC and other organs' obligation to work most intensively on restoring intranational trust and overcoming all forms of a minority's isolation. In my opinion, even now this is the most essential prerequisite for overcoming the counterrevolution and all its consequences.

Historical experience has shown that our national liberation movement headed by the Communists succeeded in bridling the (?horrid) fratricidal slaughter, in mitigating and overcoming its tragic consequences, in defeating the Ustasha, Chetnik, Ballist, White Guard and other types of nationalism that had run wild, and (?in restoring) the multinational Yugoslav community based on the policy of brotherhood and unity and on its concept of intranational relations, whose essence is a complete national equality, and on the interests of the workers class and all working strata of society in the social field.

I am convinced that even now the nationalist counterrevolution in Kosovo and all its grave consequences may be mastered only on the basis of such a policy of intranational relations. Thus, the most important task of the LC is to resolutely cut all ways in which the national divisions in Kosovo are deepened, and to particularly cut them in its ranks and in the ranks of other organized subjective forces, for such divisions most directly serve the aims and the interests of the Albanian nationalists and separatists.

All the 100,000 LCY members in Kosovo, regardless of their nationality, must ponder the increasing aggravation of problems in the intranational relations and the trends to deepen the divisions among nationalities, if they wish and want the LC of Kosovo to be an ideopolitical vanguard in these difficult times.

The Communists who are not in a position to understand this and to rise above it easily fall prey to nationalist divisions and splits. They can resist them only if they consistently actively fight for such social relations in which all people will be free and equal and in which (?true) brotherhood and unity will develop. Whenever they fail to do this, they cease to be Communists and they become appendages of nationalists among their own people, which unfortunately has been increasingly the case in our entire region recently.

Such people should have no place in the ranks of the LC of Kosovo, and especially not among its leaders. This must be the most important criterion in the cadre policy in the LC of Kosovo and in Kosovo in general.

Historical fate (?has forced) many peoples and nationalities to live together in Kosovo. History has left the present generations the heritage of a tragic lesson on the consequences of chauvinism and intranational conflicts in Kosovo that are still present today. However, it has also left shining examples of [word indistinct] of brotherhood, unity, and equality, starting with Tucovic and the Serbian Social Democrats and progressive Montenegrins and Albanians from the time of Marko Miljanov until our revolution. A lesson emerges from this for today's and future generations that only the real communist policy of intranational relations, in the sense of the best traditions of our common history and especially the policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia headed by

Tito, can ensure the happy coexistence for the members of all peoples and nations in Kosovo, regardless of the differences in language, culture, customs, traditions, religion, and such like.

Therefore, the most important task for Communists is that, proceeding from the positions of the clear, principled policy of the LCY on intranational relations, they should strengthen their political activity on its interpretation and implementation, energetically destroy all forms of nationalist divisions and nationalism in their ranks and uncompromisedly unveil their counterrevolutionary aims, and enable all progressive people in all Kosovo communities to denounce and unveil all forms of nationalistic pressures and savagery. Communists should consistently continue to implement the policy of differentiation in connection with all those people who, irrespective of their [word indistinct], are not completely clear in this respect. Communists should use all their strength to develop the most intensive ideological and political activity with a view toward renewing the bridges of intranational confidence and brotherhood and unity in Kosovo, and create conditions for people to associate, work, live, and get together with each other and organize themselves politically on the basis of ideological and political criteria, and not ethnic and national criteria as, unfortunately, is usually the case now. This is the obligation of all Kosovo Communists, whatever their national affiliation and, according to the Leninist and Titoist principle, Albanian Communists must be the harshest in the struggle against Albanian nationalism and Serbian and Montenegrin Communists in the struggle against Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism, which unfortunately is also (?not the case now).

All nationalisms in Kosovo are dangerous and the LC must fight all of them most resolutely bearing in mind that today the main thrust in this struggle must be directed toward curbing the onset of the counterrevolutionary activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists which has been going on far too long. In my opinion, it is from these positions that the entire LCY, the LC of Serbia, and particularly Communists in Kosovo beginning with the Provincial Committee, would have to observe the real situation in their ranks with more self-criticism and criticism and remove the numerous weaknesses from their activity. This is the conclusion that our LCY Central Committee should make at the session today. It is necessary for all institutions of the system in Kosovo, Serbia, and Yugoslavia to have the same degree of criticism and self-criticism when assessing and more quickly eliminating the reasons why security and legal protection is still not ensured for all Kosovo citizens regardless of their nationality [word indistinct] why it happens very often that it is not ensured to protect Serbs and Montenegrins from [word indistinct] Albanian separatists and nationalists.

It is the fact that there are many problems in Kosovo which cannot be solved easily and quickly, (?something in which we are not succeeding despite efforts exerted over the years). There are, as we very well know, grave economic problems in Kosovo and problems of resuming intranational confidence and overcoming the consequences of indoctrination of many young Albanians with Albanian nationalist ideas, which have lasted for many years. There are also problems of ensuring (?legal) security to all Kosovo citizens and their legal protection [words indistinct] which can and must be solved in a much quicker and more efficient way. So why are these problems not being solved? We are all, and particularly comrades from Kosovo and Serbia, obliged to (?learn) where the causes of [words indistinct] are and to what extent the problem is sloppiness, idleness, irresponsibility, and unskillfulness of workers and leading cadres in individual institutions of the system in Kosovo and to what extent it is [words indistinct] of the (?organization) of these institutions. It is particularly important to specifically realize the extent to which all this is also the result of the legal activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists who have infiltrated the institutions of our system in Kosovo and we are slow and hesitant in throwing them out from those institutions. Nevertheless, I think that worst of all there is a poor cadre situation and the fact that some institutions are getting rid of infiltrated nationalists and separatists too slowly.

Communists must resolutely ask themselves and all corresponding institutions of the system why—after as many as 8 years and in a relatively small area such as Kosovo—we have not managed to prevent the organized hostile activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists, both illegal and legal, to break up their organization and prevent their renewal, to discover the leadership of these organizations, their financial sources, and the like. There is no doubt that the basic reason lies in the very deeply rooted nationalistic indoctrination and the great weaknesses in the political activity on unveiling Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, on resuming intranational confidence, and developing Yugoslav socialist patriotism in Kosovo.

However, organs of the State Security in Kosovo and the entire country must more efficiently fight the illegal activity of Albanian separatists and nationalists and (?secret) information services with whom these nationalists collaborate and whom they serve. In my opinion, in order to perform that task as quickly and successfully as possible, the Yugoslav community should have engaged many more State Security forces from the entire country with a view toward being able to proffer direct aid to security organs and other state and self-managing organs in Kosovo in the struggle against this perfidious and, according to all sources, very well organized enemy.

I think that the Central Committee should assert today that these demands, which are sent to federal and state organs, are justifiable: Demands that in the future should more directly use all legal possibilities and available forces with a view toward ensuring the security of the citizens of Kosovo and breaking up all forms of organized activity by Albanian nationalists and separatists. I also think that the Central Committee itself should support such demands.

The forthcoming constitutional changes should also contribute to a quicker and more successful solution to these problems. They certainly should expand the possibilities of (?socialism) in the Republic of Serbia so that it may, as a state and as a sociopolitical community, carry out some indispensable functions throughout its territory.

The unabated emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, even after the Ninth LCY Central Committee session, is a logical consequence of our failure in the struggle to restore intranational trust and strengthen brotherhood and unity, to ensure an efficient provision of legal protection [words indistinct] for all citizens in Kosovo regardless of their nationality, as well as to prevent illegal activities by Albanian nationalists and separatists.

Here, and not anywhere else, lie the most important causes for the unabated emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. There should be no perplexities or doubts in the ranks of the LC, but unfortunately there are. Without the necessary results on these important questions, we can have no satisfactory results in numerous other measures that have been undertaken and that of course should continue to be undertaken to check the emigration and to create conditions for a return of the emigrants.

Ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in Kosovo, who face serious pressure by Albanian nationalists and separatists and drastic violations of the freedoms and rights, [words indistinct] and dignity, and primarily because of these reasons are leaving their homes in masses, [words indistinct] more and more impatient and more and more dissatisfied with the situation and with the inability of our community to change this situation, to protect them, and to provide them with the conditions for a normal and free life in their motherland.

Therefore, it is understandable that because of the situation, the people of Kosovo are conveying their demands more and more frequently, through gatherings, delegations, and letters, to the state organs and political leaders in the province, the republic, and the federation urging them to increase their efforts so that the situation will change more efficiently and rapidly. However, it would be political blindness for us to overlook that the activity by Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists have become more and more visible recently: They strive to misuse this situation and exploit the justified dissatisfaction of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, as well as the weaknesses of the LC and the system of institutions in solving the amassed great social (?and structural) problems in the country, for spreading chauvinism against the Albanian people in general and for destabilizing the Yugoslav community as much as possible, for deepening the crisis in it, for deepening the national intolerance, and for a further revival of [words indistinct].

We can and we must successfully struggle against these attempts, above all through a better and more successful solution to the problems in Kosovo, through overcoming Albanian nationalism and separatism, and through overcoming the crisis in the country. At the same time, we are obliged to increase the sociopolitical unveiling of the essence and aims of such attempts so as to (?increase the confidence of the) people in Kosovo, so that they may as resolutely as possible resist the attempts of all those who want to [words indistinct] and to misuse their problems and difficulties for their counterrevolutionary nationalistic aims.

The unity of the LC is the first, decisive, and necessary condition for the implementation of all the tasks that we have determined, including the tasks on Kosovo. This of course does not mean that we are striving toward a monolithic unity. A full ideopolitical and action unity in the LC, and cohesion within party ranks, especially in the leadership, built on democratic foundations, based on a pluralism of opinion in the building of positions (?is) the decisive factor upon which the implementation of the agreed policy for which the LC is fighting depends.

The assessments that have been offered (?and prepared) for this Central Committee session persuasively show that this necessary unity has not yet been attained. The reports prepared by the Provincial Committee of the LC of Kosovo and the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia present very different appraisals of such important questions as the assessment of the overall situation in Kosovo, the intensity of emigration from Kosovo, single-nationality gatherings, activities from the positions of Albanian nationalism and separatism, and the like.

Because of all this I believe that the LCY Central Committee at its session today must insist that the differences in the appraisals of these questions be harmonized in the LC of Serbia. This is not necessary for the sake of some formal unity but it is necessary so that appropriate synchronized activities can be conducted in all of the LC on the basis of the same assessments. This also presupposes that unless such a level of unity is reached, this Central Committee and especially its Presidium must bear their share of responsibility for (?such a situation).

Azem Vlasi Speaks

AU3007185188 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1223 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Speech by Azem Vlasi, member of the LCY Central Committee, at the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee—live]

[Text] Comrades: All our discussions so far about the Kosovo situation have been chiefly determined by two major factors: They summed up the existing situation and defined what should be done in the future. It would be necessary to go further than that today, to perceive in depth why the results are still below the level of the efforts that have been made and the measures and actions that have been undertaken, and to identify the new elements that characterize the situation in Kosovo, to assess whether all that we have been doing is good, whether it conforms with the LCY positions, what kind of influences are being expressed in Kosovo and toward Kosovo that make the already grave situation an essential element for the stabilizing of the country.

It is indisputable that some concrete and significant results set at the Ninth LCY Central Committee Session have been achieved, and that qualitative changes in some areas of social life are obvious. This was also pointed out today. These results and changes should be stressed because one can see that the situation depends on the action of our socialist forces. Second, the situation in Kosovo continues to be grave under the existing conditions, at a time when the situation in the country has generally deteriorated. Therefore the question is to what depth would we have sunk and in what situation would we have been today had it not been for such actions and such changes? In view of these results and changes we should further mobilize our strength for action and we should encourage optimism and belief that the situation can be improved.

Despite all the difficulties and problems that we have been facing we should not forget nor ignore that we have, during this period, deepened our critical attitudes toward numerous mistakes made in the past and in this way we have marked a radical break with these changes and the exponents of these mistakes. We have also made more profound, concrete, and acute the question of responsibilities, explained some past important political issues that led to confusion, dilemmas, and even ideological differences, and in this way we have contributed toward relieving ourselves from the burden of the past that hindered our action.

We have elevated all our forces to a higher level of mobility. We have been working more efficiently and many things have been changed, although this is still below the level of our real needs and the complexity of the situation. However, we must be more strict, more realistic in the criticism of the present situation, which is obviously difficult. We must be realistic and objective in the assessment of the causes of this situation, we must be critical of our own weaknesses and omissions, and we must be energetic in our demands to quickly eliminate these weaknesses and change the situation. We all agree on this. At the ninth session we noted something new, namely that the situation in Kosovo is properly understood and accepted as a general Yugoslav problem. It is understood in the sense that it is a problem that requires the involvement of the entire Yugoslav community so that the situation created by the escalation of Albanian nationalism can be overcome, and that Kosovo can assume a general and faster development, primarily in the sense of initiating measures and actions to prevent the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from this province.

The Yugoslav character of this problem is reflected through concrete development, sending manpower and other aid, but this character must also have a wider meaning. It must mean the involvement of the entire Yugoslav community, a Yugoslav approach to resolving the situation in Kosovo in the sense of a consistent implementation of the LCY policy, consistent implementation of our Yugoslav policy of national equality, and on this platform search for complete solutions, consistently proceeding from national equality.

Solutions for the current and long-term problems should be sought in the development and strengthening of socialist and self-managing relations. In this, we have also recently experienced serious stagnation, which is to say in all socialist bases. Kosovo cannot be treated as if it was some special zone or some special problem that requires different means, methods, or models of measures and actions that are outside our system of socialist self-management and the LCY policy. At no time must we forget that during our crisis all our difficulties, problems, dilemmas, controversies, vacillations, differences, and clashes are especially concentrated on and pass through Kosovo.

Both internal and external opponents have directed the greatest part of their strength and efforts on Kosovo and toward Kosovo trying to demonstrate that Kosovo was in fact the historic mistake of our system and policy, and to destroy us in this way. This is becoming increasingly more obvious then it was immediately after the counterrevolution. Comrade Dolanc made a fairly long speech about this today.

We Communists from Kosovo are directly in the frontline and, objectively speaking, we bear the greatest burden of the action, and of course, responsibility. First of all, we must increase responsibilities for the implementation of the set tasks. We are not running away from this responsibility in any way. In fact, during this period the question of responsibility has been made most acute and concrete in relation to a long period [word indistinct]. We have never made so many cadre changes in the communal leaderships, in the organs of administration and justice, internal affairs, and in education in such a short period of time as we have done now. Of course, we will do it again if needed. But, the essential question [words indistinct] in the work of our institutions, system, sociopolitical organizations, and the LC itself is to quickly eliminate the lack of knowledge, formalism in work, bureaucracy, carelessness, opportunism, (?lack of ability) and everything that hinders us in reaching the level of our total organization, efficiency in work, and in producing results that would be on a par with the seriousness and demands of the situation.

Ideopolitical differentiation should be carried out consistently. But, we must not accept it only as a demand for punishment, a demand for freeing ourselves from those who are not with the LC line and who are not fulfilling their tasks, because it is not being disputed that we should get rid of these people in order to frighten, but in order to continuously and persistently help people to successfully carry out their tasks, to fill our ranks with new forces, new people who have confidence in the LC, in what we are doing, the people who want to involve themselves.

I would like to use this occasion to say something about the fact that the question of responsibility is often discussed in different ways. Speaking about the communal and provincial leaderships, and leaderships further afield, one should bear in mind that the situation at present is significantly different from that of 1981. As we know, at present in our leaderships there are still a number of those who were, objectively speaking, directly responsible for the events in 1981 and they have been hindering our action. Albeit slowly, we have nevertheless been gradually changing this situation and have changed it significantly. The elections of 1986 saw a new, important, rejuvenated cadre structure in the responsible places in the provincial and communal organs, people who clearly and firmly adhered to LC policy, for the stabilization of the situation in the province, people who were determined fighters against Albanian and other nationalist groups , people without the burden of past mistakes. However, none of these new people are protected from bearing responsibility if they do not demonstrate readiness and the ability to work successfully. It is in fact during this period that, because of the lack of ability to carry out our tasks, we made numerous cadre changes. But, I must say that in the Kosovo LC, and the wider public, there is a certain confusion because a thesis has now been launched which states that there is a need for a fundamental cadre renewal. Who does this refer to? We must be specific about this. What can one say about the fact that in the last year or two, at least this is how we feel, the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LC and the provincial leadership have had less support and help from higher organs—I may frankly say primarily the republican organs—than the previous leaderships, some members of whom were those whose responsibility was subsequently established by us in the Provincial Committee, despite the fact we recently spent more time together, have more contacts, and cooperate more closely.

Why are the members of all nationalities in the province, who in 1981 and after opposed nationalists and the exponents of wrong policies most, now being attacked more? Why are they being vilified and called names in an unprincipled and arbitrary way, more than those who before were really responsible for the situation?

Persistent attempts to continue with the practice of gatherings and meetings on the basis of nationalist divisions after the Ninth LCY Central Committee cause significant problems for our total political situation and the present joint action of the communists and other progressive people of all nationalities. We more or less agree about their causes. If these gatherings could have been justified earlier by specific motives, excesses, and other things, then later, when the forces of our society reacted more effectively, these gatherings indeed became unnecessary and damaging. After all, it has become obvious, especially recently, that concrete motives do not seem to be very important. We did not brand these gatherings as nationalist, as we have been often accused of doing, but it is quite certain that these gatherings, apart from pointing to indisputable real problems which we have stressed ourselves in our political life—in view of what has been said and done about them, in view of the tasks of some already known organizers and manipulators, in view of the emergence of these manipulations on the part of Serbian nationalists and their effects on the political public—can be said to be inspired by togetherness and as such are damaging. We must all persist with the conclusions of the Ninth Plenum that political life and the articulation of political demands and wishes—even if this is done through lively, nervous polemics full of differences and sharp dialogues—will be conducted through the existing organizations of the system, which is to say through the LC and the SAWP; because, objectively speaking, this is the only condition for strengthening togetherness and for a more fruitful action.

The situation in Kosovo is too serious to fool ourselves that solutions can be found in the street, at the recent gatherings, outside the system's institutions, and on the basis of nationalist divisions and confrontations. After all, if anybody has had a bad experience in the street, it is us in Kosovo and therefore we shrink away from it. I am saying this, of course, without trying to make comparisons.

We all agree in our assessment of the seriousness of the problem of emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and the consequences of this emigration. But the assessment of the causes for this emigration and the front of our action to halt this emigration have still not been sufficiently widely established. It is in fact in these assessments and not in the intensity of emigration that we disagree. Today, in this complex situation it is difficult to specifically define all the causes and circumstances that stimulate emigration. But the consequences are the same. Objectively speaking this plays into the hands of Albanian nationalists whose permanent aim is a nationally pure Kosovo.

The efficiency of the authoritative organs and other system's institutions in protecting the people and their personal property has increased, but the general atmosphere and relations are such that people want to emigrate. People often think: I do not have anything to complain about specifically, but this is not good, I do not see any future in it.

A significant factor that also incites emigration at present is the very fact that the number of Serbs and Montenegrins is diminishing in the overall Kosovo population structure, and the feeling of their national essence being felt is increasingly engendered in this region. We must work together to stop the emigration over a wide front.

This means that we must intensify the struggle against all kinds of activities by Albanian nationalists, which is to say pressure; this struggle must be primarily waged by the Communists and other progressive Albanians. We must ensure an even fuller and more efficient protection of the security of persons and property. In this respect there can be no excuses and justifications. Through all the forms of life, work, and creativity, we must encourage people to get together more. We must solve the problems of unemployment and other material and social problems more rapidly. Our experience shows that if we could provide jobs more quickly and solve housing and other problems, emigration would be essentially reduced and the return of emigrants and the arrival of others would be intensified. We must act in such a way through political information that people may be encouraged to stay in Kosovo and not constantly frightened by the situation.

A similar procedure [words indistinct] the constitutional changes, and we all want to arrive at the best joint solutions, and we shall reach them. We must not spread illusions among people that these changes are their only and last chance for staying in Kosovo, for life is much more complex than this.

We must continue the struggle against Albanian nationalism in a principled, consistent, and specific way. Reaction will be best if others will help and support us Albanian Communists, instead of (?trying to supplant) us.

I must say frankly as a Communist that this struggle, in its ideopolitical aspect, is now more difficult than it was immediately after 1981. This is so first, because nationalism is now strongly present in all of Yugoslavia, because it is tolerated and underestimated, and even encouraged in some places, and different criteria in the struggle against nationalism in Yugoslavia have never produced the necessary results. Secondly, this anti-Albanian feeling is growing. It disturbs me that we Kosovo Communists must talk about it.

My last thought, and I apologize because of the time taken: If we clearly state that Kosovo is a general Yugoslav problem, we must know that this problem can be solved more efficiently and more rapidly, apart from the involvement of Kosovo forces, by a stable Yugoslavia, and this means its stable parts, or rather its republics and provinces. The Kosovo situation is being manipulated, so as to exert pressure on other communities, their leaders and political structures for the purpose of further destabilizing them, as we have experienced in recent events. This is contrary to what the LC strives for.

I think that on this occasion, too, it should be stressed that the problems in Kosovo can be solved more rapidly and the situation can be stabilized primarily through knowing better the causes and the essence of these problems and conflicts that burden it; through a resolute action that will be carried out by the progressive forces in Kosovo, persisting consistently to the end on a platform of socialism and self-management, and full national equality.

Therefore, the situation in Kosovo cannot be solved through getting excited, through force, through threats, extortion, or pressure, nor cannot be solved only by interpreting what the interests and needs are of one people or nationality. Kosovo must be regarded together and as a whole.

Force and coercion may be used only against real enemies and adversaries, and we will continue to do so in the future. What we have said in the LC stances, in the shape of a positive program and precepts, remains an essential task for us. Thank you.

Milosevic Speech

AU3007195588 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1310 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Speech by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Serbian LC Central Committee Presidium, at the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee in Belgrade—live]

[Text] Comrades: The year that has passed since the ninth session of the LCY Central Committee has been a great test for this Central Committee, and also for the LCY. That session was very popular among the public as it gave its word publicly and seriously that the Kosovo situation would be solved justly and quickly and considered a Yugoslav problem. Certainly much was expected in Serbia during the past year and the SR of Serbia itself has done everything that it could within the framework of all its institutions and organizations, considering its present powers and opportunities.

Central Committee members from all the republics who are sitting here know better than me how it is in other republics. It would have been good, had we in this LCY Central Committee also at least approximately shared the action and responsibility concerning the conclusions on Kosovo and concerning Kosovo in general. However, we have unfortunately not done so; if we had, there would be more positive results today than there are.

The problems of Kosovo continue to be, as they were before the ninth session a year ago, the chief political problem of Yugoslav society. Therefore, the tasks that we are discussing, continue to concern not only Kosovo

Communists and leaderships and Serbian Communists and the leaderships of the SR of Serbia, but also all Yugoslav Communists and especially the Yugoslav leadership.

Economic, social, and political relations in this part of Yugoslavia have for quite a long period of time been such that they are directly threatening the stability and security of the Yugoslav community as a whole. Only those who do not care about the security and stability of the Yugoslav community, can shut their eyes to this. Therefore, we should not permit ourselves to again discuss things that we have already adopted conclusions about at the Ninth LCY Central Committee Plenum. In that sense, there should not be different assessments concerning the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins under duress nor assessments concerning the character of meetings of Serbs and Montenegrins despite attempts by nationalists to exploit them—which Comrade Gracanin spoke about—nor different assessments concerning cadre policy, and not even assessments concerning the contents of the conclusions of the Ninth LCY Central Committee Plenum as a whole.

We see that the political situation in Kosovo over the last year is characterized first by the fact that the process of emigration has not stopped; second, by the fact that in some political reactions this process has been underestimated and, at best, played down; third, in the last year, there has increasingly been the tendency to equate Albanian nationalism, which is officially described as counterrevolution, with certain nationalist declarations by Serbs and Montenegrins, or what is particularly unacceptable, to equate the counterrevolutionary aggressiveness of Albanian nationalists with the justified dissatisfactions and protests of Serbs and Montenegrins because of the humiliating situation which they have been led into; fourth, in the last year, we have very often been confronted with the phenomenon that some public declarations have talked, above all, about problems only connected with communities where there are still Serbs and Montenegrins. The communities where only Albanians live, are no longer the object of such political attention. It could easily be concluded from this that the problems existing in nationally mixed communities can be solved quickly and successfully by attaining a harmonious national homogeneity, therefore by the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. Finally, a dangerous thesis has appeared on the political scene in the last year, to the effect that one should speak politically and react in the interests of all Albanians in Yugoslavia. This is an introduction into a political program which unites the two reactionary and sinister ideas of an ethnically pure Kosovo and a Kosovo republic.

We should explain these political phenomena openly, in front of all the Communists and citizens of this country, precisely because these phenomena do not meet with the necessary condemnation and measures in Yugoslavia which would otherwise have to follow if the conclusions of the LCY Central Committee ninth session, as well as the Yugoslav Constitution and the LC program, were respected. If we close our eyes to such phenomena, this would mean a direct blow not only to socialism in Yugoslavia but also to Yugoslavia as a state and would mean direct support to the counterrevolution.

The counterrevolution in Kosovo, and above all the pressures on the Serbs and Montenegrins and the emigration under these pressures, were the reasons for intensive political action after the LCY Central Committee ninth session which was supported by all of the Yugoslav public. They were also the reasons for the mobilization of significant material and other forces of society in order to give help to these people, but we still do not have the expected and necessary results, above all, in the most important things such as the safety, freedom, and rights of people. At one of the gatherings in Kosovo Polje, we heard one of the participants answer the question of what is wrong in Kosovo, by simply saying that everything was wrong. As long as one single citizen in this country lacks security or one single child has to be accompanied when he goes to school, everything is wrong.

Therefore, when a part of the population in Kosovo suffers and has a difficult time only because they belong to groups that are constantly in a minority, the accusations which are leveled at them, the pressure, and threats from others, seem like the most terrible political opportunism. This is not the first time in history that those who have been deprived of their rights and are fighting for them, are proclaimed to be the aggressors, but it is difficult to understand that oppressed people exist everywhere in our socialist, humane, and progressive society. It is particularly difficult to understand that the old and hypocritical practice still exists of calling the oppressed socially dangerous and in this context, taking measures to prevent the dangers which they hold.

This argument has been used for centuries to stifle the resistance of classes, strata, and individuals deprived of their rights. Therefore, it is historically absurd that this cynical argument is alive today in a society which attempts to be an example to others because of its humanism, tolerance, and democracy.

The Serbian LC, and I can freely say the working people and citizens of Serbia, are strongly and seriously mobilized to resolve Kosovo's problems. At the just held 12th Plenum of the LC of Serbia we assessed our work of the past year, as well as the implementation of every one of the tasks undertaken, and made conclusions which we unanimously adopted and will carry out completely. But a good part of the solution to Kosovo is connected with changes to the Constitution of the SR of Serbia. These changes should enable Serbia to constitute itself as a republic and in this way free itself from the position in which it lacks authority in performing essential state functions in a part of its territory, even during the time of the counterrevolution.

Change in the constitutional position of Serbia is the basis for establishing the legal, political, and general national security and equality of all citizens in the province, Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Turks, and others. This is also the basis for halting the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. By this I do not, of course, mean that the changes in the Constitution are sufficient to solve the Kosovo problem, but the constitutional changes that are on the agenda now are necessary. After them, it will be easier to implement other changes in the economic sphere, in education, culture, and in ordinary, every day relations among the people.

In Serbia, the awareness of the connection between changes in the Constitution and solving Kosovo's problems is present all the time and has recently been expressed publicly and in great numbers. While various committees, discussion forums, commissions, roundtable talks, officials, and experts discussed whether or not we should have a referendum within the existing rules of the game, a kind of referendum did take place in Serbia. The working people and citizens, without initiatives, and especially without suggestions from peers or the top, said in a nice and concise way what they thought about constitutional changes. They demanded these changes, demanded openness, respect for authority and institutions, and before everything and above all they demanded the respect for the basic achievements of our revolution, Yugoslavia, socialism, and brotherhood and unity. Of course, they also demanded a unified SR of Serbia.

Regarding Serbia, this demand was in the spirit of the LCY tenets and the tenets of the LC of Serbia. They particularly expressed support for the policy of the LC of Serbia and for the Central Committee. Indeed, had it not been for this support, we could have wondered whether we were on the right track. I think that this is the question we should ask ourselves all the time, a question that every leadership should ask itself.

At the meetings of workers in Serbia one could see more clearly than ever before the seriousness, dignity and determination in extending support to the LC policy and the legal organs of Serbia that Serbia be constituted as a legal commune, which it is not at present.

The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo on the one hand, and preventing Serbia from constituting itself as a republic on the other, carry in themselves a danger and injustice that we all see but nobody should allow. We strongly believe that this obvious and huge injustice will not be allowed by the workers class of Yugoslavia. As far as the workers class of Serbia is concerned, it has in fact recently demonstrated sufficiently clear and resolutely that, as regards Kosovo and the Constitution, it does not intend to make concessions or put up with injustice.

We in the LC of Serbia are convinced, as the generations before us were, during and immediately after the revolution, that the interests of the workers class of this country are unified, that they can be realized in socialism as a socioeconomic system and in Yugoslavia as the common home. Had the LC as the vanguard of the workers class lent all its capabilities to the struggle for the interests of the workers class to win political and economic power, there would have been no national clashes and divisions and narrow-minded national interests would have been wiped out with a socially stronger, historically more powerful, and a superior civilized interest—that is class interest. In the name of the affirmation and domination of this interest, we in the LC of Serbian and Serbia in general expect a fraternal, comradely, and above all class solidarity in halting the counterrevolution in Kosovo. Only the hatred of socialism could have set this crafty trap and divided us along lines of nationality in order to stop us from uniting on the class basis.

Kosovo has shown that this is a counterrevolution. If we do not eliminate it, it will spread. This is dangerous for both socialism and Yugoslavia. Thank you.

Korosec Speech

AU3107130488 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0211 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Speech by Stefan Korosec, secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, reporting on activities of the Presidium in preparing assessments and stances of the LCY Central Committee on the arrival and protest of Serbian and Montenegrin nationals from Kosovo in Novi Sad on 9 July, delivered at the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee in Belgrade—live]

[Text] Comrades: The further deepening of the socioeconomic crisis throughout the country aggravates the political situation in which new forms of activities of working people and citizens have emerged, and which is a result of solving the key problems of society too slowly. The LCY's attempts at and precepts of the further democratization of both the LC itself and society have been tested recently. On the one hand, we in the LCY have failed to elaborate more profoundly and thoroughly some essential questions of the renewal of the LC and to attain unity on them, which is to say, questions of the further democratization of the LC and society, something that is a condition for the implementation of the necessary reforms. On the other hand, contents, forms, and methods of work are being offered under the cloak of our striving for democratization, publicity in work, and so forth; these contents, forms, and methods are contrary even to some elementary ideas and practices of socialist democracy and democracy in general.

In the LCY, we are only at the beginning of a transition of the LC to modern and efficient work methods that are appropriate for the attained level of development in social relations and to the changing professional, social, intellectual, or any other structure of the population and the LCY itself, and to methods that are a condition for a faster and better development of entire society. Regardless of the above, and regardless of the initial results in the LCY, we have a frank, conscious, and responsible attitude toward all the initiatives, which includes those that exceed the possibilities of the actual material and political foundations and relations.

Such an approach demands of the LCY a thorough reexamination of the causes of the various forms of dissatisfaction of the working people and citizens, a reexamination of our attitude toward them, and our role in them. The present crisis is only one of the factors in the overall change of the methods and contents of identification, organization, and manifestation of the interests of the working people and citizens.

In the past few months, we have faced work stoppages, workers marches in Belgrade, and other forms of gatherings. In this connection, the LCY Central Committee Presidium has called for a discussion of these questions, and especially of work stoppages, to be held in the LCY Central Committee in September of this year, and has asked that specific stances be taken.

The visiting groups of ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in Belgrade, which in the past few years have become a peculiar way of protesting and expressing dissatisfaction with the grave position of the Serbian and Montenegrin people and the slow solution to Kosovo's problems, were joined by a mass march of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo in Novi Sad on 9 July this year.

The protest meeting that was held on that occasion, the mass gatherings of the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, and especially their arrival in Belgrade, all have a serious political dimension. Their arrival in Novi Sad on 9 July, however, constitutes a special event, both because this was the first march from one province to another and because of the form in which protests and demands were expressed on that occasion, as well as because of the indication that marches will be carried out in other republics.

Bearing all this in mind, the LCY Central Committee Presidium has examined the political essence of the Novi Sad march by ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens from Kosovo, and the political implications of this event. It confirmed its assessments and positions, which it conveyed to the LC and the Yugoslav public.

The Presidium believes that it is necessary that the LCY Central Committee should be acquainted with the activities of the Presidium regarding this event, and that it should assess them, as well as that it should be informed about some reaction to the assessments and positions of the Presidium.

For this point on the agenda, the Central Committee members have obtained assessments and stances of the Presidium, reports by the Presidium of the Central Committee of Serbia and the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina, and other papers distributed to you today.

I further wish to inform you that at the 82d session of the LCY Central Committee Presidium on 28 June this year, the President of the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina reported that he had received information that some 2,000 ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo intended to march in Novi Sad on 2 July this year.

In this connection, the LCY Central Committee Presidium concluded that this question should be discussed by the presidents of the Presidiums of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia, the Provincial Committee of the LC of Vojvodina, and the Provincial Committee of the LC of Kosovo, and that they should take appropriate measures to prevent the march, and report to the LCY Central Committee Presidium.

Since the conclusion of the LCY Central Committee Presidium was not implemented, the Presidium of the Vojvodina Provincial Committee, on 6 July this year, again informed the LCY Central Committee Presidium about the announced arrival in Novi Sad of a large group of ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens from Kosovo. On the basis of this report, a telex message was sent to the Presidiums of the Central Committee of the LC and Serbia and of the Provincial Committee of the LC of Kosovo on 8 July this year; the telex message reiterated that the LCY Central Committee Presidium believes that both presidiums must take the necessary political action to prevent the gathering and the march in Novi Sad from Kosovo.

However, the arrival of the ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens from Kosovo and their demonstration in Novi Sad on 9 July this year were not prevented despite the political activities initiated in the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia. Immediately afterward, political assessments of the events followed and relations began to strongly deteriorate because of the reporting by the public information media, especially between the party leaderships in Belgrade and Novi Sad.

The event assumed first-class political dimensions and was of top-level interest to the LC and the Yugoslav public. At its 86th session on 12 July, the LCY Central Committee Presidium discussed a report by the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of the LC of Vojvodina on the Novi Sad demonstration by the ethnic Serbian and Montenegrin citizens from Kosovo, and it concluded that the Presidiums of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina, of the Provincial Committee of Kosovo, and of the Central Committee of Serbia should assess at their sessions these events, their causes, consequences, and public reaction, and that they should report to the LCY Central Committee Presidium on the subject;

and that the Presidiums—again of the Central Committee of Serbia, of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina, the Provincial Committee of Kosovo—should attempt to keep the further politicization of this event, unsupported attacks on members of our highest leaderships, and articles in the mutual confrontation of the leaderships from appearing in the public information media. Such methods are not acceptable for the LCY.

The Presidium released a public statement on its 86th session, which says:

In connection with the arrival of a group of citizens of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality—I am quoting—from Kosovo in Novi Sad on 9 July and with the unprincipled public confrontations on the eve of, during, and after these events, the Presidium considers politically very harmful the gatherings, demonstrations, and other forms of undemocratic pressure, which misuse the grave situation of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, disturb the intranational relations, and conduct an irresponsible campaign in some media.

The Presidency has concluded that the Presidiums of the Central Committee of Serbia and of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina and Kosovo should immediately assess the said events, their causes, consequences, and reverberations publically, and should inform the LCY Central Committee Presidium about them. The Presidium will discuss this at its next session, adopt stances, and inform the LCY Central Committee.

However, despite this clear political stance on this event, a political confrontation in the SR of Serbia and the LC of Serbia continued and attained unexpected proportions. The Provincial Committee of the LC of Vojvodina held a session and most harshly attacked the most prominent leaders of the LC of Serbia. There was then a harsh reaction to these attacks in the information media, at the sessions held by political forums, as well as at numerous political gatherings throughout Serbia. At its 87th session held on 18 and 19 July, the LCY Central Committee Presidium examined reports by the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of the LC of Vojvodina, the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of the LC of Kosovo, and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia on the visit of Serbian and Montenegrin nationals from Kosovo in Novi Sad on 9 July, as well as on the political consequences of this event. The Presidium concluded in this respect that the Presidiums of the Central and Provincial LC Committees, the Presidium of the LC Organization in the Yugoslav People's Army, and the Presidium of the Committee of the Basic LC Organizations in the Organs and Organizations of the Federation should be sent a telex message demanding the Presidiums of the LC Central Committee of Serbia and of the Provincial LC Committees of Vojvodina and Kosovo to stop at once all polemics among leaderships and leaders, to advise the corresponding SAWP and Trade Union leaderships to stop protest meetings, as well as to advise the founders of the media to stop euphoric and subjective writing and broadcasting in the media and to most urgently inform all communal LC committee presidiums and secretariats of the basic LC organizations in the media. Presidiums of other central committees and committees of basic LC organizations in the organs and organizations of the Federation were also asked to do the same about the unacceptable writing and behavior of the media and about public statements in the media.

After a comprehensive debate at its 87th session, the Presidium established its assessments and stances on the arrival and the protest of Serbian and Montenegrin nationals from Kosovo in Novi Sad and announced these stances to the Yugoslav public. I would emphasize that on the occasion of this event, the LCY Central Committee Presidium and its president have received over 400 telex messages, telegrams, letters, and announcements and similar stances from meetings of working people and citizens, sessions, protest rallies, and meetings of workers in organizations of associated labor, from production organizations, cultural, educational, and health organizations, sessions held at organizations and organs of sociopolitical communities and delegate assemblies, as well as other gatherings. These telegrams were mostly sent from the SR of Serbia. The largest number of telex messages, telegrams, and letters extend support to the leadership of the SR of Serbia, in particular to the president of the Central Committee of Serbia and the president of the Central Committee Presidium of Serbia [as heard] asking them to persist in performing tasks in a consistent manner, particularly tasks in connection with the constitutional changes and a faster implementation of the social reforms that should ensure the setup of all essential functions of the SR of Serbia on its unified territory within the SFRY and should do so in a unified fashion.

The petitions especially stress the obligation that the constitutional changes in the SR of Serbia should be carried out more quickly and consistently. A large number of petitions ask the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium to persist in a consistent implementation of congress tenets, particularly as concerns a quicker halt to the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. They also demand a resolute implementation of the stands of the Ninth LCY Central Committee Session on Kosovo and the stances of the LCY Conference. In this connection, the consistent implementation of constitutional changes and social reforms is insisted upon.

The LCY Central Committee Presidium has thoroughly assessed the political consequences of the arrival of the group of Kosovo citizens in Novi Sad, the one-sided information presented to the public, euphoric commentaries in the media, as well as the political confrontation through statements issued by LC organs and the meetings of working people and citizens. The Assessments and Stances of the Presidium which were distributed at today's session comprise the Central Committee Presidium positions on these events. It is not necessary for me to repeat them, but because of the political lessons that we should learn, it is necessary that I draw the attention of the Central Committee members above all to the following:

First, when the gathering occurred, to refuse to talk with all the gathered citizens from Kosovo, and the insistence of the Vojvodina leadership to talk only to a delegation was not a politically thought-out and responsible gesture. On the eve of the Novi Sad event, during it, and especially in its wake, there were some unprincipled public confrontations, some heedless and basically damaging statements by people from leaderships, as well as accusations with much intolerance, labeling, disrespect for other people's reasoning, and inadmissible personal political defamations which are unacceptable to the LC.

The position of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, that the mass arrival in Novi Sad as a form of political pressure should be prevented through political action, has not been realized. The Presidium also noted that the organs and organizations of the LC of Serbia and of the LC of Vojvodina did not fully respect its warnings and suggestions on the manner and the method of discussing and assessing this case.

The delayed publication of a part of the discussion from the closed session of the Presidium of the Provincial Committee of the LC of Vojvodina contributed to a further aggravation of the situation. Various gatherings and protests after that have also contributed to a further politicization of the relations.

The LCY Central Committee Presidium in its assessments and positions pointed out that it was of decisive importance to mobilize most widely the members, organizations, and organs of the LC, and for them to act unitedly regarding the chief social problems and tasks, the preparation and the implementation of the socioeconomic reform, the changes in the political system, and the further democratic transformation in the strengthening of the unity and responsibility of the democratic forces.

For a comprehensive perception of the political essence and consequences of this event, the reaction to the LCY Central Committee Assessments and Stances is significant. In my speech, I will present only some details:

A majority of the Yugoslav public have supported the LCY Central Committee Assessments and Stance as an ideopolitical foundation for resolving the situation. Activities have been initiated in the organs of the SR of Serbia so as to implement the stances, and they are yielding results. The Assembly of the SR of Serbia has adopted the draft amendments to the Constitution of the SR of Serbia almost unanimously.

Intensified activities by individual members and organs of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia and other organs, as well as the stances by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia in stopping the announced arrival in Belgrade of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo during this session, have contributed to a pacification of the situation.

Although the Presidium Assessments and Stances have contributed to the pacification of the situation, and to a cessation of protest meetings and euphoric confrontations through the information media, the unfavorable consequences of everything that happened in connection with these events have not yet been overcome.

Nationalist forces are attempting to further exploit for their own ends the atmosphere that has been created. It is therefore necessary to identify all the individuals who exploit the sufferings, dissatisfaction, and fear for the future and for the prospects of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo so that they may attain their nationalist aims.

Speaking about the public information media, all the dailies in the country have carried the full text of the LCY Central Committee Presidium Assessments and Stances Regarding the Arrival and the Protest by Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in Novi Sad. Radio and television stations presented extensive excerpts in their primetime news casts.

However, the manner in which the Assessments and Stances were presented to the public indicates that the reception they got in the public media varied, for some of the media obviously tried to present them onesidedly by singling out certain headlines and subheads. At the same time, one also notices differences in the public information media that arise from different understandings of the content of the text or from different interpretations.

Considering that an extensive and detailed report on the reaction to the LCY Central Committee Presidium Stances has been prepared and has been distributed to the Central Committee members, there is no need for me to explain it extensively.

The LCY Central Committee today faces an important question, of how to consistently implement the LCY Central Committee Presidium Assessments and Stances and thus efficiently overcome the existing situation and the negative political consequences arising from it. I think that it would be necessary to direct the action and the stances in the following direction:

First, the LCY Central Committee Presidium has held a comprehensive discussion of this event, and it was rendered down to the adoption of the Assessments and Stances. The LCY Central Committee Presidium therefore proposes that the LCY Central Committee should confirm the Presidium Assessments and Stances Regarding the Novi Sad events. Our basic aim and the aim of this report is essentially a struggle for the implementation of the stances in every community.

Second, the LCY Central Committee should request that organs and organizations in the LC of Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo should, by implementing these stances, determine the specific responsibility of certain officials for their behavior and activities. The organs of the LC of Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo are obliged to solve disputed and unresolved questions primarily through the LC of Serbia in conformity with the LCY Central Committee Stances on the Current Questions of the Implementation of Relations on Which Unity and Togetherness in the SR of Serbia Is Based, and should inform the LCY Central Committee Presidium on solving these questions.

Third, it is necessary for the LCY Central Committee Presidium to follow activities on constitutional changes in the SR of Serbia, to take the necessary positions, and to make sure that an agreement is reached on constitutional amendments that will strengthen unity and togetherness and overcome the existing problems and differences in the SR of Serbia through a democratic dialogue in the assembly procedure.

Fourth, it is necessary that the members of the LCY Central Committee—yesterday, it was said that there are 24 members in charge of communal organizations in Kosovo—and the Presidium's working group for Kosovo more specifically involve themselves in the consistent implementation of the stances adopted at the Ninth LCY Central Committee Plenum, the implementation of specific tasks adopted on the first point of the agenda, and in explaining the ideopolitical political essence of the Presidium's assessments and stances regarding the events in Novi Sad.

Finally, proceeding from the discussion at the LCY Central Committee Presidium and the adopted assessments and stances, I would like to point out in this speech that we do not need to repeat the discussion which we conducted during the Presidium session. We need to hold a proper discussion about all these events next September, and we should prepare this discussion thoroughly.

I think that the main purpose of this discussion should be, I stress, to involve ourselves on implementing the adopted stances, so when in the future similar cases or events happen, the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee can display greater initiative to resolve them more quickly and to prevent unnecessary confrontation among the LCY organs. This event should be a lesson to all of us. Thank you.

Conclusions Reached on Kosovo Situation

LD2907165188 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Jul (TANJUG)—The basic objectives of the Yugoslav program on Kosovo are not being implemented because emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins goes on. The two chambers of the Yugoslav Assembly have therefore today empowered the appropriate federal organs and organizations to urgently take vigorous measures to establish constitutionality, legality, and the protection of the constitutional system in Kosovo.

The conclusions of the two chambers stress that the protection of the constitutional freedoms and rights of all citizens in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, their personal security, and the safety of their property must be ensured immediately. This is in view of the extremely complex political and security situation, and the increasingly aggressive activity of Albanian nationalists, separatists, and of other nationalists and destructive forces.

The chambers request that the FEC and other federal organs and organizations immediately intensify their work on implementing their commitments laid down in the Yugoslav program and to fulfil them by the envisaged deadline.

It is particularly important, the conclusion stresses, that the tasks referring to the efficient functioning by the institutions of the political system, the elimination of violations of the constitutionality and legality, and also referring to protecting the freedoms and rights of citizens in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo be carried out immediately.

The SFRY Assembly, the FEC, and the organs and organizations in the Federation working toward this end will adopt measures to establish personal and collective responsibility for the nonimplementation of the commitments arising out of the Yugoslav Program, including recall, dismissal from office, and other measures regarding their responsibility.

The FEC and other federal organs and organizations are under an obligation to submit to the Assembly by the end of 1988 a comprehensive report on the implementation of the Yugoslav Program. This is in keeping with the tasks arising out of Item 87 of the Yugoslav Program.

The chambers of the SFRY Assembly in particular stress the need for the Assembly of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and for the organs and organizations responsible to it to become fully involved in the efficient, complete, high quality, and timely implementation of the tasks arising out of the Yugoslav Program. The same applies to establishing personal and collective responsibility by the institutions and individuals who do not carry out, who frustrate the implementation, or who procrastinate with the implementation of the commitments laid down in the program.

The conclusions recommend to the Assembly of the SR of Serbia, to the assemblies of other republics, and of Vojvodina, within the framework of the rights, duties, and responsibilities; to immediately undertake everything which is necessary in order to carry out more fully and timely the commitments stemming from the Yugoslav Program. They must also ascertain the personal and collective responsibility of the institutions and individuals who do not carry out, or who frustrate or procrastinate with the implementation of the commitments laid down in the Yugoslav Program.

The appropriate organs and organizations in the federation are asked to adopt measures to accelerate the socioeconomic development of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo.

The consistent implementation of measures adopted for the speediest possible development of Kosovo must be ensured, the conclusions stress.

Polemics Increase at LCY CC Plenum

LD2907222888 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2157 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Belgrade, July 29 (Tanjug)—The session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) which opened this morning has not ended even after 14 hours of discussion on the situation in the Province of Kosovo. One year after the Ninth LCY Plenum, the party forum members are discussing what has been done regarding the adopted conclusions and tasks to settle the situation in the province and stop the migration of Serbs and Montenegrins under pressure from Albanian nationalists and separatists.

Following the introductory address by top party leadership member Franc Setinc, 42 Central Committee members requested to take the floor and nine of them still have to speak. As the debate nears its close, there are increasingly more polemics. The Central Committee today received 23 telegrams. Most of them, in addition to critical remarks, also express support to and confidence in the Central Committee and the efforts to settle the situation in Kosovo.

About 200 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo arrived in Belgrade today to express support to the Central Committee to persevere in solving their problems and then returned to their homes to carefully follow the debate of the Central Committee on television, which has been giving direct coverage of the plenum since this morning.

Although it was said at the beginning of the session that the LCY Central Committee Plenum would end today, it seems that it will continue into Saturday, since it still has to consider two more items on the agenda.

20-Hour LCY CC Plenum Ends 30 Jul

LD3007043588 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0405 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—The Sixteenth League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee Plenum ended here this morning just before 06:00 local time (04:00 GMT) after a full 20 hours of uninterrupted work.

The agenda of the meeting consisted of an assessment of the implementation in the Province of Kosovo of the tasks set by the Central Committee one year ago and some other topical questions of the committee's activities and responsibility for the general situation in the LCY and the country as a whole.

A decision in principle was made at the session for the Central Committee to hold another meeting in September which would deal, after serious and thorough preparations, with the all-round political and security situation in Yugoslavia. [Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian at 1048 GMT on 30 July transmits the following service message:

"We have been kindly asked by the LCY Central Committee Presidium to use, within the framework of yesterday's LCY Central Committee session, the following formulation of conclusions in connection with the second item on the agenda:

"The LCY Central Committee condemns crude slander in which some of its members were called names in public, such as traitors of the people, members of the fifth column, separatists, and similar things. The Central Committee has appointed a special working group and charged it with establishing the facts in connection with public confrontations among some members of the Central Committee, and proposes possible measures of responsibility, which the Central Committee will outline at its next session.

"The working group includes: Simeon Bunic, Milo Djukanovic, Vinko Hafner, (head of the group), Ivo Karamarko, Blaagoja Mitanoski, Borislav Odadzic, Ali Sukrija, and Dobrivoje Vidic."]